

Passages from *Being and Time* §19-§30

"By substance we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be. "x The Being of a 'substance' is characterized by not needing anything. That whose Being is such that it has no need at all for any other entity satisfies the idea of substance in the authentic sense. [§19 125]

BB: Substantiality as atomistic independence—by contrast to holistic *Zuhandenheit*.

Thus the ontological grounds for defining the 'world' as *res extensa* have been made plain: they lie in the idea of substantiality, which not only remains unclarified in the meaning of its Being, but gets passed off as something incapable of clarification. [§19 127]

...those entities with whose Being as *extensio* Descartes equates the Being of the 'world'. The only genuine access to them lies in knowing [*Erkennen*], *intellectio*, in the sense of the kind of knowledge [*Erkenntnis*] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped...That which is accessible in an entity through mathematics, makes up its Being. [§21 128]

Thus his ontology of the world is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he chances to esteem very highly, but rather **by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.** [§21 129]

If one is oriented primarily by Thinghood, these latter qualities must be taken as non-quantifiable value-predicates by which what is in the first instance just a material Thing, gets stamped as something good. But with this stratification, we come to those entities which we have characterized ontologically as equipment ready-to-hand. The Cartesian analysis of the 'world' would thus enable us for the first time to build up securely the structure of what is proximally ready-to-hand; all it takes is to round out the Thing of Nature until it becomes a full-fledged Thing of use, and this is easily done. [§21 132]

Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-at-hand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. They would have their sole ultimate ontological source in our previously laying down the actuality of Things as the fundamental stratum. [§21 132]

- 1 . Why was the phenomenon of the world passed over at the beginning of the ontological tradition which has been decisive for us (explicitly in the case of Parmenides), and why has this passing-over kept constantly recurring?
2. Why is it that, instead of the phenomenon thus passed over, entities within-the-world have intervened as an ontological theme?
- 3· Why are these entities found in the first instance in 'Nature'?
- 4· Why has recourse been taken to the phenomenon of value when it has seemed necessary to round out such an ontology of the world? [§21 133]

Our study of Dasein's spatiality and the way in which the world is spatially determined will take its departure from an analysis of what is ready-to-hand in space within-the-world. We shall consider three topics:

1. the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world (Section 22);
2. the spatiality of Being-in-the-world (Section 23);
- 3· space and the spatiality of Dasein (Section 24).

We have been talking about what is proximally ready-to-hand. This means not only those entities which we encounter first before any others, but also those which are 'close by'. What is ready-to-hand in our everyday dealings has the character of closeness. To be exact, this closeness of equipment has already been intimated in the term 'readiness-to-hand', which expresses the Being of equipment. [§22 135]

In each case the place is the definite 'there' or 'yonder' ["Dort" und "Da"] of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere. Its belonging somewhere at the time [Die jeweilige Zugehörigkeit] corresponds to the equipmental character of what is ready-to-hand; that is, it corresponds to the belonging-to [Zugehörigkeit] which the ready-to-hand has towards a totality of equipment in accordance with its involvements. [§22 136]

Regions are not first formed by things which are present-at-hand together; they always are ready-to-hand already in individual places. Places themselves either get allotted to the ready-to-hand in the circumspection of concern, or we come across them. Thus anything constantly ready-to-hand of which circumspective Being-in-the-world takes account beforehand, has its place. [§22 137]

The 'environment' does not arrange itself in a space which has been given in advance; but its specific worldhood, in its significance, articulates the context of involvements which belongs to some current totality of circumspectively allotted places. [§22 138]

When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantly that they are 'sitting on his nose', they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall. [§23 141]

