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Review

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Review by: G. Ryle

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n. 2) to *Wiener Studien*, 1888, without any mention of the facts that this article was reprinted in Usener's *Kleine Schriften*, and that the aphorisms are now available in Von der Muehl's recent Teubner *Epicurus*.

(5) The bibliographical statements about the publication of the Herculaneum papyri made on p. 229 are defective in several ways. There are two series of *Volumina Herculaneusia*: only the second is mentioned. Further, Bassi published one fascicle of a third series just before the war. There are many more reconstructions of Philodemus than those mentioned in n. 2. It would be as well to state that a student would normally be wasting his time by going to the *Volumina Herculaneusia* at all, since almost every fragment of value contained in those volumes has been better edited elsewhere. Bassi's publication of 1914 is, however, indispensable for the papyri with which it deals. Thus the student will be wasting his time if he follows Mr. Bailey's advice and refers for certain statements about the Gods to *Vol. Herc. I. vi.*, 13-17 (n. 1). He will be puzzled and baffled if he looks for *Philodem. de Vict. Deor.* (n. 4). The fact is that this papyrus has been excellently edited by Diels in the Berlin Academy *Abhandlungen* under the title *περὶ θεῶν Γ*; and the student should be referred in the first instance to Diels's edition. There are other notes on the same page in which reference is made to Scott's *Fragmenta Herculaneusia* when it should have been made to Diels's much fuller and better edition.

(6) "There can be little doubt that, as Giussani has pointed out, the idea of the 'fourth nature' is derived from Aristotle's 'fifth element' in the soul (*πέμπτη οὐσία, ἐνδέλεχεια* (*sic*)), which was of course wholly spiritual and non-material" (p. 391). Giussani here gives his source (Cicero) in full, which Mr. Bailey does not, and adds a footnote concerning the possible relation of this doctrine to the doctrine of the soul as we have it in the extant works of Aristotle. Some indication that this Aristotle is not the Aristotle of our texts seems to be required.

(7) "The 'fourth nature' is 'nameless' or rather 'unpredictable' (*ἄκατονόμαστον*)" (p. 392). It is difficult to say what 'unpredictable' means, but it certainly cannot mean what Mr. Bailey seems to wish it to mean, *viz.*, 'of which nothing can be predicated'.

J. L. STOCKS.

Sein und Zeit. By MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Halle a. S., Max Niemeyer, 1927. Pp. xi + 438. M. 20.

THIS is a very difficult and important work, which marks a big advance in the application of the "Phenomenological Method"—though I may say at once that I suspect that this advance is an advance towards disaster.

Heidegger is probably the most original and powerful of Husserl's

pupils; and this book, which is dedicated to Husserl and first appeared in his *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. VIII., presupposes a knowledge of the published works and refers explicitly to more recent teachings and writings, as yet unpublished, of that difficult author. Now if *Sein und Zeit* were nothing more—and it is more—than a re-exposition of the ideas of Heidegger's teacher, it would be hard enough for, anyhow, English readers to understand, since, save in chance quotations, not a word of Husserl has yet been translated and no adequate exposition in English of the cardinal positions of Phenomenology or even of the logical, epistemological and psychological doctrines contained in the *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1901 and re-edited with modifications 1913) has yet been given.¹ Moreover, to add to our difficulties, until recently there has been an additional historical obstacle to the understanding of Husserl, namely that no sure estimate could be formed of the nature and extent of the influence upon Husserl of Franz Brentano, though it was known that this was great; as, until Kraus and Kastil devoted themselves to the task, most of the psychological and philosophical teaching of Brentano remained unpublished and inaccessible. And finally the "logical Realism" of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) which, with that of Frege, was so largely formative of Husserl's logical theories, must for the present remain unexplored country for most researchers in this field; since the first and only complete edition of his most important *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837) is unprocurable, and even Höfler's re-edition in 1913 of the first two of the four books is now out of print.

It is, however, now becoming possible to see in some sort of perspective what were the beginnings and what have been the stages in the growth of Phenomenology, and a short sketch of its genesis must preface my attempt to state even the programme and method of Heidegger—many of his conclusions for lack of comprehension I must abandon unexpounded.

Brentano was, like Bradley, a step-son of the "Association-philosophy"; for him, as for Bradley, the problems are largely set by Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the two Mills, as well as by Herbart; and he, like Bradley, makes a partial escape from the conclusions of Hume by a theory of Judgement which denies the (for Locke) basic position that judging is a *coupling* or *having-together* two "ideas"; instead, he asserts, a judgement contains one "idea"-element *plus* another element irreducible to "idea," namely the element of acceptance or rejection, affirmation or negation. Unlike Bradley's, Brentano's metaphysic was Aristotelian and Thomist rather than Hegelian, and unlike him again, avoiding any attempt to *define* Judgement (*e.g.*, in terms of Subject and Predicate) he contents himself with declaring judgement to be an ultimate,

¹ But see Boyce Gibson's article in *MIND*, 1922; references and quotations in Bosanquet's latest writings; and Linke's article in *The Monist*, 1926.

irreducible and indefinable psychic fact, differing qualitatively from the primitive psychic fact of "having an idea" (*Vorstellung*) just in the presence to the former of the extra element of "accepting or rejecting".

