

IN the question about the meaning of Being, what is primarily interrogated is those entities which have the character of Dasein.... Adhering to the procedure which we have fixed upon for starting our investigation, we must lay bare a fundamental structure in Dasein: Being-in-the-world (Chapter 2). [41]

WE are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine.¹ These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being... Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. [§9 MR 67]

I. The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia).

ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression "presence-at-hand" for the term "existentia", while the term "existence", as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.

2. **That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine.** Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand.¹ To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference' ;² or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'. [§9 68]

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines] . That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic-that is, something of its own-can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. ⁴ But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity -when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.

The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched-the priority of 'existentialia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit]... [§9 68]

Dasein does not have the kind of Being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it. [§9 68]

In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence. [§9 69]

This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being -and back into it again-is all existing, such as it is.¹ We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]. And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. [§9 69]

Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof. [§9 69]

Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them "existentialia". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "categories" characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. [§9 69]

Noein (or the *logos*, as the case may be) is accepted as a way of access to them. Entities are encountered therein. But the Being of these entities must be something which can be grasped in a distinctive kind of *legein* (letting something be seen), so that this Being becomes intelligible in advance as that which it is-and as that which it is already in every entity. In any discussion (*logos*) of entities, we have previously addressed ourselves to Being. [§9 70]

Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two modes of the characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon for the question of Being has been clarified. [§9 71]

Summary at beginning of §12 of the lessons from §9:

Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists.

Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated. [§12 78]

The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a *unitary* phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. But while Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having several constitutive items in its structure. [§12 78]

Being-in...is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand. [§12 79]

"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. [§12 80]

As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'. [§12 81]

The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world. [§12 82]

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples : having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining All these ways of Being-in have concern¹ as their kind of Being-a kind of Being which we have yet to characterize in detail. Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest-these too are ways of concern ; but these are all deficient modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a 'bare minimum'. [§12 83]

Both *in* Dasein and *for* it, this state of Being is always in some way familiar [bekannt] . Now if it is also to become known [erkannt], the knowing which such a task explicitly implies takes itself (as a knowing of the world [Welterkennen]) as the chief exemplification of the 'soul's' relationship to the world. [§12 85]

Thus the phenomenon of Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single exemplar-knowing the world. This has not only been the case in epistemology; for even practical behaviour has been understood as behaviour which is 'non-theoretical' and 'a theoretical'. [§12 86]

If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, and one in which Dasein operates not only in general but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, then it must also be something which has always been experienced ontically. [§13 86]

If one reflects upon this relationship of Being, an entity called "Nature" is given proximally as that which becomes known. [§13 87]

In this kind of 'dwelling' as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense ; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself a way of Being-in-the-world ; it is not to be Interpreted as a 'procedure' by which a subject provides itself with representations [Vorstellungen] of something which remain stored up 'inside' as having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they 'agree' with actuality can occasionally arise. [§13 89]

Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be Interpreted beforehand. [§13 90]

Now the entities within the world are Things-Things of Nature, and Things 'invested with value' ["wertbehaftete" Dinge] . Their Thinghood becomes a problem; and to the extent that the Thinghood of Things 'invested with value' is based upon the Thinghood of Nature, our primary theme is the Being of Things of Nature-Nature as such. [§14 91]

But even if this ontology should itself succeed in explicating the Being of Nature in the very purest manner, in conformity with the basic assertions about this entity, which the mathematical natural sciences provide, it will never reach the phenomenon that is the 'world'. Nature is itself an

entity which is encountered within the world and which can be discovered in various ways and at various stages. [§14 92]

Should we then first attach ourselves to those entities with which Dasein proximally and for the most part dwells—Things 'invested with value' ? Do not these 'really' show us the world in which we live ? Perhaps, in fact, they show us something like the 'world' more penetratingly. But these Things too are entities 'within' the world. [§14 92]

Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein discover entities as Nature. [§14 94]

The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness—the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein. [§14 94]

The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'. The phenomenological question applies in the first instance to the Being of those entities which we encounter in such concern. [§15 95]

This phenomenological interpretation...is rather a determination of the structure of the Being which entities possess. But as an investigation of Being, it brings to completion, autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of Being which belongs already to Dasein and which 'comes alive' in any of its dealings with entities. [§15 96]

But suppose one characterizes these 'Things' as Things 'invested with value' ? What does "value" mean ontologically? How are we to categorize this 'investing' and Being-invested? [§15 96]

The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'Things': *pragmata*—that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings. [§15 96]

We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern "equipment" [*das Zeug*]. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. [§15 97]

Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to • . . ' ["*etwas um-zu . . .*"]. A totality of equipment is

constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. [§15 97]

Equipment-in accordance with its equipmentality-always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment : ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. [§15 97]

Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example) ; but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about [um] the hammer's character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' ["Handlichkeit"] of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses-in which it manifests itself in its own right-we call "readiness-to-hand" [Zuhandenheit]. Only because equipment has this 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. No matter how sharply we just look [Nur-noch-hinsehen] at the 'outward appearance' ["Aussehen"] of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is **circumspection** [§15 98]

...the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight. [§15 99]

The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurückziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality

within which the equipment is encountered [§15 99]

The work which we chiefly encounter in our concerned dealings—the work that is to be found when one is "at work" on something [das in Arbeit befindliche]—has a usability which belongs to it essentially ; in this usability it lets us encounter already the "towards-which" for which it is usable. [§15 99]

But the work to be produced is not merely usable for something. The production itself is a using of something for something. [§15 99-100]

Thus along with the work, we encounter not only entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's kind of Being entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. [§15 100]

In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence or absence of daylight... [§15 100]

[BB: Cf. the earth and the sky in das Geviert]

Our concerned absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us, has a function of discovering; and it is essential to this function that, depending upon the way in which we are absorbed, those entities within-the-world which are brought along [beigebracht] in the work and with it (that is to say, in the assignments or references which are constitutive for it) remain discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying circumspective penetration. [§15 101]

The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were talking such 'aspects' into the 'entities' which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were 'given subjective colouring' in this way. [§15 101]

To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern. Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand? [§15 101]