12/5/2006

Naturalism Week 12:

1.   Intro:
a) The threat of dualism in McD's "liberal" or expanded naturalism.
b) All three essays (Rorty, Ramberg, Price) as responding to that challenge.
c) Also as opening up further avenues (Grover in the museum): Rorty on the big divide within contemporary philosophy, also McD vs. Williamson and Brandom vs. Fodor; Ramberg on Dennett, Stich, Bilgrami, Price on Jackson and Aussie naturalism more generally.

2.   All have in common as a critical strategy the desire to delegitimize the demand for *ontological* naturalism, by diagnosing confusions or mistakes in the set-up. All the "new naturalists" also seek to allow the two kinds of vocabulary, natural and intentional, to co-exist, while rejecting questions about the *relations* between them.

3.   They also share a common constructive strategy: Pragmatic naturalism (naturalism of the subject, rather than of the object). In essence this is being naturalistic about what we are *doing* in talking about things, rather than naturalistic about the things we talk *about*. (See #12 on the handout.) If we can understand propositional attitude ascribing practices, how can there be anything left that is mysterious about the propositional attitudes? (See #6 on the handout.) (Possible analogy: one can be ontologically or semantically puzzled about complex numbers when one realizes that the symmetry of the complex plane makes complex conjugates only relatively identifiable. But as long as the inferences involving them are settled and clear, there seems no point to *ontological* or *semantic* puzzlement about them.) Their idea is to replace a (threatened) *ontological dualism* with a *practical pluralism*. In the end, I will find their pragmatic naturalism both too pragmatic and too naturalistic.

4.   Rorty 1:
I won't say much about Rorty. He is very clear, and can be thought of as offering the fighting faith of pragmatic naturalism. I'll concentrate more of my discussion on Price and Ramberg, where there are more arguments.
Interpretive claim about stages of culture:
a) Philosophy useful in the intellectual wars over religion.
b) Afterwards, two ways to go:
  i. Intellectual history and cultural criticism; or
  ii. A priori atomism of one of two sorts: empirical (experience or consciousness, and how to build up out of it) or linguistic (Frege-Russell, Peirce, *Tractatus*)
c) But there are holist critics of this sort of atomism + a priori construction: later LW. This he, following Leiter, calls 'quietism'. (I myself am a wild-eyed constructive metaphysician holist—like Sellars, not like Rorty or McDowell.)
d) Rorty: "At most, we need is a synoptic narrative of how we came to talk as we do. We should stop trying to for a unified picture, or for a master vocabulary. We should confine ourselves to making sure that we are not burdened with obsolete ways of speaking, and then insuring that those vocabularies that are still useful stay out of

each other's way." (p. 5) We might ask whether "staying out of each other's way" is *enough* to ask of a successor demand to Jackson's "location problem".

e) "Quietists think that no kind of thing is more fundamental than any other kind of thing. The fact that, as Jackson puts it, you cannot change anything without changing the motions or positions of elementary physical particles, does nothing to show that there is a philosophical problem of how these particles leave room for non-particles. It is no more philosophically pregnant than the fact that you cannot mess with the particles without simultaneously messing with a great many other things. Such expressions as "the nature of reality" or "the world as it really is", have in the past, quietists admit, played a role in producing desirable cultural change. But so have many other ladders which we are now in a position to throw away." [p. 12] (See the discussion below at (5c).)

f)   Conclusion: "I hope that my quick summary of the controversies between McDowell and Williamson and between Brandom and Fodor has helped make clear the significance of Price's distinction between two forms of naturalism. Subject naturalists like Price, Ramberg and myself urge our activist colleagues to stop talking about great big things like Experience or Language, the shadow entities that Locke and Frege invented to replace Reality once that became the province of empirical science. For we shall not be able to evacuate the so-called "core areas" of philosophy until we do this.
Object naturalists like Jackson, Leiter, Petit, and Fodor fear that philosophy would lose its soul if philosophers turned their back on Locke, Kant and Frege—if they no longer constructed theories about the Nature of Experience or the Structure of Language, and stopped asking which *really* real entities made sentences about *putatively* real entities true. We quietists think that we would only lose our insular hyper-professionalism. We might find better things to talk about, and then people might once again take an interest in what we are saying." [17]

g)

5.   Rorty 2:
a) Reading of the state of contemporary philosophy (and Pittsburgh's place in it), via the *Naturalism in Question* volume that we are reading and Leiter's *Future of Philosophy*, which we are not.

b) Me Rorty's his *naturalism* and *historicism*, in tension (dualism?). Reciprocal attempted containment of vocabularies under causes (hegemony of the causal vocabulary) and causes under vocabularies (hegemony of the vocabulary vocabulary).

c) On the issue between Williamson and McDowell:
  i. One way of thinking about this issue is whether everything globally supervenes on semantic-intentional plus modal facts: i.e., on what is potentially sayable, meanable, or believable. If it does, then even if everything *also* supervenes on the physical, that fact would not by itself support naturalism, as opposed to, say, intentionalism ('idealism'?).
  ii. For TW, this *is* an issue of idealism.
  iii. He wants to say that there can be facts and objects we cannot conceive. Here there are various options: that *are* conceivable, but not by us, or that are not in *any* sense conceivable, and within the former class, that are not conceivable by us *in practice* or *in principle*. If they are not conceivable at all, we should ask in what

sense they are *facts*. 'Fact' is a schematic sortal, and its principles of individuation depend on *vocabulary* (if not, on what?). And here it does no good to revert to *objects*, for exactly the same thing applies: what *sortal* are they 'objects' under? Sortals are *concepts*, so these things are, if objects, *by definition* 'conceivable' in the sense of falling under *concepts*. So we must be talking about concepts, e.g. sortal ones, that we cannot *grasp*. Now McD wouldn't deny that we might not *in practice* be able to grasp some concepts. But if the claim is that there is nothing that could *count* as using the concepts, that is, no practices that *in principle* could count as *deploying* the concepts, *expressing* them, then we have to ask what we are being asked to envisage when we think of there *being* concepts that characterize the things in question, just not concepts that we—or anyone, any concept users—can grasp.

iv. Williamson, quoted by Rorty:

"…for all that McDowell has shown, there may be necessary limitations on **all possible thinkers**. We do not know whether there are **elusive objects**. It is unclear what would motivate the claim that there are none, if not some form of idealism. We should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects".