He went on to find a third class of psychic facts, equally irreducible to "ideas" or even to Judgements, namely Feelings of "liking and disliking" or "wanting and aversion".

He thus broke with the English school by rejecting "Association" as the one principle and "Ideas" as the one element of psychic complexes, setting up instead a division of three irreducible types—capable, of course, of various inter-combinations—of psychic facts or "phenomena". This division was accepted as basic, anyhow at first, by all his pupils, and in particular by both Meinong and Husserl; and it has led them, with others, into profound and important investigations in the psychology and philosophy of thinking.

That, however, despite the improvements that he introduced, Brentano was fundamentally a member of the school of Locke, is shown by the fact that for him "ideas" (*Vorstellungen*) are, if no longer the whole, yet still the substrate of all conscious experience; for while an act of "having an idea" (*Vorstellen*) may occur alone, an act of judging or feeling must always be founded in one of "having an idea". To judge is to have an idea and to do something with it; to feel is to have an idea and to take up an attitude towards it. We, made wise by the event, may already wonder whether such premisses will not in due course lead to a subjectivist or agnostic theory of knowledge.

There is a character shared by acts of *Vorstellung*, Judgement and Feeling in virtue of which they may all be classified as *psychical* as opposed to *physical* facts, namely the necessary presence to all of them of an "immanent object" or "content".

There is no "having an idea" that is not having an idea of something; no affirming that is not affirming something, no wanting that is not wanting something. This relation of a psychic act to its content or immanent object is named by Brentano, in loan from the schoolmen, the "intentional" relation; and the content or immanent object that the act is of is the "intentional" object. "Intentionality" is the essential character of consciousness, and is what differentiates the psychical from the physical (a "*res cogitans*" from a "*res extensa*").

Two important things must be noticed about intentionality (which is, of course, ultimate and indefinable): (1) It has nothing to do with "intending" in our sense of intending or purposing to do: its affinities are rather with the doctrine of "first, and second intentions." Heidegger in an earlier work on Duns Scotus showed that his use of "*intentio*" was closely akin to Husserl's "*Meaning*" (*Bedeutung*). (2) The "intentional object" of an act of consciousness is not an extra-mental reality, but immanent in the consciousness of which it is the "content". Its status is

psychical, and it exists, if it exists at all, when the act that "has" it is in existence. Its being is to be "accusative" to an act of consciousness.

That is to say, Brentano's theory of intentionality is not to be construed as a premiss to or conclusion from a Realist theory of knowledge but only as a clearing up of an ambiguity latent in the use of such terms as Idea, Judgement, and Feeling.

However, Brentano is not a Solipsist; so the further distinction has to be made, between the content or intentional object of a psychic act, and the real, extra-mental object, *e.g.*, a "thing" in space and time. All psychic acts have intentional objects; only some have also real objects. For instance, the "idea" of a Golden Mountain has a content but no object; that of Mount Everest has both. Thus, too, the idea of "the composer of the *Iliad*" and that of "the composer of the *Odyssey*" have different contents, but (perhaps) the same real object.

As there are three ultimate types of psychic acts, so there are three ultimate types of intentionality; though those of Judging and Feeling are founded in that of *Vorstellung*.

The next important legacy of Brentano, and one which was a necessary condition and almost the sufficient condition for the birth of Phenomenology, was his theory of the absolute Self-Evidence (*Evidenz*) of "inner perception" or the perception of our present psychic acts and states *with their intentional objects*.

Harking back to Descartes' Method of Doubt and his "*Cogito ergo sum*," he asserts that while our judgements of external reality are contingent and problematic (since they are founded in "ideas" the contents of which are different from and ultimately incomparable with their extra-mental real objects), our judgements of what is immanent in the consciousness of the judger are self-ratifying, since there is *identity* between the content and the object of the idea which, *quâd* judging, we are asserting.

Thus I may doubt whether I am really seeing a ship, but I cannot doubt that what I see *really* looks to me as it *seems*, or that I am really believing it to be the look of a ship; I may doubt whether sardines are good food, but I cannot doubt that I like them.

He gives to the objects of "inner perception" the general title of "Psychic Phenomena" or the "Phenomena of consciousness," using the term "phenomenon" (it is important to note, to appreciate the meaning of "Phenomenology") *not* in the sense of Kant but in that of Comte; *i.e.* to denote not an "appearance" as *opposed* to a reality, but a *reality that appears i.e.* manifests itself. So a "psychic phenomenon" is simply a particular manifestation of consciousness. Often, indeed, the term means little more than "fact" in ordinary parlance.