As de-severant Being-in, Dasein has likewise the character of directionality. Every bringing-close [Näherung] has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close [sich nähert], so that one can come across it with regard to its place. Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives directionality. In this concern—that is, in the Being-in-the-world of Dasein itself—a supply of 'signs' is presented. Signs, as equipment, take over the giving of directions in a way which is explicit and easily manipulable. They keep explicitly open those regions which have been used circumspectively—the particular "whithers" to which something belongs or goes, or gets brought or fetched. If Dasein is, it already has, as directing and de-severing, its own discovered region. Both directionality and de-severance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern. Out of this directionality arise the fixed directions of right and left. Dasein constantly takes these directions along with it, just as it does its de-severances. [§23 143]

In the phenomenon of the **region** we have already indicated that on the basis of which space is discovered beforehand in Dasein. By a 'region' we have understood the "whither" to which an equipment context ready-to-hand might possibly belong, when that context is of such a sort that it can be encountered as directionally de-severed—that is, as having been placed. This belongingness [Gehorigkeit] is determined in terms of the significance which is constitutive for the world, and it articulates the "hither" and "thither" within the possible "whither". In general the "whither" gets prescribed by a referential totality which has been made fast in a "for-the-sake-of-which" of concern, and within which letting something be involved by freeing it, assigns itself. With anything encountered as ready-to-hand there is always an involvement in [bei] a region. To the totality of involvements which makes up the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, there belongs a spatial involvement which has the character of a region. [§24 145]

The homogeneous space of Nature shows itself only when the entities we encounter are discovered in such a way that the worldly character of the ready-to-hand gets specifically deprived of its worldhood. [§24 145]

Our chapter on the 'who' of the average Dasein will thus be divided up as follows:

1. an approach to the existential question of the "who" of Dasein (Section 25);
2. the Dasein-with Others, and everyday Being-with (Section 26);
3. everyday Being-one's-Self and the "they" (Section 27). [§25 150]

The answer to the question of who Dasein is, is one that was seemingly given in Section 9, where we indicated formally the basic characteristics of Dasein. **Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine.** [§25 150]

Even if one rejects the "soul substance" and the Thinghood of consciousness, or denies that a person is an object, ontologically one is still positing something whose Being retains the meaning of present-at-hand, whether it does so explicitly or not. Substantiality is the ontological clue for determining which entity is to provide the answer to the question of the "who". Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand. This meaning of Being is always implicated in any case where the Being of Dasein has been left indefinite. Yet presence-at-hand is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein. [§25 150]

In our previous analysis, the range of what is encountered within-the-world was, in the first instance, narrowed down to equipment ready-to-hand or Nature present-at-hand, and thus to entities with a character other than that of Dasein. This restriction was necessary not only for the purpose of simplifying our explication but above all because the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein of Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. Thus Dasein's world frees entities which not only are quite distinct from equipment and Things, but which also—in accordance with their kind of Being as Dasein, themselves are 'in' the world in which they are at the same time encountered within-the-world, and are 'in' it by way of Being-in-the-world. These entities are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are *like* the very Dasein which frees them, in that *they are there too, and there with it*. So if one should want to identify the world in general with entities within-the-world, one would have to say that Dasein too is 'world'. [§26 154]

By 'Others' we do not mean everyone else but me—those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too. [§26 154]

We use the term "Dasein-with" to designate that Being for which the others who are [die seienden Anderen] are freed within-the-world. This Dasein-with of the Others is disclosed within-the-world for a **Dasein**, and so too for those **who are Daseins with us** [die Mitdaseienden], only because **Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with**. The phenomenological assertion that "Dasein is essentially Being-with" has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish ontically that factually I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur. [§26 154]

If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world (which, by way of anticipation, we have called 'concern'), it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of care; **for as "care" the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined.**

Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which

belongs to equipment ready-to-hand ; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of **concern**, but rather of **solicitude**. [§26 157]

(The etymological connection between 'Sorge ('care'), 'Fürsorge' ('solicitude'), and 'Besorgen ('concern'), is entirely lost in our translation.) [157]

Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance. [§26 159]

In Dasein's Being, the context of references or assignments which significance implies is tied up with Dasein's ownmost Being—a Being which essentially can have no involvement, but which is rather that Being for the sake of which Dasein itself is as it is.

