Passages from *Being and Time*

Division Two

WHAT have we gained by our preparatory analysis of Dasein, and what are we seeking? In Being-in-the-world, whose essential structures centre in disclosedness, we have found the basic state of the entity we have taken as our theme. The totality of Being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as care. In care the Being of Dasein is included. When we came to analyse this Being, we took as our clue existence, which, in anticipation, we had designated as the essence of Dasein. This term "existence" formally indicates that Dasein is as an understanding potentiality-for- Being, which, in its Being, makes an issue of that Being itself. In every case, I myself am the entity which is in such a manner [dergestalt seiend]. By working out the phenomenon of care, we have given ourselves an insight into the concrete constitution of existence-that is, an insight into its equiprimordial connection with Dasein's facticity and its falling.
What we are seeking is the answer to the question about the meaning of Being in general. [§45 274]

What, indeed, do we mean by the "primordiality" of an ontological Interpretation? [§45 275]

Ontological investigation is a possible kind of interpreting, which we have described as the working-out and appropriation of an understanding. Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight, and its fore-conception. If such an interpretation, as Interpretation, becomes an explicit task for research, then the totality of these 'presuppositions' (which we call the "hermeneutical Situation") needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand…[§45 275]

Can we progress from the result we have obtained—that the being of Dasein is care—to the question of the primordial unity of this structural whole? [§45 275]

What is the status of the fore-sight by which our ontological procedure has hitherto been guided? We have defined the idea of existence as

i) a potentiality-for-Being—
ii) a potentiality which understands,
iii) and for which its own Being is an issue.
iv) But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine,
v) is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated….[§45 275]

[BB: How should we understand the relation, the progression, of these characteristics?

We have indeed contended that care is the totality of the structural whole of Dasein's constitution. [§45 276]

One thing has become unmistakable : our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and of Dasein as less than a whole [als unganzes]. [§45 276]

Summary:
WHAT have we gained by our preparatory analysis of Dasein, and what are we seeking? In Being-in-the-world, whose essential structures centre in disclosedness, we have found the basic state of the entity we have taken as our theme. The totality of Being-in-the-world as a structural whole has revealed itself as care. In care the Being of Dasein is included. When we came to analyse this Being, we took as our clue existence, which, in anticipation, we had designated as the essence of Dasein. This term "existence" formally indicates that Dasein is as an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which, in its Being, makes an issue of that Being itself. In every case, I myself am the entity which is in such a manner [dergestalt seiend].
By working out the phenomenon of care, we have given ourselves an insight into the concrete constitution of existence—that is, an insight into its equiprimordial connection with Dasein's facticity and its falling.
What we are seeking is the answer to the question about the meaning of Being in general, and, prior to that, the possibility of working out in a radical manner this basic question of all ontology. [§45 274]

What, indeed, do we mean by the "primordiality" of an ontological Interpretation?
Ontological investigation is a possible kind of interpreting, which we have described as the working-out and appropriation of an understanding. Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight, and its fore-conception. If such an interpretation, as Interpretation, becomes an explicit task for research, then the totality of these 'presuppositions' (which we call the "hermeneutical Situation") needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand, [§45 275]

If, however, the ontological Interpretation is to be a primordial one, this not only demands that in general the hermeneutical Situation shall be one which has been made secure in conformity with the phenomena; it also requires explicit assurance that the whole of the entity which it has taken as its theme has been brought into the fore-having. [§45 275]

Can we progress from the result we have obtained—that the being of Dasein is care—to the question of the primordial unity of this structural whole?
What is the status of the fore-sight by which our ontological procedure has hitherto been guided?
We have defined the idea of existence as a potentiality-for-Being-a potentiality which understands, and for which its own Being is an issue. But this potentiality-for-Being, as one

which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated… [§45 275]

One thing has become unmistakable: our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and of Dasein as less than a whole [als unganzes]. [§45 276]

But can Dasein also exist authentically as a whole? How is the authenticity of existence to be determined at all, if not with regard to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this? …But an authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience. And conscience, as a phenomenon of Dasein, demands, like death, a genuinely existential Interpretation. Such an Interpretation leads to the insight that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-Being in that it wants to have a conscience. [§45 277]

Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality. [§45 277]

Thus the investigation comprised in the division which lies before us will now traverse the following stages: Dasein's possibility of Being-a-whole, and Being-towards-death (Chapter I); Dasein's attestation of an authentic potentiality-for-Being, and resoluteness (Chapter 2); Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Chapter 3); temporality and everydayness (Chapter 4); temporality and historicality (Chapter 5); temporality and within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of time (Chapter 6). [§45 278]

In the centre of these considerations we have the task of characterizing ontologically Dasein's Being-at-an-end and of achieving an existential conception of death. The investigations relating to these topics are divided up as follows: the possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp (Section 47); that which is still outstanding, the end, and totality (Section 48); how the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this phenomenon (Section 49); a preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death (Section 50); Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein (Section 51) ; everyday Being-towards-death, and the full existential conception of death (Section 52); an existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death (Section 53). [§46 280-1]

The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua something present-at-hand. [§47 281]

50. Preliminary Sketch of the Existential-ontological Structure of Death

From our considerations of totality, end, and that which is still outstanding, there has emerged the necessity of lnterpreting the phenomenon of death as Being-towards-the-end, and of doing so in terms of Dasein's basic state. Only so can it be made plain to what extent Being-a-whole, as constituted by Being towards-the-end, is possible in Dasein itself in conformity with the structure of its Being. We have seen that care is the basic state of Dasein. The ontological signification of the expression "care" has been expressed in the 'definition' : "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)". In this are expressed the fundamental characteristics of Dasein's Being: existence, in the "ahead-of-itself"; facticity, in the "Being-already-in"; falling, in the "Being-alongside". If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being ofDasein, then death (or Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in terms of these characteristics. [§50 293]

51. Being-towards-death and the Everydayness of Dasein
In setting forth average everyday Being-towards-death, we must take our orientation from those structures of everydayness at which we have earlier arrived. In Being-towards-death, Dasein comports itself towards itself as a distinctive potentiality-for-Being. But the Self of everydayness is the "they". The "they" is constituted by the way things have been publicly interpreted, which expresses itself in idle talk. Idle talk must accordingly make manifest the way in which everyday Dasein interprets for itself its Being-towards-death. The foundation of any interpretation is an act of understanding, which is always accompanied by a state-of-mind, or, in other words, which has a mood. So we must ask how Being-towards-death is disclosed by the kind of understanding which, with its state-of-mind, lurks in the idle talk, of the "they". How does the "they" comport itself understandingly towards that ownmost possibility of Dasein, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped ? What state-of-mind discloses to the "they" that it has been delivered over to death, and in what way? [§51 296]

In Dasein's public way of interpreting, it is said that 'one dies', because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that "in no case is it I myself", for this "one" is the "nobody". [§51 297]

In this manner the "they" provides [besorgt] a constant tranquillization about death…
The "they" does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death…
But temptation, tranquillization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called "falling". As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death. Being-towards-the-end has the mode of evasion in the face of it-giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it. [§51 298]

In accordance with the tendency to falling, which is essential to everydayness, Being-towards-death has turned out to be an evasion in the face of death-an evasion which conceals. [§52 299]

In explicating everyday Being-towards-death we have clung to the idle talk of the "they" to the effect that "one dies too, sometime, but not right away." [§52 299]

The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as follows: death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein' s ownmost possibility—nonrelational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein' s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end. [§52 303]

Dasein is constituted by disclosedness-that is, by an understanding with a state-of-mind. Authentic Being-towards-death can not evade its ownmost non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by thus fleeing from it, or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the "they". [§53 304]

All understanding is accompanied by a state-of-mind. Dasein's mood brings it face to face with the thrownness of its 'that it is there'. But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein' s ownmost individual Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined [des so bestimmten Seienden], and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being. For this reason, anxiety as a basic state-of-mind belongs to such a self-understanding of Dasein on the basis of Dasein itself. Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety. [§53 310]