We have then in inner perception of our own psychic phenomena a fount of self-evident judgements which are both affirmative and existential; and we have no other such fount (though we may make

self-evident *negative* judgements of the form "No X is Y" or "there is no X that is Y" simply from logical insight).

So all positive knowledge either is, or is founded in "inner perception," and the science of the objects of inner perception acquires accordingly a priority over all other sciences.

Now the science of the objects of inner perception falls for Brentano into two major divisions. At first only in his practice but later also explicitly in his theory he divides Psychology into "genetic" and "descriptive" psychology. Under the former he classed all forms of inductive, experimental, statistical, anthropological, evolutionary, and pathological or physiological psychology; but these all presuppose the findings of "descriptive" psychology, the function of which it is to analyse and describe the general types of psychic phenomena or the general modes of intentionality which the particular data of "genetic" psychology exemplify. The method of "descriptive psychology" is intuitive, moving not by inference but by direct inspection of individual instances of psychic phenomena in which the universal type-structure can be read. We are told that Brentano, reserving the title "psychology" for the inductive or "genetic" branch, came later to call the descriptive science of psychic phenomena by the name "Psycho-gnosis". Kraus, more recently, has coined for it the name "Phenomenognosis": but the title that will stick is that adopted by Husserl and his school—"Phenomenology". It would have been more accurate, if less convenient, to call it "Psycho-phenomenology" since its subject-matter is limited to psychic phenomena; but as, in the end, the conclusion is reached that *only* such entities as are psychic are self-manifesting, *i.e.* are proper "phenomena," this precision would perhaps be extravagant.

These are, I think, the most important of the teachings of Brentano for the history of Phenomenology; they are not, however, his *only*, and in some respects they are not his final teachings. For, alarmed by the erections made upon his foundations by his two leading pupils Husserl and Meinong, he came later to withdraw or re-fashion some of his theories. These later theories, however, need not be expounded here.

Husserl began his career as a theoretical psychologist of the school of Brentano; and a native interest in the theory of mathematics led to his first book *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* in which he applies the principles of Brentano to the special field of arithmetical "ideas". Hence, like Meinong, he was driven back to the general problem of the nature, status, and origin of "abstract ideas," *i.e.*, concepts and ideas of relations; and the early writings of both are accordingly largely composed of criticisms, amazingly acute and profound, of the treatment of these problems by the English Locke-Spencer school. And it is perhaps no coincidence that Brentano who claimed to be the pupil of Aristotle and the Schoolmen should be the teacher of pupils who re-affirmed the independent reality of "entia rationis" and found in our thinking-elements that were not "sensations" or echoes of "sensations".

Husserl in particular came then to see the domain of the logical as no mere province in the domain of the psychological, and in the First Part of his *Logische Untersuchungen* he attacks root and branch the fallacy of "psychologism," of which at that date almost all logicians were victims, the fallacy, namely, that the objects of Logic, universals, Facts, implications, relations, types, wholes, etc., are simply varieties of mental states, processes, and dispositions. His sustained and masterly demonstration of the self-ruinous character of all such "psychologistic" theories and of the necessity of a "pure" and independent science of Logic, to which parts of the Second Part of the *Logische Untersuchungen* are valuable contributions, have been of radical importance for German philosophy and psychology in the last quarter of a century.

But he had other fish to fry than merely to elaborate a "Platonic" logical Realism, and though many would have preferred him to work along the lines of Bolzano and Frege in the direction of a pure Formal Ontology, like the "*Gegenstandstheorie*" of Meinong, he had no intention of abandoning his first love, the study of the phenomena of consciousness. Emancipation from "psychologism" did not involve desertion of the task of analysing the types of "intentional experiences"; and clear ideas about the *objects* of knowing and thinking were an aid and not a hindrance to his study of what knowing and thinking in essence are.

Especially does he devote himself to the complex problem or cluster of problems of the nature and status of Meaning. For this general and even over-catholic title covers both the "terms" and "propositions" (*i.e.*, roughly, the word-meanings and sentence-meanings) with which logic has to do and the "ideas" or "conceptions" and "judgements" which are the objects of the psychology or Phenomenology of Thought. More, the theory of mathematics necessitates an understanding of what symbols and symbol-meanings are; metaphysics must have or give an account of the sort of being possessed by "concepts," "facts," and "propositions" (or Meinong's "objectives"); the philosophy of language and of grammar pivot on the idea of "expression," and these are all problems of "Meaning". And lastly the characterisation of all conscious acts as "intentional experiences," *i.e.*, experiences in the essence of which it is that they are *of* something other than themselves, soon led to the adoption of the noun "Meaning" to denote the "intentional object" of a psychic act, and of the verb "to mean" to denote the intending of its immanent object by such an act.