Are "elusive objects" ones that can't even be *referred to*? They seem to be ones the concepts needed to identify and individuate which cannot be grasped by *any* thinker.

d) The issue of the coherence of talk of "all possible vocabularies" is to the fore here. The modal separability argument shows us that new vocabularies can identify new *kinds* of things—kinds of things no instance of which is *identical to* (or with) the things picked out by sortals in the *old* vocabulary (though they *might* be *materially constituted by*, or *functionally realized by*, or stand in some other supervenience-supporting relation to, things of the old kinds). In *this* sense, vocabularies *can* let us pick out *new* kinds of things, things we could *not* pick out before. Williamson either thinks that *no possible vocabulary* can pick out the facts/objects he envisages, that is, that for all vocabularies, it is *not* the case that…. Or he thinks that there *is* such a vocabulary, but it is not one that *we*, in principle could ever deploy. But if the reason *we* can't deploy that vocabulary is some contingent feature of us as *humans*, then McD won't disagree: by 'we' he means us vocabulary-deployers. And the idea of a *vocabulary* that in principle *no-one* can deploy seems empty.

e) From the naturalism and historicism discussion: one key concept, and point of contact with Price, is the idea that

i. representation is the concept that expresses *what vocabularies* (any vocabulary, all vocabularies) are *for*, and hence defines a dimension along which we can privilege, say, natural-scientific vocabulary. An alternative is

ii. to restrict the claimed extramural privilege of nat-sci vocabulary to other vocabularies *insofar as* they purport or aspire to *represent* how things really are. (Sellars does just this, with description (-and-explanation) in the place of representation.)

It does *not* seem necessary in order to deny (i) that one go as far as HP does, by denying that there *are* any vocabularies or aspects of them that are properly understood as representational [Q: Would he say the same about descriptive? I

don't think so. It is doing *semantics* in terms of <u>representation</u> that he objects to, and people don't do that for <u>description</u>—I think.]

f)   But if we see vocabularies not only as deploying concepts to serve antecedent needs, interests, and purposes [these three thought of as in order of increasing contingency and specificity], but as also and essentially generating new ones, it seems that the new concepts that are thereby generated will always make accessible new features of reality—new kinds of objects, hence new facts—one that we could not so much as make claims about before. (We need not say that the new vocabularies *generate* the new objects and facts. Some of them will be such that it is part of what they are that they were there before we were able to talk about them.)

6.   <u>Price</u>:
   a)   Two kinds of naturalism: *object* naturalism and *subject* naturalism.
   b)   <u>Priority Thesis</u>: Subject naturalism is theoretically prior to object naturalism.
   c)   <u>Invalidity Thesis</u>: There are strong reasons for doubting whether the presuppositions of object naturalism survive subjective naturalist scrutiny.
   d)   "The possibility of a distinctive subject naturalist approach to the placement issues turns on the fact that…these problems *originate* as problems about human linguistic usage." [75]
   e)   "On one conception, the problem begins with linguistic…data; on the other, it begins with objects themselves." [75]
   f)   Argument: One can question the applicability of the material (object) construal—for instance by considering the possibility of *non-cognitivism* (or an *error* theory) about the subject-matter in question—but *not* of the linguistic construal. [at 76]
   g)   "Object naturalism…rests on substantial theoretical assumptions about what we humans do with language—roughly, the assumption that substantial "word-world" semantic relations are part of the best scientific account of our use of the relevant terms." [78]
   h)   3 Arguments Against Object Naturalism:
      i.   The Threat of Semantic Deflationism
      ii. Stich's Problem: 'Belief' is not sufficiently semantically determinate to pick out one thing rather than another.
      iii. Putnam's Problem (from *Meaning and the Moral Sciences*): there is an underdetermination in applying a semantic theory of reference to 'refers'. For it can both be true that: 'Reference' stands in the relation R* to the relation R*, and 'Reference' stands in the relation R** to the relation R**. "In the light of the role of semantic notions in the object naturalist's conception of the task of philosophy, that task does not make sense with respect to the semantic terms themselves." [83] In connection with (iii) we should note also Rorty's argument [ref.?] that objective theories of reference such as causal theories seem to entail that there must be a definite line to be drawn between cases where we are referring to Ks but have mostly false beliefs about them, and cases where we fail to refer to anything at all. (Think of 'phlogiston' and oxygen, say in Kitcher's discussion of the case.) But there is no such line to be drawn.
   i)   Both the Stich and the Putnam case might be thought to turn on the fact that (as I claim) 'believing' and 'cause' are *schematic sortals*. They do not have determinate criteria of identity and individuation that go with them. At most they have

determinate criteria of application (along with *some* consequences of application). But they function grammatically as sortals, implying that they *do* have such criteria of identity and individuation. This point seconds Price's analysis of Lewis's proposal to identify theoretical terms by their *causal roles*. But he points out that, however well that works for *some* terms, others, (numbers, values, even causes themselves) we need something else to play that role. And the Putnam argument shows that that cannot be a *semantic* notion such as "what we are referring to". 'Referent' is *also* a schematic sortal—indeed, it is a *purely schematic* sortal, since any *object* or *thing* can be a referent, or what is represented.

j) BB: We should distinguish four theses:
   i. Deflationism about 'true' and 'refers'. Note that we should carefully distinguish *within* this view between *explanatory* deflationism (there are no substantive notions of <u>truth</u> and <u>reference</u> that can be appealed to in doing the hard semantic work of *explaining* what *contentfulness* consists in) and *expressive* deflationism (there is nothing we can *say* using the terms 'true' and 'refers' that we can't say without them). The first is correct, the second is not.
   ii. Denying the *representationalist* order of semantic explanation, which *starts* with a notion of <u>representation</u> as the most basic theoretical concept in semantics, and seeks to explain all other features of content and force in terms of it. An alternative is an *inferentialist* order of explanation, which assigns the same role to <u>inference</u>. Another alternative would use *both* notions. Each of these is obliged to explain the other's primitive somewhere in its account. Representationalists typically explain the goodness of inference in terms of set-theoretic inclusion relations among representeds (e.g. sets of possible worlds). Inferentialists take themselves to be obliged to explain the representational dimension of conceptual content in terms of the inferential articulation of what then become visible as representings.
   iii. One might *restrict* representational semantic analyses to some *special* discourses: *descriptive* ones, say, or just *representational* ones.
   iv. Denying that there *is* a representational dimension to discourse or conceptual content, and that a representational account of the semantics of *any* discourse is *ever* appropriate.

