

## Notes for Week 13

### 1. Overview:

Three large strands of thought:

- i. Normative Pragmatics
- ii. Semantic Inferentialism
- iii. Metalinguistic Expressivism

### 2. **Normative Pragmatism:**

- a) Sapience vs. Sentience
- b) Contentfulness of linguistic expressions and intentional states must be explained together. (Relationism.)
- c) Pragmatism: explain meaning-content functionally, in terms of use.
- d) In order to discern conceptual contents as expressed by linguistic expressions and possessed by intentional states, must start with their use as specified in a *normative* vocabulary.
- e) Two main contenders for an account of the normativity of intentionality that Kant discovered:
  - i. Teleosemantic (Millikan). This is *selectional* account, appealing to *alethic modal* relations. It develops Peircean pragmatism.
  - ii. Social.
- f) Social account explains normative *statuses* in terms of normative *attitudes* (of taking or treating *as*, for instance, correct/incorrect)
- g) Social account can be either I/we (e.g. Wright) or I/thou.
- h) Idea: Instead of *single*-sorted normative metavocabulary (appropriate/inappropriate, correct/incorrect, assertible/not-assertible), use *double*-sorted normative vocabulary: commitment/entitlement or responsibility/authority.
  - i. Argument upstream: Practices of giving and asking for reasons (cf. semantic inferentialism) require distinguishing both what one is committed to and not and which of those commitments one is entitled to or not. (Social-practical account of “Asserting” in terms of responsibility and authority.)
  - ii. Argument downstream: Double-sorted normative account is much more flexible and powerful. We see this with the *objectivity argument* from *MIE* 8.
- i) Social account of I/thou sort, from (f) can then be implemented by distinguishing, in addition to the two normative *statuses* of commitment/entitlement, the two normative *attitudes* of attributing/acknowledging.
- j) Result is social *deontic scorekeeping* model of discursive practice.

### 3. **Semantic Inferentialism:**

- a) Inferentialism vs. Representationalism.

- i. Historically.
- ii. Conceptually: Reasoning vs. Representing
- iii. Conceptually: Top-down vs. Bottom-up
- b) Intimate connection between speech act of *asserting* and *inferring*.
- c) Inferential articulation and propositional contentfulness as being fit to play the functional role both of *premise* and of *conclusion* in inference.
- d) *Material* goodness of inferences vs. *formal* goodness. Order of explanation is from the material to the formal.

ISA:

- e) Substitution: using the method of noting invariance (ultimately, of pragmatic significance) under substitution as a scalpel to dissect sentential contents.
- f) Anaphora: using inheritance of substitution-inferential content to define tokening-recurrence structures.
- g) *Ascriptions* as incorporating pragmatic attitudes in propositional contents, so as expressing normative pragmatic attitudes in inferential semantic form.

#### 4. **Metalinguistic Expressivism:**

- a) Here a key point is that this is what I make of the idea of Kantian categories. But that is not a theme emphasized in *BSD*, which is the main elaboration of this theme. It is only in connection with Sellars that I came to realize this connection and its importance.
- b) The possibility of formal meaning-use analysis: codifying the relations between meanings (contentful vocabularies) and use (practices or abilities) in meaning-use diagrams that can be built up recursively from some basic elements.
- c) Paradigm is *logical expressivism*, endorsed already in *MIE* (and in *AR 1*).
- d) *Modal* vocabulary.
- e) *Normative* vocabulary.
- f) *Intentional* and *semantic* vocabularies.
- g) The idea, new with *BSD*, that:
  - i. Modal vocabulary articulates semantic inferentialism
  - ii. Normative vocabulary articulates normative pragmatics, and
  - iii. intentional and semantic vocabularies should be understood as articulating the *relations* between what is expressed by modal vocabulary and what is expressed by normative vocabulary.
- h)

#### Phase Two:

##### 5. Two further developments:

- a) Adding the *historical* dimension: the process of determination and development of conceptual contents. (This is a matter of the relation between normative pragmatics and semantic inferentialism.)
  - i. Hegelian story about how *recollective rationality* can reconcile *detectivism* and *constitutivism* about both normative statuses vs attitudes
  - ii. and conceptual contents vs applications of concepts.

- b) Rethinking *logic*: leaving the lamp-post. “From Logical Expressivism to Expressivist Logics.”

6. Synthesizing Four Traditions:

- a) Analytic Philosophy (especially, of language, of mind, and of logic).
- b) American Pragmatism and Neo-Pragmatism
- c) German Idealism
- d) Sellars

Phase Three:

7. Personal professional habits

- a) Philosophers as professional writers. Balancing reading and writing. Suitable daily habits. (“A usable page a day is a book ms. a year.”)
- b) Class preparation of notes, classroom exposition, immediate post-class rewriting of notes gives three successive versions of a telling of a story. By then it is in shape to be a first draft of something.

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