

Week 6 Passages
Being and Time §§31-34

State-of-mind is one of the existential structures in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is understanding. A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood. If we Interpret understanding as a fundamental *existentiale*, this indicates that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's Being. On the other hand, 'understanding' in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from 'explaining'), must, like explaining, be Interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the "there" in general. [§31 182]

To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there", is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; its Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there', as that for the sake of which Dasein is. In the "for-the-sake-of-which", **existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called "understanding"**. In the understanding of the "for-the-sake-of-which", the significance which is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it. The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" and of significance equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world. Significance is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such. **To say that the "for-the-sake-of-which" and significance are both disclosed in Dasein, means that Dasein is that entity which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself.** [§31 182]

The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. **Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility.** The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern with the 'world', as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to **Dasein's potentiality-for-Being towards itself, for the sake of itself.** [§31 183]

[P]ossibility as an *existentiale* is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically. [§31 183]

Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself-thrown possibility through and through. [§31 183]

Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of. [§31 184]

That which is ready-to-hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole of a possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand. But even the 'unity' of the manifold present-at-hand, of Nature, can be discovered only if a possibility of it has been disclosed. [§31 184]

the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call "projection" [Entwurf]. [§31 185]

The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being. [§31 185]

the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects--that is to say, possibilities. [§31 185]

Understanding *can* devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the "for-the-sake-of-which"; that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either **authentic**, arising out of one's own Self as such, or inauthentic. [§31 186]

Because understanding, in every case, pertains rather to Dasein's full disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, this diversion of the understanding is an existential modification of projection as a whole. In understanding the world, Being-in is always understood along with it, while understanding of existence as such is always an understanding of the world. As factical Dasein, any Dasein has already diverted its potentiality-for-Being into a possibility of understanding. [§31 186]

Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways of its Being which we have already noted: as **the circumspection [Umsicht] of concern**, as **the considerateness [Rucksicht] of solicitude**, and as **that sight which is directed upon Being as such** [Sicht auf das Sein als solches], for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. [§31 186]

In existing, entities sight 'themselves' [sichtet "sich"] only in so far as they have become transparent to themselves with equal primordially in those items which are constitutive for their existence: their Being-alongside the world and their Being-with Others. [§31 187]

The disclosedness of the "there" in understanding is itself a way of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. In the way in which its Being is projected both upon the "for-the-sake-of-which" and upon significance (the world), there lies the disclosedness of Being in general. [§31 187]

An entity whose kind of Being is the essential projection of Being-in-the-world has understanding of Being, and has this as constitutive for its Being. [§31 188]

As *existentialia*, states-of-mind and understanding characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. By way of having a mood, Dasein 'sees' possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being has been delivered over to the Fact of its thrownness into the "there". [§31 188]

As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities. This Being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a potentiality-for-Being, and **it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust [Rückschlag] upon Dasein**. The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility--that of developing itself [sich auszubilden]. **This development of the understanding we call "interpretation"**. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. [§32 188]

To say that "circumspection discovers" means that the 'world' which has already been understood comes to be interpreted. **The ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the sight which understands**. [§32 189]

That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its "in-order-to", and taken apart **as such-that** which is explicitly understood—has **the structure of something as something**. [§32 189]

If we tell what it is for [des Wozu], we are not simply designating something; but that which is designated is understood *as* that *as* which we are to take the thing in question. That which is disclosed in understanding that which is understood--is already accessible in such a way that its 'as which' can be made to stand out explicitly. **The 'as' makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation**. In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what we have thus interpreted [Ausgelegte] need not necessarily be also taken apart [auseinander zu legen] by **making an assertion** which definitely characterizes it. Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets. [§32 189]

In the mere encountering of something, it is understood in terms of a totality of involvements; [§32 189]

That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the 'something as something'; and this Articulation lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it. [§32 190]

When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the "as", is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands. It is not more primordial than that kind of seeing, but is derived from it. [§32 190]

But if we never perceive equipment that is ready-to-hand without already understanding and interpreting it, and if such perception lets us circumspectively encounter something as something, does this not mean that in the first instance we have experienced something purely present-at-hand, and then taken it as a door, as a house? This would be a misunderstanding of the specific way in which interpretation functions as disclosure. **In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it;** but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. [§32 190-1]

Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. [§32 191]

[D]o the forestructure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation show an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of projection? And does this phenomenon point back to a primordial state of Dasein's Being? [§32 192]

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein--that is, when they have come to be understood--we say that they have meaning [Sinn] . But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verstandlichkeit] of something maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "meaning" . The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation Articulates. *Meaning is the "upon-which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something ; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception.* In so far as understanding and interpretation make up the existential state of Being of the "there", "meaning" must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. **Meaning is an *existentiale* of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'.** Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-

world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful [sinnvoll] or meaningless [sinnlos]. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed with its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding. [§32 192-3]

Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted...