Explanatory deflationism in (i) gives good reason to deny the representationalist order of semantic explanation in (ii). But it does *not* give good reason to deny (iii) or (iv). The distinction between what we say or think and what we are talking or thinking *about* is *not* a bit of high semantic theorizing, but part of ordinary talk about talk. It is given more formal expression in the distinction between *de dicto* ascriptions of propositional attitude and *de re* ascriptions: "Adams believed (said, claimed) *that* Ben Franklin did not invent the lightning rod," vs. Adams believed (said, claimed) *of* the inventor of the lightning rod that *he* did not invent the lightning rod." Or: "The Senator claimed *of* a bunch of bloodthirsty thugs that *they* are freedom-fighters." Talking about what we are talking about is an important *practical* strategy for *localizing disagreements*: "The ones you talk about (or refer to) as 'freedom fighters' [now we've stipulated that we're talking about the same folk—not disagreeing about whether freedom fighters in general are bloodthirsty thugs] are in fact (according to me) bloodthirsty thugs." Compare the sly prosecutor: "The defense attorney claims

that a perjurer is a reliable witness." Defense: "No, I claim that N.N. is a reliable witness, and disagree with you about whether *he* is a perjurer." The prosecutor *should* have said (if the point were to be clear about who is committed to what) "The defense attorney claims *of* a perjurer (someone who is, in fact, according to me, a perjurer) that *he* is a reliable witness." After all, Adams did *not* claim *that* the inventor of the lightning rod did not invent the lightning rod.

k) "The difficult opponent [for the object naturalist] is not someone who agrees to play the game in the material mode but bats for nonnaturalism, defending a primitive plurality of ontological realms. The difficult opponent is the naturalist who takes advantage of a nonrepresentationalist theoretical perspective to avoid the material mode altogether. If such an opponent can explain why natural creatures in a natural environment come to *talk* in these plural ways—of 'trueh', 'value', 'meaning', 'causation', and all the rest—what puzzle remains? What debt does philosophy now owe science?" [87]

l) "Without representationalism, the joints between topics remain joints between kinds of behavior, and don't need to be mirrored in ontology of any other kind." [88]

m) Rorty on Price:

"Both Jackson and Price pride themselves on being naturalists, but different things come to their minds when they speak of "nature". When Jackson uses that word he thinks of particles. A subject naturalist like Price thinks instead of organisms coping with, and improving, their environment. The object naturalist expresses his fear of spooks by insistint that everything be tied in, somehow, with the movements of the atoms through the void. The subject naturalist expresses his rejection of spooks by insisting that our stories about how evolution led from the protozoa to the Renaissance should contain no sudden discontinuities—that it be a story of gradually increasingly complexity of physiological structure gradually making possible increasingly complex behavior."

7. Ramberg:

a) While there are many contemporary figures who have earned black belts in Davidson interpretation (certainly McDowell has one, and perhaps I do), Ramberg and Bilgrami are the two Davidson students who are doing interesting new work with the thought of the master, developing that tradition rather than just either expounding his views or criticizing them.

b) Ramberg's intentional perspectivism-contextualism (in connection with Bilgrami's semantic localism). But it relativizes everything to "interests and purposes".

c) His view, like one strand of Rorty's, is from my point of view reductive, in that it treats vocabularies as *for* something, and for something that is specifiable antecedently to the vocabulary being in place: something naturalistically characterizable. It is usefully less radical than Price's anti-representationalism, but falls down at this point.

d) The passage on the relations between reductionism and naturalism that Rorty quotes from near the end of the essay is very suggestive and helpful.:

"Reduction, says the pragmatist, is a meta-tool of science; a way of systematically extending the domain of some set of tools for handling the explanatory tasks that scientists confront. Naturalization, by contrast, is a goal of philosophy: it is the

elimination of metaphysical gaps between the characteristic features by which we
deal with agents and thinkers, on the one hand, and the characteristic features by
reference to which we empirically generalize over the causal relations between
objects and events, on the other. It is only in the context of a certain metaphysics that
the scientific tool becomes a philosophical one, an instrument of legislative
ontology."
   e) [Now walk through the Ramberg passages from the handout.]

8.   The vocabulary-as-tool metaphor: Pro
Rorty's positive suggestion is that we can make sense of normative evaluations of
vocabularies on the model of assessing tools as more or less useful in pursuit of certain
goals or *purposes*. (Cf. #1 and #7 from the handout.) One of the cardinal benefits he sees
stemming from the adoption of the vocabulary of instrumental pragmatism is the
discursive pluralism that idiom encourages. It makes sense to make normative
comparisons of tools once a task is specified. Hammers are better than wrenches for
driving nails. But it makes no sense to ask whether hammers or wrenches are better,
simply *as tools*. Assessment of tools is always relative to a purpose; to describe
something as a tool is only to say that it has a purpose, not to specify some particular
purpose. Similarly, Rorty wants to teach us not to ask whether one vocabulary is better
than another simply *as a vocabulary*. We can say that the causal vocabulary is the better
one to apply if one's purpose is to predict which way one billiard ball will move when
struck by another, or to get someone to say "Ouch". And we can say that the vocabulary
vocabulary is probably better if we want instead to discuss the relations between Blake's
poetry and Wordsworth's.

One of the main indictments of the metavocabulary of representation is that it tempts us
to think that we can make sense of the question "Which vocabulary is better as a
representation?", without having to specify a further purpose. "Mirroring the world" is
intelligible as such a purpose only as an element of some larger practical context. The
root commitment of the representational metavocabulary as a metavocabulary is the idea
that 'representing the world' specifies a purpose that all vocabularies share—or at least a
purpose to which they could all be turned, a dimension along which they could all be
compared. But insofar as this is true, the purpose in question is devoid of any content
common to the motley of vocabularies with which we are familiar. It is an empty formal
compliment that can be paid to any set of practices that deserve to be called 'linguistic',
in virtue simply of some performances counting within them as having the significance of
assertions. The compliment is empty because promiscuous. It affords no grounds for
comparison, for assessments of better and worse. For assertions just are claims about
how things are. That is, we derive our practical grip on the notion of 'representing how
things are' from our practical mastery of assertion: representing how things are is what
we are doing when we make claims.