It is, then, in the first instance the Phenomenology of those psychic acts that have *logical* Meanings, *i.e.*, of acts of thinking, that Husserl prosecutes; but concurrently he is developing the general theory of Phenomenology and the general theory of its subject-matter, the intentionality or meaningfulness of consciousness in general. And this general theory we may now sketch. Phenomenology is for Husserl the science of the "phenomena of

consciousness" (a phrase of Brentano's which Husserl for good reasons came to relinquish) or of "intentional experiences". But it is not a "matter-of-fact" science: it does not deal with actual instances, in the sense that it first records and explores these and then makes inductive generalisations from them. Rather it is a science of Essences; it is the science of the character that any experience must have to be a case of doubting (say) or questioning or fancying or inferring. Its subject-matter is the type or type-structure of intentional experiences as discerned *intuitively* in some real or imaginary exemplary instance. In a word its subject-matter is Essences and not individuals and its method is by "exemplary intuition": so that it stands to empirical psychology as geometry stands to geography.¹

That there *are* Essences and that we can know them has been already established in the more purely logical parts of the *Logische Untersuchungen*.

Now as Phenomenology is the "eidetic" science of intentional experiences, as such, it covers with its net in a certain sense *everything*. For whatever in any sense *is*, be it an existent or a subsistent, a fancy, a fact, a relation, the number 7, a hope, a piece of nonsense, the Equator, etc.; in a word anything that could conceivably be named or thought about is potentially *for me*; *i.e.*, it is potentially the objective correlate or intentional object of some or other act of my consciousness. I may know it or wonder about it or entertain it or be angry with it and so on, and it is therefore actually or potentially the "accusative" (I borrow the metaphor from grammar, as we have no separate rendering for "Gegenstand" as opposed to "Objekt") of an intentional experience. And the sort of intentionality that makes my Erlebnis what it is, is in its specific detail as in its generic structure something the analysis of which belongs to Phenomenology. This leads to important and (I think) dangerous consequences; for the science of Phenomenology is given a primacy over all other sciences, and it, itself presupposition-less, is supposed to be sovereign over presuppositions which all other sciences must make.

For already in his *Logische Untersuchungen* Husserl, on the basis of what I regard as a serious error in his theory of Meaning (derived, I suspect, from Brentano's founding of Judgement and Knowledge in Vorstellung), had erected a theory of knowledge or self-evident judgement according to which such objects of knowledge as are not experiences "enjoyed" by the knower of them are tissues of Meanings, which Meanings are the *gift* of consciousness; so that consciousness is *constitutive* of all objects that are (or pretend to be)

¹ A good statement in English of what are in fact the subject-matter, method and relations with empirical psychology of Phenomenology is given—of course unwittingly—by Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, Vol. I, p. 328, and the last sentence of § 119 on p. 277. And his analyses, *e.g.*, of Opinion, Conviction, and Belief are admirable applications of the "Phenomenological Method".

transcendent. This culminates in a doctrine explicitly formulated in his "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie," which reminds us strongly of Kant or Green, that "pure consciousness" is the only self-subsistent reality and the absolute *prius*. And he speaks accordingly of all objects of psychic acts, *including all objects of knowledge*, as "correlates of consciousness"—things the being of which is to be "accusative" to actual or possible intentional experiences.

There is thus a progressive trend visible in the philosophy of Husserl and his followers towards a rarified Subjective Idealism or even Solipsism, a trend which, in my view, is not necessitated by the idea of Phenomenology, which I regard as good, but only by a particular elaboration of a part of a special theory of Meaning which is, if I am not mistaken, an evil legacy from the Locke-Brentano hypothesis of the existence of "ideas"—certain mental entities out of which knowledge is somehow composed, though they are neither the objects known nor yet our acts of getting-to-know, but representatives between the former and the latter.

This very sketchy account of a few of the threads in the philosophy of Husserl—I can give here no exposition of the many other elements in it which I believe to be of really notable importance—must serve as a preface to Heidegger.

Heidegger's only previous published book was a little work on Duns Scotus whose doctrine of the Categories, Intentionality, and Meaning he expounds clearly, comparing them *en route* with kindred views of Husserl.

In *Sein und Zeit* however, he breaks new ground and in some 440 large pages he builds up what he himself only claims to be the threshold to the solution of a problem vastly more profound and radical than any that Husserl has yet formulated. Moreover, in the course of the book Heidegger sets himself to the construction of a new philosophical terminology, especially designed to denote unambiguously the basic categories of Meaning which he is trying to explicate.

Phenomenology must be presupposition-less; that is to say, phenomenological interpretations or analyses must take for granted no theories or observations made in a state of (phenomenological) naïveté. This is common ground. But in fact—so Heidegger thinks—previous phenomenologists had failed to disembarass themselves of a weighty inheritance of presuppositions, the presence of which either cramps or vitiates their results. For instance, the historical genesis of Phenomenology from psychology, the survival in that psychology of the simple Mind-Matter dualism of Descartes, as well as the "chemical" theory of atomic ideas, states, and dispositions, the universal domination of Platonic and Aristotelian categories over all contemporary philosophical and psychological thinking, have stood in the way of the strict application of the phenomenological method; with the issue that even the most radical of its exponents have been tackling, with tools that were not their own, objects that they could only see with a squint.