But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up. What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. [§32 194,195]

...understanding, in accordance with its existential meaning, is Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being. [§32 195]

The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure. If, however, we note that 'circularity' belongs ontologically to a kind of Being which is present-at-hand (namely, to subsistence [Bestand]), we must altogether avoid using this phenomenon to characterize anything like Dasein ontologically. [§32 195]

For one thing, it can be demonstrated, by considering assertion, in what ways the structure of the 'as', which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified. When this has been done, both understanding and interpretation will be brought more sharply into view. For another thing, the analysis of assertion has a special position in the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive period when ancient ontology was beginning, the logos functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically *is* [zu eigentlich Seienden], and for defining the Being of such entities. Finally assertion has been accepted from ancient times as the primary and authentic 'locus' of *truth*. The phenomenon of truth is so thoroughly coupled with the problem of Being that our investigation, as it proceeds further, will necessarily come up against the problem of truth; and it already lies within the dimensions of that problem, though not explicitly. The analysis of assertion will at the same time prepare the way for this latter problematic. [§33 196]

In what follows, we give three significations to the term "assertion".

1. The primary signification of "assertion" is "pointing out" [Aufzeigen]. In this we adhere to the primordial meaning of *logos* as *apophansis*—letting an entity be seen from itself. In the assertion 'The hammer is too heavy', what is discovered for sight is not a 'meaning', but an entity in the way that it is ready-to-hand. [§33 196]

2. "Assertion" means no less than "predication". [§33 196]

Every predication is what it is, only as a pointing-out. The second signification of "assertion" has its foundation in the first. Within this pointing-out, the elements which are Articulated in predication—the subject and predicate—arise. It is not by giving something a definite character that we first discover that which shows itself--the hammer—as such; but when we give it such a character, our seeing gets restricted to it in the first instance, so that by this *explicit* restriction of our view, that which is already manifest may be **made explicitly manifest** in its definite character. In giving something a character, we must, in the first instance, **take a step back** when confronted with that which is already manifest--the hammer that is too heavy. In 'setting down the subject', **we dim entities down** to focus in 'that hammer there', so that by thus dimming them down we may let that which is manifest be seen in its own definite character as a character that can be determined. [§33 197]

3. "Assertion" means "communication" [Mitteilung] , speaking forth [Heraussage]. As communication, it is directly related to "assertion" in the first and second significations. It is letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character. [§33 197]

The three significations of 'being valid' which we have set forth--the way of Being of the ideal, Objectivity, and bindingness--not only are opaque in themselves but constantly get confused with one another. [§33 198]

M&R note: Heidegger uses three words which might conveniently be translated as 'validity': 'Geltung' (our 'validity'), 'Gültigkeit' (our 'valid character'), and 'Gelten' (our 'being valid', etc.). Verbindlichkeit, "Allgemeingültigkeit".'

If we bring together the three significations of 'assertion' which we have analysed, and get a unitary view of the full phenomenon, then we may define "assertion" as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates". [§33 199]

By what existential-ontological modifications does assertion arise from circumspective interpretation? [§33 200]

Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or perform something, turns into something 'about which the assertion that points it out is made. [§33 200]

Within this discovering of presence-at-hand, which is at the same time a covering-up of readiness-to-hand, something present-at hand which we encounter is given a definite character in

its Being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner. Only now are we given any access to *properties* or the like. [§33 200]

The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is understood, the 'as' no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements. As regards its possibilities for Articulating reference-relations, it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality. The 'as' gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand. It dwindles to the structure of just letting one see what is present-at-hand, and letting one see it in a definite way. This levelling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the "as" with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain possibility of exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it.

Thus assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands. The primordial 'as' of an interpretation (*hermeneia*) which understands circumspectively we call the "existential-hermeneutical" in distinction from the "apophantical 'as' " of the assertion. [§33 200]

When considered philosophically, the *logos* itself is an entity, and, according to the orientation of ancient ontology, it is something present-at-hand. [§33 201]

If the phenomenon of the 'as' remains covered up, and, above all, if its existential source in the hermeneutical 'as' is veiled, then Aristotle's phenomenological approach to the analysis of the *logos* collapses to a superficial 'theory of judgment', in which judgment becomes the binding or separating of representations and concepts. [§33 202]

By demonstrating that assertion is derived from interpretation and understanding, we have made it plain that the 'logic' of the *logos* rooted in the existential analytic of Dasein. [§34 203]

...we have gained a sharper insight into the fact that the methodological basis on which ancient ontology arose was not a primordial one. The *logos* gets experienced as something present-at-hand and Interpreted as such, while at the same time the entities which it points out have the meaning of presence-at-hand. This meaning of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, so that Being in the sense of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneously, and we are unable even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. [§34 203]