So Rorty's purpose in introducing the vocabulary vocabulary is not to recommend it as a
replacement for or competitor of the causal vocabulary. It is introduced as useful for
some purposes, and not for others. It *is* intended to replace the metavocabulary of
representations. For that one turns out, Rorty argues, to have outlived its usefulness for
the purposes for which philosophers introduced it: understanding how vocabularies work

in general (and in particular the relationship between the causal vocabulary of modern physics and the intentional vocabulary of everyday life). My purpose in the remainder of the essay is not further to examine that critical argument, but rather further to explore the instrumental pragmatism Rorty recommends to replace the representationalism of our philosophical fathers.

9.   The vocabulary-as-tool metaphor: Con
If we should think of vocabularies instrumentally, as tools, what should we think of them as tools for doing? The purposes with respect to which we assess vocabularies as better and worse, more and less successful, come in two flavors. For we can think of purposes either as they come into view from the perspective of the *naturalist*, or as they come into view from the perspective of the *historicist*. Vocabularies can be viewed as evolutionary coping strategies. As determinately embodied organisms, we come with interests in survival, adaptation, and reproduction. Vocabularies can be useful tools for pursuing those inbuilt ends—particularly the causal vocabularies that enable prediction and secure control over the natural environment. Broadening the focus somewhat, *whatever* it is that we find ourselves wanting or pursuing—whether rooted in our biology, in the determinate historical circumstances under which we reproduce our social life, or in idiosyncrasies of our individual trajectories through the world—deploying vocabularies can be a useful means for getting what we want. This thought is the lever with which classical American pragmatism sought to move the conceptual world. To think of vocabularies this way is really to think of them in the terms of the metavocabulary of causes (of already describable effects).

But vocabularies can do more than just help us get what we already want. They also make it possible to frame and formulate new ends. Rorty says:

> The Wittgensteinian analogy between vocabularies and tools has one obvious drawback. The craftsman typically knows what job he needs to do before picking or inventing tools with which to do it. By contrast, someone like Galileo, Yeats, or Hegel (a 'poet' in my wide sense of the term—the sense of "one who makes things new") is typically unable to make clear exactly what he wants to do before developing the language in which he succeeds in doing it. His new vocabulary makes possible, for the first time, a formulation of its own purpose.

No nineteenth century physicist could have the goal of determining whether neutrinos have mass. No ancient Roman governor, however well-intentioned, could resolve to respect the human rights of the individuals over whom he held sway. No medieval poet could set out to show the damage wrought on an individual life by the rigidity of gender roles inscribed by an archetypal family romance. In fact, pragmatism itself is a prime example: Raymond Williams points out that the words 'problem' and 'solution' had only such rare and specialized uses (in mathematics) at the time that they do not even occur in the King James version of the Bible. (Nor, indeed, does 'happiness'.) Can we post-Deweyans so much as understand the way of being in the world natural to ones whose personal, professional, and political activities are not structured by the seeing of problems and the seeking of solutions to them?

And as purposes wax, so they wane. No physician can any longer so much as try to isolate the choleric humour in a feverish patient. No statesman can aim, like Metternich, to re-establish recognition of the divine right of kings. And it would be a rare contemporary poet who could adopt Milton's goal and write so as "to justifye the wayes of God to man". A distinctive feature of Rorty's discursive pragmatism is how seriously he takes this historicist point about the role of alterations of vocabulary in altering the purposes accessible to us—both by engendering novel ones and by rendering familiar ones obsolete or irrelevant. To think of vocabularies this way is to think of them in terms of the metavocabulary of vocabularies, rather than the metavocabulary of causes. For to do so is to focus on bringing about new descriptions, rather than new effects.

This insight provides another reason to reject the monolithic representationalist answer to the question: What are vocabularies *for*—that is, what purpose do they serve *as* vocabularies? For the representationalist response is that vocabularies are tools for representing how things always already in any case are. It entails that vocabularies can be partially ordered depending upon whether they do that job better or worse. Such a response is at least intelligible so long as we restrict our attention to the role of vocabularies in pursuing the sort of goals that come into view from the broadly naturalistic perspective. Insofar as the point of vocabularies is conceived as helping us to survive, adapt, reproduce, and secure antecedently specifiable wants and needs, limning the true vocabulary-independent structure of the environment in which we pursue those ends would evidently be helpful. It is much less clear what the representationalist picture has to offer if we broaden our attention to include the role of vocabularies in *changing* what we want, and even what we need. From the historicist perspective, insofar as it makes sense to talk about what all vocabularies are for, simply as such, the answer must give prominent place to the observation that they are for engendering new purposes. This function of vocabularies is simply not addressed by representationalist totalitarianism.

These two sorts of purposes—those that loom largest from the perspective provided by the commitments implicit in the naturalist's preferred vocabulary, and those that loom largest from the perspective provided by the commitments implicit in the historicist's preferred vocabulary—fund structurally different sorts of assessments of more and less successful vocabularies, and consequently structurally different notions of conceptual or discursive *progress*. Assessments of the relative success of various vocabularies at achieving purposes of the first kind are at least in principle available *prospectively*. Assessments of the relative success of vocabularies at achieving purposes of the second kind are in principle only available *retrospectively*.

Interests rooted in fundamental features of our embodiment and activities as social creatures transcend more parochial features of our vocabularies. They put even practitioners of discarded vocabularies in a position to assess with some authority the relative success of different attempts at pursuing them. Thus Aristotle would not, without complete re-education, be able to appreciate much of the conceptual progress we have made in physics since his time. But he would immediately be able to appreciate our greater facility at making large explosions, constructing tall buildings, traveling and transporting cargo by air, and so on. For our techniques are simply and evidently better

at doing things he could already perfectly well understand wanting to do—in a way that more accurately measuring the charge on an electron is not something he could already understand wanting to do. We owe the preservation of the bulk of classical Greek philosophy and literature—the repository of their vocabularies—to the admiration of the early Arabs for the practical achievements of Greek medicine. Greek doctors could save warriors from the effects of battlefield wounds and diseases the Arabs knew would otherwise be fatal. That gave them a reason to treasure and translate works of Greek theory that would otherwise have left them unmoved. For the medical practice answered to interests the Arabs shared, while the theory—which the Greeks insisted was inseparable from the practice—answered to interests formulable only in an alien vocabulary. In cases like these, progress in achieving ends can be visible even from the point of view of those speaking a *less* successful vocabulary.