It is no longer, or rather it is not yet, the time for Phenomenology to analyse the types of psychic acts and their interconnexions, to examine the relation of "act" to "content" and of these to "real physical things" and "the world"; for the original isolation of such things as types, psychic acts, act-contents, physical things and the world, was one inherited from naïve predecessors and not *found* by phenomenology.

The most fundamental presuppositions are ontological presuppositions; and it is to this field that Phenomenology must go, deliberately postponing the study of the twigs until it has completed its examination of the root. And the root is Being (*Sein*). The root problem of Phenomenology is the Meaning of Being—not in the sense that a *definition* is sought for it, for that would be a nonsensical demand, but that an insight of a new—phenomenological—sort is wanted, in possessing which we shall know 'with a difference' something which, of course, we must understand or know 'in a way' already. And by "Being" is meant not this or that entity of which we can say that it is or that it is something, but the universal which these exemplify.

Now Husserl, though he reached the point of saying that *Sein* is nothing else than the Correlate of *Bewusstsein*, i.e., Being is just what Consciousness has as its "accusative," had never quite emancipated himself from the Cartesian point of view that Consciousness and Being are *vis-à-vis* to one another in such a way that in studying Consciousness we are studying something on the outside of which and transcending which lies a region of absolute Reality.

And in this frame of mind he could *separate* the spheres of Phenomenology and Ontology by saying that the former is the science of Consciousness, the latter the science of—something else.

But Heidegger is critical of this naïve assumption; and Phenomenology must, he urges, so far from accepting the alleged cleavage between Consciousness and Being, select as its first task of all, the analysis and description of that most primitive level of Experience in which is generated *for us* that seeming polar opposition. Our attitude of regarding Being as the opposite of Consciousness is itself one of the intentional experiences, and perhaps the most important of the intentional experiences that Phenomenology must examine.

In this way Heidegger turns the tables on the objection that a more orthodox phenomenologist would be certain to raise, namely, that Phenomenology, being by definition the science of consciousness, can only take Being into its province on the illegitimate assumption that Being is an *Erlebnis* or a component of an *Erlebnis*.

Next, as well the Husserlian as the Kantian or Cartesian accounts of Thought or Consciousness are stated in terms of the ontological categories of Plato and Aristotle. But as these cate-

gories were distilled out of a natural and naïve (*i.e.*, pre-phenomenological) attitude towards the world and ourselves, they must be not indeed rejected but put, so to speak, in inverted commas; they must be accounted for with the naïve attitude from which they sprang. They cannot supply the terms in which we are to unpack the Meanings for which we are looking, for they are at least under suspicion of being metaphorical. Phenomenology is Hermeneutic and the categories which are the untested framework of our everyday world are among its primary *interpretanda*.

As a practical consequence of this view Heidegger imposes on himself the hard task of coining, and on us the alarming task of understanding, a complete new vocabulary of terms—mostly many-barrelled compounds of everyday “nursery” words and phrases—made to denote roots and stems of Meaning more primitive than those in which Plato, Aristotle, and subsequent scientists and philosophers have so taught us to talk and think, that we, by the strong force of habit, have come to regard as ultimate and pivotal ideas which are in fact composite and derivative. Heidegger’s ontological Phenomenology is to turn our eyes back again to contemplate with a new method and a new clarity the springs of Meaning from which flow our most familiar and most “homely” conceptions and classifications. The principle on which he seems to be designing his new terminology is, I should judge, the hypothesis that certain “nursery” words and phrases have a primitiveness and freedom from sophistication which makes them more nearly adequate expressions of really primitive Meanings than the technical terms which science and philosophy in the course of a long development have established.

The hypothesis seems to me a perilous one, for it is at least arguable that it is here, and not in the language of the village and the nursery, that mankind has made a partial escape from metaphor.

In *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger does not make the assault upon his final objective; he opens the campaign with a preliminary occupation of a terrain that is nearer home. Indeed it is of the essence of his starting-point that it is as near home as possible, for before trying to interpret what is the Being which any entity as such has, he tries to examine what sort of Being *we* have who are making the examination.

Like Brentano and Husserl he goes back to Descartes’ ‘*Cogito ergo sum*’ and enquires more deeply than Descartes could do not merely what is a ‘*cogitatio*’ or what can be done by or what can happen to a ‘*res cogitans*,’ but what the ‘*I*’ is and must be for such actions and passions to be possible. The threshold to the Hermeneutic of ‘*Esse*’ is the Hermeneutic of ‘*Sum*’; and if he can find out what it ultimately is to be an experiencer having experiences, a door, perhaps the only door, will be open for the next search after the innermost Meaning of Being.