We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death-a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious. [§53 310]

With Dasein's lostness in the "they", that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon. The "they" has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of Being. The "they" even hides the manner in which it has, tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has 'really' done the choosing. So Dasein make no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the "they". [§54 312]

But because Dasein is lost in the "they", it must first find itself. [§54 313]

Conscience gives us 'something' to understand ; it discloses. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call [Ruf]. Calling is a mode of discourse. The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty. [§54 314]

But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek-the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one's-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call "resoluteness" [Beschlossenheit]. [§54 314]

Through disclosedness, that entity which we call "Dasein" is in the possibility of being its "there". With its world, it is there for itself, and indeed-proximally and for the most part-in such a way that it has disclosed to itself its potentiality-for-Being in terms of the 'world' of its concern. Dasein exists as a potentiality-for-Being which has, in each case, already abandoned itself to definite possibilities. And it has abandoned itself to these possibilities because it is an entity which has been thrown, and an entity whose thrownness gets disclosed more or less plainly and impressively by its having a mood. To any state-of-mind or mood, understanding belongs equiprimordially. In this way Dasein 'knows' what it is itself capable of [woran es mit ihm selbst ist], inasmuch as it has either projected itself upon possibilities of its own or has been so absorbed in the "they" that it has let such possibilities be presented to it by the way in which the "they" has publicly interpreted things. The presenting of these possibilities, however, is made possible existentially through the fact that Dasein, as a Being-with which understands, can listen to Others. Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the "they", it fails to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self. [§55 315]

To any discourse there belongs that which is talked about in it. Discourse gives information about something, and does in some definite regard. From what is thus talked about, it draws whatever it is saying as this particular discourse—what is said in the talk as such. In discourse as communication, this becomes accessible to the Dasein-with of Others, for the most part by way of uttering it in language. [§56 317]

And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to? To one's own Self. [§56 317]

Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent. [§56 318]

57. Conscience as the Call of Care

Such procedures are facilitated by the unexpressed but ontologieally dogmatic guiding thesis that what is (in other words, anything so factual as the call) must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let itself be Objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all. [§57 320]

Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety ; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein's Being-in-the-world face to face with the "nothing" of the world ; in the face of this "nothing", Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. What if this Dasein, which finds itself [sich befindet] in the very depths of its uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience ? [§57 320]

The proposition that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself . . .) . Dasein is falling into the "they" (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience-that is, conscience itself-has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care. [§57 322]

The appeal to the they-self signifies summoning one's ownmost Self to its potentiality-for-Being, and of course as Dasein-that is, as concernful Being-in-the-world and Being with Others. [§58 325]

In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in its falling ; and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is. Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through. Thus "care" -Dasein's Being-means, as thrown projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-basis is itself null) . This means that Dasein as such is guilty. [§58 331]

…the "summons to Being-guilty" signifies a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-Being which in each case I as Dasein am already. Dasein need not first load a 'guilt' upon itself through its failures or omissions ; it must only be 'guilty' authentically—'guilty' in the way in which it is. [§58 333]

Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-theworld—the call which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-forBeing-guilty. And corresponding to this call, wanting-to-have-a-conscience has emerged as the way in which the appeal is understood. [§59 335]

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience-this reticent self-projection up on one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call "resoluteness" [Entschlossenheit].
Resoluteness is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness. [§60 343]

In resoluteness we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic. Whenever a "there" is disclosed, its whole Being-In-the-world-that is to say, the world, Being-in, and the Self which, as an 'I am', this entity is—is disclosed with equal primordiality. Whenever the world is disclosed, entities within-the-world have been discovered already. The discoveredness of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand is based on the disclosedness of the world, for if the current totality of involvements is to be freed, this requires that significance be understood beforehand. In understanding significance, concernful Dasein submits itself circumspectively to what it encounters as ready-to-hand. Any discovering of a totality of involvements goes back to a "for-the-sake-of-which"; and on the understanding of such a "for-the-sake-of-which" is based in turn the understanding of significance as the disclosedness of the current world. [§60 343-4]