By contrast, the sophisticated interests that are intelligible only as products of particular vocabularies give rise to assessments of success and progress that are essentially available only retrospectively. From the privileged vantage point of (what we take to be) a mature atomic theory of the nature of matter, we can retrospectively discern (indeed, in an important sense, constitute) a progressive path trodden by Democritus, Lucretius, Dalton, and Rutherford, and contrast it with the mistakes of the fans of infinitely divisible cosmic goo. Nineteenth century realist painters, having won their way clear to the purpose of conveying in a picture exactly the visual information available to an observer from a point of view fixed in space and time could then rewrite the history of art Whiggishly, seeing it as structured by such epoch-making events as the discovery of the laws of perspective; medieval painters would not and could not have seen the later productions as doing better what they were trying to do. Assessments of progress in realism of portrayal are essentially retrospective.

Assessments of technological and theoretical progress are evaluations of the relative success of different vocabularies at achieving a fixed constellation of goals. Such evaluation requires that the goals be specified in some vocabulary. The structural difference I am pointing to reflects the difference between goals that are specifiable in all the vocabularies being evaluated, and those that are specifiable only in a privileged subset—in the limit, in one of them. Naturalistic pragmatism allows vocabularies to be evaluated only with respect to their utility for accomplishing the first sort of end. Historicist pragmatism allows vocabularies to be evaluated also with respect to their utility for accomplishing the second sort of end. Naturalistic pragmatism courts the dangers of reductionism and philistinism—as though we could safely dismiss Romantic poetry by asking what contribution it has made to the adaptability and long term survivability of human beings. Historicist pragmatism courts the dangers of smugness and empty self-satisfaction. For it is far too easy to tell Whiggish retrospective stories, rationally reconstructing one's tradition as a monotonic approach to the pinnacle of one's current vocabulary. We can all too easily imagine our scientific institutions falling into the hands of theological fanatics who can describe in excruciating detail just how the revolutionary change from present day science to their loopy theories represent decisive progress along the essential dimension of pleasingness to God—a purpose unfortunately and pitiably no more available from within the impoverished vocabulary of TwenCen

natural science than that of measuring the charge of electrons was from within Aristotle's vocabulary.

Once these two sorts of purposes have been distinguished, it is obviously important to try to say something about how they ought to be understood to be related. It is a central and essential feature of Rorty's developing philosophical vocabulary that it strives to keep both the perspective of the naturalist and the perspective of the historicist fully in view at all times. The reductive naturalist must be reminded that she is leaving out of her story an absolutely crucial *practical* capacity that vocabularies give us: the capacity to frame genuinely novel purposes, and so in a real sense to remake ourselves. The uncritical historicist must be sprung from the dilemma of flabby relativism, on the one hand, and self-satisfied parochialism, on the other, by the reminder that there *are* purposes that transcend vocabularies and permit us to make comparative assessments. The theological fanatics should not be permitted to claim theoretical progress over traditional natural science until and unless that progress can be certified technologically as well. The question is: can they on the basis of their theories both keep the machines running and continue to make the sort of progress at securing common practical ends that would have convinced Aristotle of our greater prowess, and ought to convince contemporary scientists that their successors had indeed made corresponding progress? Pragmatism ought to be seen as comprising complementary vocabularies generated by the perspectives of naturalism and historicism, of common purposes and novel purposes, rather than as restricting itself to one or the other.

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Doing that is thinking of our moral value—in terms of which the purpose and limitations of political institutions and activities are to be understood—as deriving from our nature as essentially discursive creatures: vocabulary-mongers. What matters about us *morally*, and so ultimately, *politically* is not ultimately to be understood in terms of goals available from the inevitably reductive perspective of the naturalist: paradigmatically the avoidance of mammalian pain. It is the capacity each of us discursive creatures has to say things that no-one else has ever said, things furthermore that would never have been said if we did not say them. It is our capacity to transform the vocabularies in which we live and move and have our being, and so to create new ways of being (for creatures like us). Our moral worth is our dignity as potential contributors to the Conversation. This is what our political institutions have a duty to recognize, secure, and promote. Seen from this point of view, it is a contingent fact about us that physiological agony is such a distraction from sprightly repartee and the production of fruitful novel utterances. But it is a fact, nonetheless. And for that reason pain, and like it various sorts of social and economic deprivation, have a second-hand, but nonetheless genuine, moral significance. And from that moral significance these phenomena inherit political significance. Pragmatist political theory has a place for the concerns of the naturalist, which appear as minimal necessary conditions of access to the Conversation. Intrinsically they have no more moral significance than does the oxygen in the atmosphere, without which, as a similar matter of contingent fact, we also cannot carry on a discussion. What is

distinctive of the contemporary phase of pragmatism that Rorty has ushered in, however, is its historicist appreciation of the significance of the special social practices whose purpose it is to create new purposes: *linguistic* practices, what Rorty calls 'vocabularies'. There is no reason that the vocabulary in which we conduct our public political debates and determine the purposes toward which our public political institutions are turned should not incorporate the aspiration to nurture and promote its citizens' vocabulary-transforming private exercises of their vocabularies. The vocabulary vocabulary brings into view the possibility that our overarching *public* purpose should be to ensure that a hundred private flowers blossom, and a hundred novel schools of thought contend.

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Now it is the first lesson of historicist pragmatism that the notion of "all possible vocabularies" is one to which we can attach no definite meaning. Every new vocabulary brings with it new purposes for vocabularies to serve. These purposes are not in general so much as formulable in the antecedently available vocabularies. They are the paradigm of something that Rorty claims (I suggested at the outset, as a lesson drawn from his eliminative materialism) we should not think of as part of the furniture of the world patiently awaiting our discovery of them, but as genuinely *created* by our new ways of speaking. As such, there is no way to throw our semantic net over them *in advance* of developing the languages in which they can be expressed.

10.   <u>Conclusion</u> One way forward: "Towards an Analytic Pragmatism": This is the project of adding *pragmatically mediated semantic relations* to the possibly enlightening relations between *base* and *target* vocabularies that analytic philosophy has always investigated.

11.

12.

