Handout for Week 13: Overview

I. **Three large strands of thought**:

1. **Normative Pragmatics**:
   a) Kant on the normativity of intentionality.
   b) Two approaches: modal selectional-teleosemantic and social.
   c) Normative *statuses* vs. normative *attitudes*.
   d) *Two* normative statuses (not just one: appropriateness or assertibility).
   Practices of giving and asking for reasons require distinguishing *commitments* (responsibiilties) from *entitlements* (authority).
   e) *Two* normative attitudes (not just one: acknowledging or taking-true).
   Understanding discursive practices as *social* practices requires explicitly making the social-perspectival (I-thou) distinction between *attributing* a status to someone *else* and *acknowledging* (or claiming) it *oneself*.
   f) Double-sorted normative account is much more flexible and expressively powerful than single-sorted. (Cf. *MIE* Ch. 8 objectivity proofs.)
   g) Deontic scorekeeping model of discursive practice: what practitioners *do* is to keep track of each others' normative statuses and attitudes, labeled with (measured by) sentences.
   h) Attitude-dependence of normative statuses. Normative statuses are *instituted by* normative attitudes.
   i) Status-dependence of normative attitudes. Normative attitudes are responsible to normative statuses.

   Q: How can these both be true?

2. **Inferential Semantics** (ISA):
   a) **I**nferentialism vs. representationalism about content: two orders of explanation. Categorially, top-down (sentences to terms/predicates) vs. bottom-up (terms/predicates to sentences).
   Start with idea of content as role in *reasoning* (as opposed to being understood in terms of the supposed origins of content in experience). Inferentialism is a kind of semantic *rationalism*. (Erlangen-school constructivism is another.)
   Propositional contentfulness is being fit to play role of premise and conclusion in inferences.
   b) **S**ubstitution: Theoretically discern conceptual content expressed by subsentential expressions (which cannot play the roles of premise and conclusion in inference) indirectly, by the Bolzano-Frege method of *noting invariance* (of sentence-level features) *under substitution*. The conceptual content of subsentential expressions is determined by their role in substitution inferences.
   c) **A**naphora: Unrepeatable tokenings can be understood to be conceptually contentful insofar as they participate in token-recurrence structures determining their role in substitution inferences. These can either be symmetric (*cotypicality* of ideal proper names and definite descriptions) or asymmetric (anaphoric chains or trees of possible tokenings of anaphoric dependents, which inherit their substitution-inferential significance from their ancestors). Examples of the latter are actual proper names and most uses of definite descriptions. Deixis presupposes anaphora.

3. **Metalinguistic Expressivism**:
   a) Kant's idea of *categories*: Besides concepts whose defining expressive task is to describe and explain empirical goings-on, there are concepts whose defining expressive task is to make explicit (put into the form of propositional conceptual contents, that is, assertible, thinkable form) essential features of the framework of practices that makes describing and explaining possible.
   b) Following Sellars (following Carnap): Understanding this categorial expressive role *metalinguistically*. The meaning-use analysis (including diagrams) of *Between Saying and Doing* formalizes and extends this program.
   c) Expressivism about *logic*. What demarcates logical vocabulary is a distinctive expressive role: making explicit material relations of consequence and incompatibility. If one answers the question about the demarcation of distinctively logical concepts this way, the question of the correctness of one logic rather than another lapses. Since according to the semantic inferentialist, those relations articulate the conceptual contents of nonlogical vocabulary, *logic is the organ of semantic self-consciousness*.
   d) Alethic *modal* vocabulary (paradigmatically, subjunctive conditionals) is categorial-metalinguistic in this sense, making explicit the essential *subjunctive robustness* of the material inferential and incompatibility relations that articulate the contents of ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary.
   e) Deontic *normative* vocabulary makes explicit *pragmatics*: the use and function of various vocabularies.
   f) *Intentional* and *semantic* vocabularies should be understood as articulating the *relations* between what is expressed by modal vocabulary and what is expressed by normative vocabulary.
   g) The proper function of *philosophy* is the care and feeding, grooming, application, and exploitation of the metaconcepts expressed by metalinguistic categorial vocabulary.

