
Heidegger on Being and the World

Wednesdays at 1pm in 1008 B, Cathedral of Learning Bob Brandom (rbrandom@pitt.edu)

The course website, with a week-by-week schedule and all the readings, is available at:
https://spaceofreasons.netlify.app/courses/heidegger-2026/
Or by drilling down under the "Courses" tab from my Pitt website:
https://sites.pitt.edu/~rbrandom/

Week 10: October 28, 2026. Division Two of *Being and Time*: Dasein's Temporality

Recap of Week 9:



Plan:

1) Three aspects of ontological presence (Vorhandenheit):
   i. As *logos*, Being such that what it *is* can be *said* of it.
   ii. As out of time, unchangeable, Being as opposed to Becoming.
   iii. As the Being of the temporal present (Gegenwart).

2) The modality articulating Dasein's kind of Being (existence) as thrown-projecting (Geworfen-entwerfen) is not just autonomous attitude-dependent deontic statuses of commitment. It also essentially involves three 'temporal ecstases' of such commitments: the future, having been, and the present.

3) Other landmark temporal vocabularies:

McTaggart on the A-series/B-series, and David Lewis on endurantism/perdurantism.
Heidegger's principal influences are Aristotle on change and Kant on schematizing concepts.

4) Heidegger's temporal ecstases interpreted in terms of what is expressed by **tensed statements with imperfective aspect**. Michael Thompson and Sebastial Rödl.
5) Within a constellation both acknowledge as requiring all three temporal ecstases, Heidegger privileges *prospective* projection, while Hegel privileges *retrospective* recollection.
6) Imperfectively construed doings are the for-the-sake-of-whiches (Umwillen) of Dasein, which induce the in-order-tos (Um-zus and Wozus) of equipment.
7) Clock-time, as a series of present 'now's, is derived from ecstatic temporality in the same way Vorhandensein is derived from Zuhandensein. In both cases, it is by the use of specialized zuhanden equipment: sentences used for (Um-zu) assertings and clocks used for measurings.
8) Remarks on finitude and death. Martin Hägglund.
9) Retrospective on Heidegger's phenomenological ontological metavocabulary.

We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, **the "ecstases" of temporality**. [§65 377]

The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon. Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, **there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' to which one is carried away**. This "whither" of the ecstasis we call the "horizonal schema". In each of the three ecstases the ecstatical horizon is different. **The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally whether authentically or inauthentically, is the "for-the-sake-of-itself"**. The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be taken as that in the face of which it has been thrown and that *to which* it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizonal schema of *what has been*. In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown, Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present. **The horizonal schema for the Present is defined by the "in-order-to"**. [§69 416]

Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world', and falls into it concernfully. **As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown**—this entity has been disclosed as a "there". As being with Others, it maintains itself in an average way of interpreting—a way which has been Articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-the-world has always expressed itself, and as Being alongside entities encountered within-the-world, it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the very object of its concern and discussing it. **The concern of circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality**—indeed in the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits. Such concern, as concernfully reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions, always says (whether audibly or not) that something is to happen 'then', that something else is to be attended to 'beforehand', that what has failed or eluded us 'on that former occasion' is something that we must 'now' make up for. [§79 458]

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling

has its temporal roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). [§68 401]

But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was…. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as "having been". Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost "been". Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. **The character of "having been" arises, in a certain way, from the future**. [§65 373]

The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. [§65 378]

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially **futural…t**hat is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of **having-been**, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness… [§74 436-7]

Repeating *is handing down explicitly*—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. [§74 437]

In **repetition** [Wiederholung], fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. [§74 438]

Dasein exists for the sake of a potentiality-for-Being of itself. In existing, it has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is—namely, for the sake of itself. **In so far as Dasein exists factically, it understands itself in the way its "for-the-sake-of-itself" is thus connected with some current "in order-to"**…Dasein is its world existingly. [§69 416]

The current 'now that so and so . . .' is as such either appropriate or inappropriate. Not only is the 'now' (and so too any mode of interpreted time) a 'now that . . .' which is essentially datable; but as such it has essentially, at the same time, **the structure of appropriateness or inappropriateness**. Time which has been interpreted has by its very nature the character of 'the time for something' or 'the wrong time for something'. When concern makes present by awaiting and retaining, time is understood in relation to a "for-which"; and this in turn is **ultimately tied up with a "for-the-sake-of-which" of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. With this "in-order-to" relation**, the time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier become acquainted as significance, and which constitutes the worldhood of the world. [§80 467]

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness, as thrown, *takes over*. In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a *handing down* to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily *as* having thus come down… Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate* [Schicksals]. This is how we designate **Dasein's**

primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, **in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen**. [§74 435]

Saying "now", however, is the discursive Articulation of a making-present which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting. **The dating which is performed when one uses a clock, turns out to be a distinctive way in which something present-at-hand is made present**. Dating does not simply relate to something present-at-hand; **this kind of relating has itself the character of measuring**. [§80 469]

We have exhibited datability as the first essential item in the time with which we concern ourselves. This is grounded in the ecstatical constitution of temporality. **The 'now' is essentially a "now that . . ."** . **The datable "now"**, which is understood in concern even if we cannot grasp it as such, **is in each case one which is either appropriate or inappropriate**. Significance belongs to the structure of the "now". We have accordingly called the time with which we concern ourselves "world-time". **In the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of "nows"**, both datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not permitted to 'come to the fore' when time is characterized as a pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time covers them up. [§81 474]

Martin Hägglund *This Life: Secular Life and Spiritual Freedom* [Vintage, 2019]
Eternal bliss is therefore not only unattainable but also undesirable, since it would eliminate the care and passion that animates our lives. **What we do and what we love can matter to us only because we understand ourselves as mortal**… The question of what we ought to do with our lives – a question that is at issue in everything we do – presupposes that we understand our time to be finite. **For the question of how we should lead our lives to be intelligible, we have to believe that we will die**. If we believed that our lives would last forever, we could never take our lives to be at stake. We would never be seized by the need to do anything with our time. We would not even be able to understand what it means to do something sooner rather than later in our lives, since we would have no sense of a finite lifetime that gives urgency to any project or any activity. Hence, mortality is the condition of agency and freedom. To be free is not to be sovereign or liberated from all constraints. Rather, we are free because we are able to ask ourselves what we ought to do with our time. All forms of freedom – the freedom to act, the freedom to speak, the freedom to love – are intelligible as freedom only insofar as we are free to engage the question of what we should do with our time. If it were given what we should do, what we should say, and whom we should love – in short: if it were given what we should do with our time – we would not be free….
Most fundamentally, I must live in relation to my irrevocable death – otherwise I would believe that my time is infinite and there would be nothing at stake in dedicating my life to anything. Any form of spiritual life must therefore be animated by the anxiety of being mortal, even in the most profound fulfillment of our aspirations.