13.   Ramberg quotes:
A distinctive feature of the interpretivist strategy as it has been developed after Quine (1960), is that it aims for naturalization without taking the route through nomological or conceptual reduction. Where some see only three alternatives — some form of reduction, outright elimination, or a retreat to dualism — the post-Quinean interpretivist claims to mark out a fourth possibility. [2]

14.   The attempt to settle what the reifications of a vocabulary *really are*, in terms of some other, ontologically legitimizing vocabulary, is itself at odds with a naturalistic view of thought. Pragmatists do not want to say that the mental is really something physical or material. Nor, though, do they want to say that, really, it is something non-material or non-physical. Naturalistic pragmatists are proposing ways to describe ourselves as thinkers and agents that make the philosophical contrast between mind and matter seem to be without any particular ontological point. [2]

15.   The pragmatist is not claiming to solve the mind-body problem, nor to dissolve it. Nor is the problem being diagnosed as illusory, as a product of some form of conceptual confusion, linguistic mistake or general lack of semantic alertness. The pragmatist takes the mind-body problem to be real, but transient. It is a problem we will come to see as idle once we have developed better ways of conceiving ourselves and our relations to our surroundings, once we have developed, that is, better vocabularies. These vocabularies will be better in the specific sense that they will enable us to treat certain items as agents *without* sticking

us with dichotomous schemes of fundamental ontological kinds, the kind of kinds whose relation one to the other cannot but become immediately problematic. The interpretivist strategy is attractive because it holds out the promise of just this kind of improvement in our conception of the capacities that make us persons. [4]

16.   I am about to offer a version of the interpretivist strategy that will enable me to make explicit its intimate connection with a pragmatist conception of rationality and of philosophy. I will be stressing two closely related aspects of this intimate connection. Pragmatism serves interpretivism, in so far as an effective defence of the interpretivist strategy against common objections will appeal to a pragmatic conception of rationality. Interpretivism serves pragmatism, in so far as the strategy becomes, in the context of the conception, a tool for naturalization. [4]

17.   The essence of this view is that in so far as we are dealing with creatures (or machines, or what have you) qua agents, the better theory simply is the one that better rationalizes behaviour. Of the many theories that could be made to account for the evidence, *the optimal theory for IDA has the subject(s) less beset by irrationalities than do alternative theories*.[20] This is to assert an unrepentantly rationalistic version of the methodological constraint on ideal interpretation, one we might therefore label the Rationality Maxim. It will be important to keep in mind, as we assess objections to interpretivism, that RM has what we may call global scope. That is to say, IDA relies on RM to choose between candidates for total theories — or, in anticipation of a later distinction, for total accounts. Just because it constrains theory-choice holistically, RM governs the interpretation of any particular utterance or movement only in an indirect, mediated way. The kind of rationality-judgements we will require IDA to be guided by are going to be over-all judgements of the global state of subjects captured or characterized by various candidate theories or accounts. [6-7]

18.   The naturalizing potential of the interpretivist strategy rests in significant part on what Davidson calls "a bland monism." (Davidson 1970, 214) It is monistic, because it denies the dualist's thought that there are two ontological kinds; mental and physical. It is bland in a somewhat peculiar sense; it also denies the reductivist or eliminativist thought that there is *one* ontological kind of a sort to which our various ways of talking may stand in questionable relationship. The pragmatist thus takes the lesson of Davidson's (1970) argument for anomalous monism to be that we need not worry about the ontological priority of kinds of description, but only about their relative utility for specific purposes. Indeed, the naturalistic pragmatist encourages us to retreat altogether from ontology, advocating a view of language that simply leaves no room for it; the world causes our noises to mean what they do — by way of the complicated patterns of similarity-judgements that we endlessly interacting noise-makers are disposed to produce. [9-10]

19.   What motivates Rorty's use of the concept of a vocabulary, is his thought that it may bring us closer to a philosophical vocabulary within which we may still the ontological urge, the urge that leads us to engage in projects of ontological legitimation. The concept serves this purpose precisely in so far as it allows us to pick out discursive structures in a manner that precludes any attempt to restore an ontologically potent form of the distinction between what we talk about and how we talk about it. [10]

20.   When we claim to be characterizing a vocabulary, we thereby claim to be giving a *basic* account of some set of concepts. That is to say, we claim to be offering reasons for thinking that the interests we invoke, the concepts we analyze, and the manner of the analysis, all are linked in such a way that to use a different kind of concept would, *eo ipso*, be to serve different kinds of interests. Claiming to offer a basic account, in this sense, is not to rule out the possibility of there being — or coming to be — systematic conceptual relations between the vocabulary one thus specifies and other vocabularies. Rather, it is to insist that such conceptual relations will not provide a way for us to keep the interests as is and drop the concepts, in favour of those of some other vocabulary. If we decide to say, for example in a case where one explanatory paradigm replaces another in some area of enquiry, that this is actually what has happened, the conclusion to draw would be that our earlier conception of the vocabulary in question stood in need of revision; we had not fully grasped what we were talking about. What we were working with was a pseudo-

vocabulary; in so far as we had obtained a philosophical analysis of the vocabulary, it was one in which interest and concept turned out, in retrospect, not to be well matched. [11]

Vocabularies are as enduring as interests are, which means that some will be highly transient, and others may be impossible for us to get by without. Like interests, they may be nested, contested, and individuated at cross-purposes. Further, we must not suppose that intellectual history will yield categorical diagnoses; emerging conceptual connections between vocabularies may lead to better, perhaps more comprehensive, accounts of vocabularies and interests, or they may indicate changes in interest, or themselves cause changes in interest. What may appear to one historian as the emergence of a better characterization of a vocabulary will to another appear as the abandoning of a set of goals in favour of another set. Such messiness tends to increase as historical distance decreases, approaching the chaotic at the limit constituted by the present.

Specifying interests, moreover, is itself an interest-governed enterprise — when we invoke vocabularies in our descriptions of social or intellectual evolution, no perspective is possible that is not laden with normative commitments. Similarly, any philosophical characterization of a vocabulary, staking a claim for the basic nature of some set of concepts, will involve a stipulative element. It will embody a proposal for conceiving of our interests in a certain way, a plea for seeing them that way and for assigning them a certain weight. The notion I am characterizing is essentially a hermeneutic one — vocabularies are never neutrally described, and they are never fully given. [11]

21.   this is a claim that the interpretivist strategy is designed to preserve. As a constitutive account of a vocabulary of action, it aims to portray the rules governing the concepts of that vocabulary just so as to ensure the removal from law that Davidson speaks of. The interpretivist strategy does exactly this when it offers us a view of these concepts whereby the very feature that gives them purchase on persons, free agents (as we redundantly say), at the same time renders them unsuitable as predicates of empirical law. A point of portraying concepts as governed holistically by rationality-considerations is to deprive those concepts of the particular kind of stability which empirical theorizing requires of its predicates; to the extent that some putative empirical generalization links psychological concepts in a way that is at odds with the norms governing them, to that extent the content of the generalization itself grows wobbly. This is just the feature of the concepts of the vocabulary that allows us to see ourselves and others as agents. What makes the vocabulary that Davidson aims to characterize the vocabulary it is, is its constitutive relation to agency. [11]