Thrown into its 'there', every Dasein has been factically submitted to a definite 'world'—*its* 'world'. At the same time those factical projections which are closest to it, have been guided by its concernful lostness in the "they". To this lostness, one's own Dasein can appeal, and this appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness. But in that case this authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the 'world' is discovered (and this is founded upon that disclosedness) and the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed. [§60 344]

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one' s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others. [§60 344]

The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality-for-

Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. The existentiell indefiniteness of resoluteness never makes itself definite except in a resolution ; yet it has, all the same, its existential definiteness. What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful solicitude. As care, however, Dasein has been Determined by facticity and falling. Disclosed in its 'there', it maintains itself both in truth and in untruth with equal primordiality. [§60 345]

Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care [in der Sorge gesorgte] , and which is possible as care-the authenticity of care itself. [§60 348]

…resoluteness has been worked out as Being-guilty, a self-projection in which one is reticent and ready for anxiety…[§60 348]

An authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole on the part of Dasein has been projected existentially. By analysing this phenomenon, we have revealed that authentic Being-towards-death is *anticipation*. Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being, in its existentiell attestation, has been exhibited, and at the same time existentially Interpreted, as *resoluteness*. [§61 349]

In our existential Interpretation, the entity which has been presented to us as our theme has Dasein's kind of Being, and cannot be pieced together into something present-at-hand out of pieces which are present-at-hand. [§61 350]

Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness. [§61 351]

If the ascendancy of the falling understanding of Being (of Being as presence-at-hand) keeps Dasein far from the ontological character of its own Being, it keeps it still farther from the primordial foundations of that Being. [§61 352]

Prospectus:
…the chapter will be divided as follows: anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity (Section 62); the hermeneutical Situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care, and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general (Section 63); care and Selfhood (Section 64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care 305 (Section 65); Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising therefrom of repeating the existential analysis in a primordial manner (Section 66). [§61 352]

We have characterized resoluteness as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself. Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's Being, and signifies the null Being-the-basis of a nullity. The 'Guilty !' which belongs to the Being of Dasein is something that can be neither augmented nor diminished. It comes before any quantification, if the latter has any meaning at all. Moreover, Dasein is essentially guilty-not just guilty on some occasions, and on other occasions not. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience resolves upon this Being-guilty. To project oneself upon this Being-guilty, which Dasein is as long as it is, belongs to the very meaning of resoluteness. The existentiell way of taking over this 'guilt' in resoluteness, is therefore authentically accomplished only when that resoluteness, in its disclosure of Dasein, has become so transparent that Being-guilty is understood as something constant. But this understanding is made possible only in so far as Dasein discloses to itself its potentiality-for-Being, and discloses it 'right to its end'. Existentially, however, Dasein's "Being-at-an-end" implies Being-towards--the-end. As Being-towards--the-end which understands--that is to say, as anticipation of death-resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not just 'have' a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards--death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity. [§62 353]

When the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the "they" is revealed. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. When one has an understanding Being-towards-death as one's ownmost possibility—one's potentiality-for-Being becomes authentic and wholly transparent.
The call of conscience passes over in its appeal all Dasein's 'worldly' prestige and potentialities. Relentlessly it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty, and exacts of it that it should be this potentiality authentically. [§62 354]

To any truth, there belongs a corresponding holding-for-true. The explicit appropriating of what has been disclosed or discovered is Being-certain. [§62 355]

But Dasein is equiprimordially in the untruth. Anticipatory resoluteness gives Dasein at the same time the primordial certainty that it has been closed off. [§62 356]

The question of the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is one which is factical and existentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute. [§62 357]

Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death ; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments. [§62 357]

Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. [§62 358]

The way which we have so far pursued in the analytic of Dasein has led us to a concrete demonstration of the thesis which was put forward just casually at the beginning-that the entity which in every case we ourselves are, is ontologically that which is farthest. The reason for this lies in care itself. Our Being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves most closely in the 'world'—a Being which is falling—guides the everyday way in which Dasein is interpreted, and covers up ontically Dasein's authentic Being, so that the ontology which is directed towards this entity is denied an appropriate basis. Therefore the primordial way in which this entity is presented as a phenomenon is anything but obvious, if even ontology proximally follows the course of the everyday interpretation of Dasein. The laying-bare of Dasein's primordial Being must rather be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation. [§63 359]

Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological Interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the Being of this entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up. [§63 359]

Unless we have an existentiell understanding, all analysis of existentiality will remain groundless….
If the Being of Dasein is essentially potentiality-for-Being, if it is Being-free for its ownmost possibilities, and if, in every case, it exists only in freedom for these possibilities or in lack of freedom for them, can ontological Interpretation do anything else than base itself on ontical possibilities—ways of potentiality-for-Being—and project these possibilities upon their ontological possibility ? And if, for the most part, Dasein interprets itself in terms of its lostness in concerning itself with the 'world', does not the appropriate way of disclosure for such an entity lie in determining the ontico-existentiell possibilities (and doing so in the manner which we have achieved by following the opposite course) and then providing an existential analysis grounded upon these possibilities? [§63 360]

Dasein understands itself as Being-in-the-world, even if it does so without adequate ontological definiteness. Being thus, it encounters entities which have the kind of Being of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. No matter how far removed from an ontological concept the distinction between existence and Reality may be, no matter even if Dasein proximally understands existence as Reality, Dasein is not just present-at-hand but has already understood itself, however mythical or magical the interpretation which it gives may be. For otherwise, Dasein would never 'live' in a myth and would not be concerned with magic in ritual and cult. [§63 361]

We have shown earlier how that understanding-of-Being which prevails proximally and for the most part, conceives Being in the sense of presence-at-hand, and so covers up the primordial phenomenon of truth. [§63 364]

Through the unity of the items which are constitutive for care—existentiality, facticity, and fallenness—it has become possible to give the first ontological definition for the totality of Dasein's structural whole. We have given an existential formula for the structure of care as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)". [§64 364]

The they-self keeps is not on saying "I" most loudly and most frequently because at bottom it Authentical itself, and evades its authentic potentiality-for-Being. [§64 369]

Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individualization of the reticent resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself. As something that keeps silent, authentic Being-one's- Self is just the sort of thing that does not keep on saying 'I' ; but in its reticence it 'is' that thrown entity as which it can authentically *be*. The Self which the reticence of resolute existence unveils is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question as to the Being of the 'I'. [§64 369-70]

Care does not need to be founded in a Self. But existentiality, as constitutive for care, provides the ontological constitution of Dasein's Self-constancy, to which there belongs, in accordance with the full structural content of care, its Being-fallen factically into non-Self-constancy. [§64 370]

We need the unwavering discipline of the existential way of putting the question, if, for our ontological point of view, Dasein's kind of Being is not to be finally perverted into a mode of presence-at-hand, even one which is wholly undifferentiated. Dasein becomes 'essentially' Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. Such resoluteness, as a mode of the authenticity of care, contains Dasein's primordial Self-constancy and totality. [§65 370]

What are we seeking ontologically with the meaning of care? What does "meaning" signify ? In our investigation, we have encountered this phenomenon in connection with the analysis of understanding and interpretation. According to that analysis, meaning is that wherein the understandability [Verstehbarkeit] of something maintains itself—even that of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically.
"Meaning" signifies the "upon-which" [das Woraufhin] of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is. Projecting discloses possibilities—that is to say, it discloses the sort of thing that makes possible. To lay bare the

"upon-which" of a projection, amounts to disclosing that which makes possible what has been projected. [§65 370-71]