The title that Heidegger appropriates for an ‘*I*’ who thinks and

in particular is asking the questions, using the methods, and appreciating the answers that I am now doing, is "Dasein" (one of numerous loans from established *philosophical* terminology which, however necessary, are certainly confusing). The business, then, of the present work is the "Hermeneutic" or "Analytic" of "Dasein"; and as my being is not a timeless subsistence but a being-myself through a continuum of "nows," the special problem of the work as indicated in the title is to analyse the intrinsic *temporality* of my being.

Perhaps also Heidegger's interest in the way in which time enters into conscious experience was stimulated by some lectures that Husserl was giving, in 1905 and later, on the inward experience of time. These have just been edited and published by Heidegger.

Now the most fundamental and "primitive" moment of a "Dasein's" being is "being-in-the-world"—being in it not as a chair is in a room or a cow in a field but as having it or being through and through occupied with it and by it. The world that I am in in this sense is all that it means to me; it is what makes me an experienter of experiences. "Being-in-the world" for a "Dasein" is just the tissue of its attitudes, interests, and utilisations. In a word, the world that I am "in" is simply the sum of what I am *about*. The distinction between theory and practice, or thought and will, between thinking-about and doing-about is derivative from the primitive mode of a "Dasein's" being—namely "being-about . . ." (*besorgen*). Nor is it a mere chance attribute of a "Dasein" that it has this character of "being-about . . .". Rather it is the essence of its being what it is, to "be about . . .". And so, as the world, namely what I am about, belongs intrinsically to what I am, the pretended Subject-Object dualism is a pure fiction imported from the naturalistic attempt to see the relation between me and my world as akin to a relation between one fragment and another fragment of my world.

One of the derivative ways of "being-about . . ." is "thinking-about . . .": and of this one of the derivative modes is knowing; and that this is derivative and not primitive is shown by the fact that before knowing I must "wonder about . . ." and before "wondering about . . ." I must be "interested in . . ." or "concerned about . . ." which in the end turns out to be close to the most primitive mode of "being-about . . ." and also of "being-an-I" that there is.

Now while everything that I am-in-the-world-with has the character of being something that I am-about, this is not yet enough to characterise what we ordinarily term 'Things'. The Meaning of 'Thing' is not primitive but derived, and before the world that I 'have' is stocked with 'Things,' it is stocked with *instruments* or *tools*, *i.e.*, what I can "work-with" in the performance of some task for some end. Later comes the conception of a 'Thing,' namely what can't or needn't be worked with: the conception of 'Thing' is derived from the conceptions of 'unemployed' and 'instrument':

so the mode of "being-about . . ." which is *using* is primitive to the modes of "being-about" which are knowing, classifying, and naming 'Things'.

(I may here interject that Heidegger seems to be confusing what is anthropologically primitive with what is logically primitive. It is perhaps a fact of human nature that I begin by being interested in things for what I can or can't do with them and only later do I want to know as a scientist what they are. But the former attitude involves equally with the latter the knowledge of things as having attributes and relations, though in infancy I restrict my interest to a few of those attributes and relations, namely those which bear on my business.

I must leave till later my further and fundamental objection that all these so-called "primitive" attitudes or ways of "being-an-I" really involve *knowledge*, which knowledge necessitates universals and categories upon which the Analysis of Dasein throws—and can throw—no light at all.)

It is important to note that in all the ways of being-about, being-in, being-with, and being-without that characterise a "Dasein," the Dasein has some sort of *understanding* of what it is being or doing. Not that it has scientific, "thematic" *knowledge*—for this is a late product—but the moods, tenses, and inflections of its being-itself are "illuminated" or "transparent" to itself. If it were not so the Analysis of Dasein would have no self-evidence, and so would not be the proper approach to our ultimate problem.

The spatiality of the world is derived from such primitive attitudes as having-to-hand-convenient-for-using or not-having-to-hand; but apart from mentioning the similarity of Heidegger's treatment of Space and later of Time with that of Bergson and some anthropologicistic pragmatists, I must pass quickly over this and several other important sections in which the constituents and structure of the world we 'have' are derived or analysed.

What in the end is a Dasein? What does 'sum' in 'Cogito ergo sum' ultimately denote? Behind the question "what are the root types of my behaviour, my attitudes, my actions, and my passions?" lies the question, "What is it to *be* an I ('Dasein')?"

The answer rings at first strangely. "Dasein ist Sorge." What I am is Concern or Care (Cura). Willing, wishing, wondering, reflecting, knowing, doing, with their "accusatives," all are ways of "caring" or "caring about" or "caring for".