22.   What is really at stake here, what my contextualist account of ideal interpretation puts under great strain, is the possibility of the reification of mental content. On the model of ideal interpretation I have proposed, the interpreter does not eliminate anomaly in behaviour. Rather the interpreter produces a set of devices, alternative theories, which allows us selectively to displace anomaly, deviance from norms of reason, and thus insulate behaviours or behaviour-patterns on which we may want for particular purposes to focus. [19]

23.   It now appears that notions invoked in descriptions of ideal interpretation such as 'the perspective on the world,' 'the total theory of an agent,' or 'the totality of the behavioural evidence,' are misleading. They are misleading at least in so far as they suggest that there is a single, general perspective, defined by a general interest in agency as such, from which determinate thought-attributions and action-descriptions emerge. There is no such perspective, nor, hence, is there such a thing as *the* perspective on the world of IDA's subject. It is better to think of the idealization toward which these terms gesture as consisting in IDA's ability to form simultaneously an indefinite range of interpretational perspectives on some one subject, each of which may constitute its evidence differently. For IDA, with her account of an agent consisting of a set of causally related non-equivalent theories, there is no saying what the subject thinks or does *in general*; looking simultaneously through the various theories that go into an account of a subject, IDA would induce in herself an utterly blurring astigmatism. Determinate ascriptions of content and descriptions of action come only when the subject is regarded through one lens or another, that is to say, for some purpose or other. Thought and action emerge, as particular, interest-governed interpretative perspectives on behaviour are *actualized*. What our thoughts are and which actions we perform depend not only on what we do and what goes on in us and what the world is like, but quite literally on the particular perspectives from which we actually come to be regarded as engaging with the world. *A fortiori*, it depends

on *there being* particular perspectives; I take the actual interaction of interpreters to be a condition of intentionality. [20]

But what the pragmatic naturalists will not allow any room for is a notion of meaning that is not fully exhausted by a rationalizing holistic characterization of speech and other behaviour. Such a behaviour-transcendent notion of meaning treats manifest behaviour as kind of indicator of underlying states. It opens the door for sceptical worries about identity of contents across agents and time-slices of agents of a sort that may remain pressing *in spite of* our successful prediction of speech and other action. It should be dismissed.

24.   This will undoubtedly seem, from Fodor's point of view, like sheer, brick-headed point-missing; if you think *reduction* — or at least the clearly perceived possibility of reduction — is required for the legitimation of causal explanation, then the above method for reinflating the scope of explanatory generalizations will be entirely beside the point. [21]

25.   The version of the thesis of interest- and context-dependency of meaning that I propose is in any case not intended to provide an answer to Fodor's worries about holistic individuation of the *denotata* of psychological predicates (though the paper as a whole is intended to help those not yet firmly set in their metaphysical ways be less compelled by the kind of assumptions which yield Fodorian worries). My concern is with the nature and justification of the generalizations that may be invoked in ideal interpretation, and only indirectly with the problem of their scope. But my difficulties with the two-level account, offered as a response to Fodor, is rooted in an attachment expressing itself also in the difference between Bilgrami's locality-thesis and my contextualism. My doubts are rooted in what may be called whole-hog holism. Whole-hog holists think, as I still think, that any attribution of content and specification of a concept in ideal interpretation involves projections giving *maximally complete* descriptions of the evidence — under some specification. So in fixing concepts locally in terms of selected beliefs, we make implicit reference to some such maximally complete description. The claim I stand by differs from Bilgrami's; as a whole-hog holist, I am made a contextualist by the fact that I deny that ideal interpretation yields any single coherent theory at all of all the beliefs associated with each of an agent's terms, no matter how metaphysically light-weight we make the status of such a theory. The resulting contextualism provides me with an opportunity to accommodate the use of what looks like straightforward empirical generalizations within what is in essence a norm-driven enterprise. This contextualization yields refraction into multiple theories also at the level of the kind of transient, super-fine-grained concepts that are the deliverances of theories of meaning. Context, on the model I suggest, does not select doxastic items from meaning-theory, it selects entire theories of meaning and belief.

No maximally complete description of the evidence is a definitive account of all the evidence there is. Still, the notion of maximal completeness is necessary, it seems to me, to forestall a crippling indeterminacy. However, this constraint operates, as I have stressed, within the context of particular interpretive aims and interest. Theories of meaning may well be trumped-up postulates, abstractions of available resources, but even such theories, such characterizations, are selected among by IDA in settling some context of agency or other. [22]

26.   Since my thesis combines whole-hog holism with contextualism of content, it is in one way more radical than Bilgrami's. It is Nietzschean, in a quite distinct sense in which Bilgrami's is not; it denies that contextually determined meaning and belief refer back to any sort of coherently specifiable totality of ascriptions at all. [22]

27.   What is implicitly at stake here is the scope of the normative diagnosis, as well as the source of its normative force. A person may be convicted of irrationality only on the basis of a judgement of how his or her states of mind are related to one another. [24]

28.   We Rortyans eagerly nod when Stich tells us that "appeals to rationality, justification, and the rest" cannot serve in any substantive sense "as final arbiters in our effort to choose among competing strategies of inquiry." (1990, 21) But we must dissent when Stich goes on to say that we are thereby "in effect, denying that rationality or justification have any intrinsic or ultimate value." The point, rather, is that *nothing* can serve as *final* arbiters in our effort to choose among competing cognitive strategies.

Nevertheless, truth, rationality, and justification could no more fail to be intrinsically valuable than the good could fail to be intrinsically choice-worthy. What ensures this is also what guarantees that *analysis* of these concepts which aims to abstract away from malleable interest and contingent commitment, is normatively sterile — or self-deceptive. [27]

On this perspective, the significance we ought to afford the vocabulary of agency — its "ontological status" — is a function of our ability to link it up with a vocabulary of science. It could in principle be that in spite of its utility this vocabulary is actually ontologically inadequate. It could come to stand revealed, by philosophy, as invalid.