According to the analysis which we have now completed, Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others. [§26 160]

And, significance, as worldhood, is tied up with the existential "for-the-sake-of-which". Since the worldhood of that world in which every Dasein essentially is already, is thus constituted, it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we are circumspectively concerned, and it does so in such a way that together with it we encounter the Dasein-with of Others. The structure of the world's worldhood is such that Others are not proximally present-at-hand as free-floating subjects along with other Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world. [§26 160]

Our analysis has shown that Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world. Dasein-with has proved to be a kind of Being which entities encountered within-the-world have as their own.

So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being. [§26 163]

'The Others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some people [einige] , and not the sum of them all.

The 'who' is the neuter, the "they" [das Man]. [§27 164]

The "they" has its own ways in which to be. That tendency of Being-with which we have called "distantiality" is grounded in the fact that Being-with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness, which is an existential characteristic of the "they". [§27 164]

This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being. Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the "they", constitute what we know as 'publicness' ["die Offentlichkeit"]. [§27 165]

Yet because the "they" presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability. The "they" can, as it were, manage to have 'them' constantly invoking it. It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It 'was' always the "they" who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been 'no one'. In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that "it was no one". [§27 165]

Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The "they", which supplies the answer to the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein, is the "nobody" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other [Untereinandersein].

In these characters of Being which we have exhibited—**everyday Being-among-one-another, distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one's Being, and accommodation**—lies that 'constancy' of Dasein which is closest to us. This "constancy" pertains not to the enduring Being-present-at-hand of something, but rather to Dasein's kind of Being as Being-with. [§27 166]

Of course, the "they" is as little present-at-hand as Dasein itself...

Furthermore, the "they" is not something like a 'universal subject' which a plurality of subjects have hovering above them...

The "they" is not the genus to which the individual Dasein belongs, nor can we come across it in such entities as an abiding characteristic. [§27 166]

The "they" is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. [§27 167]

The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen] . As they-self, the particular Dasein has been. dispersed into the "they", and must first find itself...

If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the "they" itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest. Dasein is for the sake of the "they" in an everyday manner, and the "they" itself articulates the referential context of significance...

Proximally Dasein is "they", and for the most part it remains so. [§27 167]

These considerations have at the same time brought us a concrete understanding of the basic constitution of Dasein: Being-in-the-world, in its everydayness and its averageness, has become visible. [§27 168]

But because the phenomenon of the world itself gets passed over in this absorption in the world, its place gets taken [tritt an seine Stelle] by what is present-at-hand within-the-world, namely, Things. The Being of those entities which are there with us, gets conceived as presence-at-hand. Thus by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up. [§27 168]

But what more is there to point out in Being-in-the-world, beyond the essential relations of Being alongside the world (concern) , Being-with (solicitude), and Being-one's-Self ("who")? [§28 169]

But the fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are **equiprimordial**. The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal ground'. [§28 170]

...what else is presented with this phenomenon than the *commercium* which is present-at-hand between a subject present-at-hand and an Object present-at-hand? Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that Dasein is the Being of this 'between'...

The "between" is already conceived as the result of the *convenientia* of two things that are present-at-hand. But to assume these beforehand always splits the phenomenon asunder, and there is no prospect of putting it together again from the fragments. Not only do we lack the 'cement'; even the 'schema' in accordance with which this joining-together is to be accomplished, has been split asunder, or never as yet unveiled. What is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon-in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure. [§28 170]

The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. There 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this 'yonder'—a Being which is **de-severant**, **directional**, and **concernful**. Dasein's existential spatiality, which thus determines its 'location', is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The "yonder" belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-

world. 'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'there'-that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the 'there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. **By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself.** [§28 171]

Dasein is its disclosedness. [§28 171]