Heidegger tells us that he came to this conception of Care as the absolutely primitive Being that an 'I' as such has, through studying the Augustinian and other Christian philosophies of human nature; but I surmise, too, that there are legacies in it of the characterisation by Brentano and Husserl of Consciousness as what has intentionality. For by "Care" Heidegger does not mean any particular emotion of fearing, or being anxious, or wishing, or any particular act of striving, or any particular inclination or impulse,

but the primitive sort of being in which all such emotions and acts and states are founded; for they are all particular ways of "caring".

Next (what bears on the special problem of the *temporal* nature of an 'I'), what I am is not exhausted by what I have done and become up-to-date; rather it is of the essence of my being what I am that there are potentialities in me; I *can* be what I am not yet; and what I can be belongs just as intrinsically to my being as what I am already, *i.e.*, that of my being which I have already realised. Care is accordingly as essentially care about what I might be as care about what I already am. This leads to an analysis of what my Being as a *whole* is, *i.e.*, the whole structure of which what I am up-to-date and what I might be are integral moments. Now one of the characteristics of my whole being is that *quâd* Life it terminates in Death—*terminates* in Death without finding its *completion* in it. So we have to investigate what sort of a whole it is which has both termination in Death and a completion (never fully realised) in being all that it has the potentiality of being. In this whole belong conscience—the certainty of what I might be—and the sense of sin or guilt—the certainty that I am not what I might have been. (Here Heidegger is reviving important Augustinian theses which lead one to wonder if the second part of this work will not be a sort of Eckhart philosophy in phenomenological clothing.)

But here, for the reviewer at any rate, the fog becomes too thick; and the results of the analyses of our intrinsic temporality, of the several concepts of time, historical becoming, history, and the criticisms of the theories of Dilthey and Hegel must go unpounded.

A word about the *method* of Phenomenology. It is its boast that it does not make and does not presuppose "logical constructions" or "theories" or "systems". "Phenomenology makes no hypotheses." It does not move by making deductions from axioms or inductions from observed and recorded facts. Its method is that of "exemplary intuition," *i.e.*, the inspection of individual examples *quâd* exemplifications of Essences or Types—this of course in the region of consciousness. We intuit in this or that feeling of anger, act of choice or imagination, that essential character lacking which the particular examined would be something other than a case of being angry, choosing, or imagining.

So here, Heidegger claims simply to be revealing, unpacking or interpreting the essence of what we do and are. Accordingly, his sentences which on first reading seem to be mere dogmatic assertions, have to be read as expressions of a Hermeneutic analysis to understand which is to see that it is true. He is simply telling us explicitly what we must have known 'in our bones' all the time. Similarly, *e.g.*, Cook Wilson does not tell us anything *new* about Conception, Opinion, or Belief; he is telling us something which we, when told, recognise that we knew implicitly from the start.

The dangers lie in the undue extension of this method; if, for instance, our interpreter has, without realising it, a theory of knowledge, or a metaphysical system, he may easily come to interpolate into the interpretations that he gives something that could never have been intuited in the exemplary instance he is examining—since, even if it be true, yet it was never in the Essence of that example. Or else, under the same influence, he may omit to notice an integral element in that Essence. Thus I suspect that certain theories of human nature have been interpolated into Heidegger's analyses of it; and on the other side the basic place of knowing in being-in-the-world or in any experiencing of a Meaning has been forgotten. And so an anthropologicistic Metaphysic seems to have been read out of our every-day experience, of which both the positive element of Humanism and the negative sceptical element of Relativism and Solipsism appear to be derived from views interpolated into and not won by the Phenomenological Method.

It remains to make a few tentative comments and criticisms upon the general idea, and especially the method, of this approach to the Hermeneutic of Being *vis à* the Hermeneutic of "being-an-I" ("Dasein").

(1) In the first place it is taken for self-evident that some sort of *understanding* what I do and am belongs essentially to my doing what I do and being what I am. This doctrine is, I suppose, the same as that of Brentano and Husserl that in "inner" or "immanent perception" I have a source of self-evident positive judgements and that I have no other such source; so that any degree of "Evidenz" in any positive judgement that I make must either be or be grounded in the self-evidence of "inner perception". But while there is no objection to the thesis that I can know my own experiences and the 'I' who has them, the assertion that this is all that I can know, or that if I can know anything else I can only know it if I first know my experiences and my 'I,' is far from self-evident; indeed it seems to me to contradict itself. At any rate it presupposes a theory of knowledge and a metaphysic, and so a Phenomenology based on this theory is not presuppositionless. However it might still be the case that the analysis of what it is to be "an I" and to experience my experiences was the best, though not the only, approach to the ultimate analysis of what Being as such is. 'I' might be the most accessible or the most transparent example of Being.

(2) Some would quarrel with the original assumption that there is a problem about the Meaning of Being. But as the (perhaps departmental) question of the relation between Being *quâ* timeless "subsistence" and existing *quâ* existing in the world of time and space seems to me a real one, I do not take up this cudgel.