For the pragmatic naturalist, the argument runs in the other direction; the irrelevance of the prospects of reduction to the run-of-the-mill purposes and interests served by our vocabulary of agency suggests that the naturalisation of this vocabulary has little to do with the supposed philosophical validity that reduction is alleged to provide. [29]

29.   It is easy, perhaps, in thus objecting to interpretivism in the guise of Dennett's intentional stance, to lose sight of the fact that the fate of the vocabulary of intentional states is not, on the pragmatist's view, confined to the question of which predictive strategy is most reliable, or detailed, or elegant or precise or accurate. As much at issue is the question of what it is that is to be predicted. What we folk (psychologists) care about, typically, is not how people move various parts of their bodies, but what it is that we do by so moving them. And, again typically, whatever predicates we settle on in our descriptions of bodily movements, these are predicates agents can satisfy by moving their bodies in slightly, perhaps very, different ways. Such differences we generally want the predicates of our folk-psychological vocabulary to be insensitive to. What makes different movements instances of the same type of action, are the interests that give applicability to the predicates explicated by ideal interpretation. [30]

30.   Dennett (1991a) reveals his pragmatist stripes when he defends the integrity of folk psychology precisely by arguing the irreducibility of the types of this vocabulary to the predicates of some other vocabulary. [30]

31.   If the argument in Section IV has merit, the identification of actions is not only interest-dependent in a general way; the nature of these interests is such as to make the identity of intentional states (and thus actions) dependent on actual contexts of interaction. There is no fixing the elements of the subjective perspective of an agent on the world as such. To see an item as an agent, then, is not only to see the item as autonomous with respect to the categories of empirical law. It is also to see that item as possessing a nature beyond what any determinate attribution of thought will make explicit; where agents are concerned there is, to paraphrase Heidegger, always more being than theory. I suggest that this is a constitutive feature of the vocabulary of agency — i.e., a part of what it is to consider some item as an agent. [30]

32.   The pragmatic naturalist, by contrast, treats the gap itself, that which transforms reduction into a philosophical project, as a symptom of dysfunction in our philosophical vocabulary. Pragmatic naturalism does not aim at conceptual reduction, but at a transformation of those conceptual structures we rely on to sustain our sense of a metaphysical gap between those items we catch in our vocabulary of thought and agency, and those items we describe in our vocabularies of causal regularities. It is in the context of this metaphilosophical project that the interpretive strategy as wielded by Dennett and endorsed by Rorty emerges as a naturalizing one. It is not merely non-reductive, it is anti-reductionist; it seeks to free us from those philosophical perceptions that transform reductive enterprises into tests for ontological legitimacy. [31]

33.   I have just proposed a view of philosophy that emphasizes the distinctiveness of the vocabulary of intentional states, of agency, and which ties philosophy as an enterprise to that distinctiveness. This may seem to place me at odds with Rorty (1997), who invokes the lack of sharp individuation-criteria for vocabularies to doubt that the "gulfs" between intentional psychology and physics and between (as his example has it) biology and physics, respectively, are "not equally wide, and of the same sort." (?) In both cases, we are just distinguishing vocabularies on the basis of distinct purposes. For Rorty, no vocabulary, or division of vocabularies, is philosophically special or privileged. There is an important truth to this, but I

think its significance may be slanted by Rorty's fear of reason. The truth is that there is no other measure for critical evaluation of what we do or want than other things we do or want; there is no critique or justification that transcends the contingencies of need and interest, contingencies that give our vocabularies their shape. Recognizing this, however, does not force us to give up the idea that philosophy has a constitutive relation to the norms of reason. To insist on this relation, in the context of the interpretivist strategy, is just another way of stressing the point that philosophy is reflection on *praxis*. [32]

34.   Rorty strives to naturalize our conception of philosophical reflection by thinking of it as an adaptive activity of natural creatures. We should, he urges, learn to think of ourselves in terms such that there no longer appears to be anything *conceptually* or *philosophically* mysterious about our being embodied thinkers, or agents in a world of causes. The interpretivist strategy naturalizes precisely in so far as it frees us from worries about the "ontological status" of the kinds that constitute the *denotata* of our various ways of describing things. While Rorty's naturalism is in important ways Quinian, it is not Quine's naturalism, nor that of Quine's more scientistic descendants. By resisting the scientistic urge that informs both realism and eliminativism, the pragmatic naturalist insists that questions of what sort of predictive vocabulary to apply when, and to what — or whom, are questions that by their nature will not be contained within the scope of theoretical criteria of theory-choice. As questions of vocabulary choice, such questions resist methodological resolution. Neither mounting scientific knowledge nor the increasingly sophisticated theoretical superstructure of methodology raised upon it by philosophy of science will, all by itself, tell us under what aspects we should care about things. [33]

35.   But what pragmatic naturalists with one hand take away from philosophy — the idea of ontology (whether as metaphysics or natural science) as a substantive enquiry into the legitimacy of vocabularies — they return with the other; we are left with a conception of philosophy as aiding our practical and ethical deliberations, our experimentations, by imaginatively providing alternatives to what begins to look like conceptual hang-ups and fixed ideas ('intuitions'), and depicting altered self-conceptions for us to try out. On this view, the job of a philosopher is to make vivid how our practices might change if we were to describe things — particularly human beings — in altered vocabularies, or if we extend particular vocabularies into new domains. This intellectual practice is not so much a pursuit of truth as it is a pursuit of alternative perspectives on the relevance to each other of various ways of making truth-claims. It is exemplified by the pragmatic naturalist's promotion of the interpretive strategy. [34]

36.   The interpretivist strategy undermines (as I have argued in sections III, IV and V) the reification of mental content and of subjecthood. At the same time, the strategy also frees the notion of reason from the transcendental aspirations in which it has been embedded (as I try to show in sections VI, and VII), and makes a notion of reason available for a pragmatized conception of philosophy. These two aspects of the naturalizing effects of the strategy are related. Both follow from a characterization of a vocabulary of reflection that aims to extricate our notion of agency and personhood from the dualistic, dichotomizing elements in the conception of subject and object that have come to be dominant in the modern stage of the narrative that Plato launched. These elements are what condition the opposition between reason and contingent creaturely need, and they are what makes 'ontology' — the reductive reconnection of metaphysically ranked vocabularies — appear both as a domain of substantive enquiry and as a pressing task. Some of these elements are, to our detriment, still powerfully entrenched in our common vocabulary of the mental. They are no less active in the tough-minded resolve of contemporary physicalism than in the species-aggrandizing conceits of the early dualists of the modern era. Although they are still shaping conceptions of philosophical problems and of the tasks of philosophy, these elements are not presuppositions of philosophical reflection. In seeking to give them the slip, Rorty is engaging in the distinctively philosophical project of providing a reasoned view of better ways of being human. [34]