...in so far as the essence of this entity is existence, the existential proposition, 'Dasein is its disclosedness', means at the same time that **the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'.** [§28 171]

In **understanding [Verstehen]** and **state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit]**, we shall see the two constitutive ways of being the "there"; and these are equiprimordial. [§28 171-2]
State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by **discourse [Rede]**. [§28 172]

Under A (the existential Constitution of the "there") we shall accordingly treat:

Being-there as state-of-mind (Section 29);
fear as a mode of state-of mind (Section 30);
Being-there as understanding (Section 31);
Understanding and interpretation (Section 32);
assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation (Section 33);
Being-there, discourse, and language (Section 34). [§28 172]

Under B (the everyday Being of the "there", and the falling of Dasein) we shall analyse idle talk (Section 35), curiosity (Section 36), and ambiguity (Section 37) as existential modes of the everyday Being of the "there"; [§28 172]

...we shall analyse them as corresponding respectively to the constitutive phenomenon of discourse, the sight which lies in understanding, and the interpretation (or explaining [Deutung]) which belongs to understanding. [§28 172]

Note: '**Befindlichkeit**'. More literally: 'the state in which one may be found'. (The common German expression 'Wie befinden Sie sich ?' means simply 'How are you ?' or 'How are you feeling?')

...in every case Dasein always has some mood [gestimmt ist] [§29 173]

Being has become manifest as a burden. Why that should be, one does not know. And Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to

cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial is closure belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as "there". Furthermore, a mood of elation can alleviate the manifest burden of Being; that such a mood is possible also discloses the burdensome character of Dasein, even while it alleviates the burden. A mood makes manifest 'how one is, and how one is faring' ["wie einem ist und wird"] . In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its "there". [§29 173]

the Being of the "there" is disclosed moodwise in its "that-it-is"; [§29 173]

In an **ontico-existentiell** sense, Dasein for the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood. In an **ontologico-existential** sense...

In the evasion itself the "there" is something disclosed. [§29 174]

This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its "whence" and "whither", yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the **"thrownness" [Geworfenheit]** of this entity into its "there"; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the "there". [§29 174]

Facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being—one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it. [§29 174]

An entity of the character of Dasein is its "there" in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it **finds itself [sich befindet] in its thrownness**. [§29 174]

...ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood ; we are never free of moods. Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first essential characteristic of **states-of-mind that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and-proximally and for the most part-in the manner of an evasive turning-away**. [§29 175]

But to be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character (Bedrohlichkeit) of that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only in so far as Being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-world can "matter" to it in this way. **The fact that this sort of thing can "matter" to it is grounded in one's state-of-mind**; and as a state-of-mind it has already disclosed the world-as something by which it can be threatened, for instance. Only something which is in the state-of-

mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind. [§29 176]

Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. [§29 177]

Yet even the purest *theoria* [theory] has not left all moods behind it; even when we look theoretically at what is just present-at-hand, it does not show itself purely as it looks unless this *theoria* lets it come towards us in a tranquil tarrying alongside. [§29 177]

A state-of-mind not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; it is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' "matter" to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self. The existential constitution of such evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of falling. [§29 178]

Phenomenological Interpretation must make it possible for Dasein itself to disclose things primordially; it must, as it were, let Dasein interpret itself. Such **Interpretation** takes part in this disclosure only in order to **raise to a conceptual level the phenomenal content of what has been disclosed**, and to do so existentially. [§29 179]

That in the face of which we fear, the 'fearsome', is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being. [§30 179]

Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind (we call this possibility 'fearfulness' ["Furchtsamkeit"], has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close. [§30 180]

If something threatening breaks in suddenly upon concerned Being-in-the-world (something threatening in its 'not right away, but any moment'), fear becomes alarm [**Erschrecken**]. [§30 181]

BB: Cf. the use of 'Erschrecken' in the later work: "alarmed dismay" is the contemporary attunement, replacing ancient "wonder" (at Being).