The fundamental existentialia which constitute the Being of the "there", the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. In understanding, there lurks the possibility of interpretation that is, of appropriating what is understood. In so far as a state-of-mind is equiprimordial with an act of understanding, it maintains itself in a certain

understanding. Thus there corresponds to it a certain capacity for getting interpreted. We have seen that **assertion is derived from interpretation, and is an extreme case of it**. In clarifying the third signification of assertion as communication (speaking forth), we were led to the concepts of "saying" and "speaking", to which we had purposely given no attention up to that point. **The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time** will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness. **The existential ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk [Rede]**. This phenomenon is one of which we have been making constant use already in our foregoing Interpretation of state-of-mind, understanding, interpretation, and assertion; but we have, as it were, kept it suppressed in our thematic analysis.

Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding. [§35 203]

Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the "totality-of-significations" [Bedeutungsganze]. This can be dissolved or broken up into significations. Significations, as what has been Articulated from that which can be Articulated, always carry meaning [. . . sind . . . sinnhaft] . **If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the "there", is a primordial existiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world**, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly. The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world--an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind--expresses itself as discourse. The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is put into words. To significations, words accrue. But **word-Things do not get supplied with significations.** [§35 204]

The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. [**Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache.**] Language is a totality of words--a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. Language can be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand. **Discourse is existentially language, because that entity whose disclosedness it Articulates according to significations, has, as its kind of Being, Being-in-the-world**—a Being which has been thrown and submitted to the 'world'. [§35 204]

Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concerned Being-with-one-another. Such Being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as **talking in the way of 'giving a talk'**. [§35 204]

That which the discourse is about [das Worüber der Rede] does not necessarily or even for the most part serve as the theme for an assertion in which one gives something a definite character....

What the discourse is about [das Worüber der Rede] is a structural item that it necessarily possesses; for discourse helps to constitute the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, and in its own structure it is modelled upon this basic state of Dasein. [§35 205]

In any talk or discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such [ein Geredetes als solches]-something said as such [das . . . Gesagte als solches]... In this "something said", discourse communicates. [§34 205]

'Communication' in which one makes assertions—giving information, for instance—is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially. In this more general kind of communication, the Articulation of Being with one another understandingly is constituted. Through it a co-state-of-mind [Mitbefindlichkeit] gets 'shared', and so does the understanding of Being-with. Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. [§34 205]

Whenever something is communicated in what is said-in-the-talk, all talk about anything has at the same time the character of expressing itself [Sichaussprechens]. In talking, Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich . . . aus] not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, but because as Being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. [§34 205]

In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind) is articulated according to significations; and discourse is this articulation.

The items constitutive for discourse are:

what the discourse is about (what is talked about);

what is said-in-the-talk, as such;

the communication;

and the making-known.

These are not properties which can just be raked up empirically from language. They are existential characteristics rooted in the state of Dasein's Being, and it is they that first make anything like language ontologically possible. [§34 206]

We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself--hearing....Hearing is

constitutive for discourse....Listening to . . . is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears, because it understands. **As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is 'in thrall' to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thralldom it "belongs" to these. Being-with develops in listening to one another** [Aufeinander-horen]... [§34 206]

It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening [Horchen] becomes possible. Harkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology--the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Harkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. **What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle.** We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling.

It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 'sensations'; [§34 207]

Because discourse is constitutive for the Being of the "there" (that is, for states-of-mind and understanding), while "Dasein" means Being-in-the-world, Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself. **Dasein has language.** [§34 208]

Man shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that **he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself.** The Greeks had no word for "language"; they understood this phenomenon 'in the first instance' as discourse. But because the *logos* came into their philosophical ken primarily as assertion, this was the kind of logos which they took as their clue for working out the basic structures of the forms of discourse and its components. Grammar sought its foundations in the 'logic' of this logos. But this logic was based upon the ontology of the present-at-hand. [§34 208-9]

we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance with significations; and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences. [§34 209]

In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein's

kind of Being, or is it neither of these? What kind of Being does language have, if there can be such a thing as a 'dead' language ? What do the "rise" and "decline" of a language mean ontologically? [§34 209]

Philosophical research will have to dispense with the 'philosophy of language' if it is to inquire into 'the 'things themselves' and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually. [§34 209-10]

what are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being-in-the world, so far as the latter, as something which is everyday, maintains itself in the kind of Being of the "they"? Does the "they" have a state-of-mind which is specific to it, a special way of understanding, talking, and interpreting? [§34 210]

Is not Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, thrown proximally right into the publicness of the "they"? [§34 210]

The expression 'idle talk' ["Gerede"] is not to be used here in a 'disparaging' signification. Terminologically, it signifies a positive phenomenon which constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein's understanding and interpreting. For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language. [§35 211]