(3) But there is what I regard as a vital ambiguity present in that expanded theory of Phenomenology which makes it the logical 'prius' of not only psychology but logic, metaphysics, and the

mathematical and natural sciences. Accepting Brentano's improvement on the Locke-Hume theory of "ideas" according to which the distinction was made between the act and the content (or immanent object) of a *Vorstellung*, the phenomenologists have very properly generalised the principle and find in every phenomenon of consciousness, *i.e.*, in every intentional act or experience an act side and a content or Meaning side. Then looking at the world, they see that every thing or event, every relation or universal, every conceivable 'It' can be regarded as the objective correlate or content to an appropriate act of consciousness—knowing perhaps, or surmising, or being vexed at, or wanting, or being interested in.

And as it is the proper business of phenomenology to analyse states and acts of consciousness, everything is in this way drawn into its net; for anything and everything is or has a Meaning-forme, and the meaning of the act or acts in which it has its meaning-for me is the proper subject matter of the science of intentionality.

But while it is a dangerous metaphor to speak of acts having "meanings" or of things as being the "meanings of acts," it is a fatal error to speak of a thing known as the correlate of a knowing-act as if that implied that we could get to the heart of the thing by analysing our experience of knowing it. A twin is a correlate to a twin but operations upon the one are at most operations upon the other one's twin, not operations upon the other one himself.

And this leads to dangerous results in the practice of the phenomenological method; it leads to them here in *Sein und Zeit*. For the presence of *knowledge* of some reality (which is surely present in any and every conscious experience) though it is not explicitly recognised is surreptitiously imported as well into such terms as "understanding" and "illumination" as into the countless nursery-terms which Heidegger is trying to build up into a new philosophical vocabulary.

For instance the general characterisation of our conscious being as a "being-in-the-world" surely implies that *underlying* our other reactions and attitudes there is *knowledge*. We 'have-' or are "in-the-world" only if we know that at least one 'something' exists. Similarly the attempt to derive our knowledge of 'things' from our practical attitude towards tools breaks down; for to use a tool involves knowledge of what it is, what can be done with it, and what wants doing.

And if we like to call things that we know "correlates of acts of knowing," we must at least recognise that the analysis of what those things are is not in the least degree forwarded by an analysis of our acts of knowing them, but only by getting to know still more about the things themselves.

This ambiguity is especially well-concealed, equally deeply involved, in the conception of Meaning. The thing which I know and which I signify with such symbols as sentences is in one sense of the word the 'Meaning' of my sentences: but it is not (except per accidens) an *Erlebnis* or an act of consciousness; nor is it anything constituted

by an act of consciousness. Only in another sense of the word is "Meaning" something derivative from a state or act of consciousness—namely when it is not the thing symbolised by a symbol but the fact that this symbol symbolises that thing. Certainly a symbol symbolises because we choose that it shall, so its meaning (*i.e.*, meaningfulness) is the product of an act of consciousness, but the origin of the functioning of a symbol is no more the origin of the thing which it is its function to symbolise than the forest in which a sign-post grew is the parental home of the town to which the sign-post points.

And I stress these arguments against the Husserl-Heidegger treatment of Meaning for two connected reasons :

(a) I think it can be shown that Husserl's theories of Meaning (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*) are primarily developments of Brentano's theory of "ideas" (*Vorstellungen*). A Meaning is, at the start, just the intentional "accusative" of an act of "having an idea"; later the term also covers the intentional "accusatives" of acts of Judging, so that propositions as well as concepts are Meanings. Now (as Representationism always ends in Subjectivism) this theory has in the end to say that the world of things and events *as I apprehend it* must be just a tissue of Meanings, which Meanings must be the contribution of acts of consciousness.

(b) I think, too, that it can be shown that the only reason why Heidegger's Hermeneutic of "Dasein" takes or promises to take the form of a sort of anthropologicistic Metaphysic (smelling a little oddly both of James and of St. Augustine) is because Heidegger presupposes that the Meanings which his Hermeneutic is to unravel and illuminate must be in some way man-constituted.

But though I deplore the damage wrought upon his Metaphysics by the presuppositions which Heidegger has unconsciously inherited, I have nothing but admiration for his special undertaking and for such of his achievements in it as I can follow, namely the phenomenological analysis of the root workings of the human soul.

He shows himself to be a thinker of real importance by the immense subtlety and searchingness of his examination of consciousness, by the boldness and originality of his methods and conclusions, and by the unflagging energy with which he tries to think behind the stock categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology.

And I must also say, in his behalf, that while it is my personal opinion that *quâ* First Philosophy Phenomenology is at present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and will end either in self-ruinous Subjectivism or in a windy mysticism, I hazard this opinion with humility and with reservations since I am well aware how far I have fallen short of understanding this difficult work.

Sein und Zeit, it is worth mentioning, is most beautifully printed and the pages have generous margins.

G. RYLE.