II. Relations between pragmatics (theory of use or force) and semantics (theory of meaning or content):

4. Pragmatism as a kind of functionalism:
   a) *Semantic* pragmatism: the point of postulating meaning/content is to explain proprieties of use. Semantic vocabulary : Pragmatic vocabulary :: Theoretical vocabulary : Observational vocabulary.
   b) *Methodological* pragmatism: All there is to confer content/meaning on expressions or states is the role they play in the use of expressions or the system of individual abilities.
5. *Ascriptions* make semantically explicit pragmatically implicit propositional attitudes/statuses.
6. *Metalinguistic expressivism* in the form of *meaning-use analysis* codifies relations between the use and content of a recursively generated infinite hierarchy of pragmatic metavocabularies.

III. **Two further programs**:

7. Make explicit the *historical* dimension of *development* of conceptual contents, which is the *determination* (conferral, institution) of the conceptual contents of expressions by their *application* in judgments and intentions. Move from a *static* to a *dynamic* account of conceptual content. (From a Kant-Frege to a Hegel-Wittgenstein picture, from Hegelian *Verstand* to *Vernunft*.)
Hegelian model of the recognitive structure of recollection, as expounded in *A Spirit of Trust*.
On this model we can understand "judge-made law" in Anglo-American common and case law.
Understanding *recollective rationality* is how we are to:

a) Reconcile the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with the status-dependence of normative attitudes, and
b) Understand how the very same practices of using concepts by *applying* them in judgment can *institute* the norms that govern such applications, and so *confer* the contents expressed.
c) Understand the reciprocal relations between *detectivism* and *constitutivism* about the norms articulating conceptual contents.

8. From *logical expressivism* to *expressivist logics*. Breaking free of the lamp-post.
Rethink modern logic from the ground up, on the basis of an expressivist understanding of the task of logic. This means building modality into the ground-floor of logic. And it means formally characterizing material relations of consequence and incompatiblity that are seriously *substructural* by the light of traditional logic. They are nonmonotonic, nontransitive, and characterized by path-dependence (hysteresis) rather than closure.
If a set of premises Γ implies a sentence A (we can write: $\Gamma|\sim A$), then we can say that the elements of Γ are its *explicit* content, and A is part of its *implicit* content. This is literal: if $B \in \Gamma$, B is explicitly *contained in* Γ (and in that sense is part of its *content*). A is *implicit* in Γ just in the sense of *implied by* Γ, so *implicitly contained* in Γ, hence part of its *implicit* content.
Then CT (Cut, or Cumulative Transitivity) says that if $\Gamma|\sim A$ and $\Gamma,A|\sim B$, then $\Gamma|\sim B$. That is, *explicitation*, making part of the *implicit* content of Γ (namely A) *explicit* (moving it from the right to the left of the turnstile), never *adds* (implicit) content.
MO (Monotonicity) says that if $\Gamma|\sim A$ and $\Gamma|\sim B$, then $\Gamma,A|\sim B$. That is, *explicitation*, making part of the *implicit* content of Γ (namely A) *explicit* (moving it from the right to the left of the turnstile), never *loses* (implicit) content.
Together, these two traditional (e.g. Tarski and Gentzen) structural principles on consequence relations stipulate that
explicitation* is always *inconsequential:
making implicit content explicit never changes what follows from a premise-set.
Material inferential practices are not in general like this. Traditional logic, in insisting on montonocity and transitivity of logical consequence relations, cuts itself off from performing its proper expressive task: codifying material proprieties of inference and incompatibility.
We can do better.
We can introduce logical vocabulary that will allow us to explore the *logic of explicitation* in substructural material consequence (and incompatibility) relations.