Taken strictly, "meaning" signifies the "upon-which" of the primary projection of the understanding of Being. When Being-in-the-world has been disclosed to itself and understands the Being of that entity which it itself is, it understands equiprimordially the Being of entities discovered within-the-world, even if such Being has not been made a theme, and has not yet even been differentiated into its primary modes of existence and Reality. All ontical experience of entities—both circumspective calculation of the ready-to-hand, and positive scientific cognition of the present-at-hand—is based upon projections of the Being of the corresponding entities—projections which in every case are more or less transparent. But in these projections there lies hidden the "upon-which" of the projection; and on this, as it were, the understanding of Being nourishes itself.
If we say that entities 'have meaning', this signifies that they have become accessible in their Being; and this Being, as projected upon its "upon-which", is what 'really' 'has meaning' first of all. Entities 'have' meaning only because, as Being which has been disclosed beforehand, they become intelligible in the projection of that Being—that is to say, in terms of the "upon-which" of that projection. The primary projection of the understanding of Being 'gives' the meaning. The question about the meaning of the Being of an entity takes as its theme the "upon-which" of that understanding of Being which underlies all Being of entities. [§65 371-72]

Dasein is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its existence. In existing, Dasein understands itself, and in such a way, indeed, that this understandin gdoes not merely get something in its grasp, but makes up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-for Being. The Being which is disclosed is that of an entity for which this Being is an issue. The meaning of this Being-that is, of care-is what makes care possible in its Constitution; and it is what makes up primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-Being. [§65 372]

Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty. This understanding means that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was. Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost 'as-it-already-was'-that is to say, its 'been' [sein "Gewesen"]. Only in so far as Dasein is as an "I-am-as-having-been", can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as "having been". Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost "been". Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of "having been" arises, in a certain way, from the future. [§65 373]

This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been ; we designate it as "temporality". Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. [§65 374]

The "ahead-of-itself" is grounded in the future. In the "Being-already-in . . .", the character of "having been" is made known. "Being-alongside. . ." becomes possible in making present. While the "ahead" includes the notion of a "before", neither the 'before' in the 'ahead' nor the 'already' is to be taken in terms of the way time is ordinarily understood…[§65 375]

…it should instead give us a hint that making-present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves, remains included in the future and in having been, and is included in these in the mode of primordial temporality. When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of vision' as regards the Situation which has been disclosed.
Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. [§65 376]

We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the " ecstases" of temporality. [§65 377]

The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. [§65 378]

Care is Being-towards-death. We have defined "anticipatory resoluteness" as authentic Being towards the possibility which we have characterized as Dasein's utter impossibility. In such Being-towards-its-end, Dasein exists in a way which is authentically whole as that entity which it can be when 'thrown into death'. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it exists finitely. The authentic future is temporalized primarily by that temporality which makes up the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness; it thus reveals itself as finite. [§65 378]

Our analysis of primordial temporality up to this point may be summarized in the following theses. Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatical. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite. [§65 380]

Temporality first showed itself in anticipatory resoluteness. This is the authentic mode of disclosedness, though disclosedness maintains itself for the most part in the inauthenticity with

which the "they" fallingly interprets itself. In characterizing the temporality of disclosedness in general, we are led to the temporal understanding of that concernful Being-in-the-world which lies closest to us, and therefore of the average undifferentiatedness of Dasein from which the existential analytic first took its start. We have called Dasein's average kind of Being, in which it maintains itself proximally and for the most part, "everydayness". By repeating the earlier analysis, we must reveal everydayness in its temporal meaning…[§66 380]

The ontological structure of that entity which, in each case, I myself am, centres in the Self-subsistence [Selbständigkeit] of existence. Because the Self cannot be conceived either as substance or as subject but is grounded in existence, our analysis of the inauthentic Self, the "they", has been left wholly in tow of the preparatory Interpretation of Dasein. Now that Selfhood has been explicitly taken back into the structure of care, and therefore of temporality, the temporal Interpretation of Selfconstancy and non-Self-constancy1 acquires an importance of its own. This Interpretation needs to be carried through separately and thematically. [§66 381]

As an entity for which its Being is an issue, Dasein utilizes itself primarily for itself [verwendet sich…für sich selbst], whether it does so explicitly or not. Proximally and for the most part, care is circumspective concern. In utilizing itself for the sake of itself, Dasein 'uses itself up'. In using itself up, Dasein uses itself-that is to say, its time. [§66 381]

Reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world. Concernful circumspective discovering, in reckoning with its time, permits those things which we have discovered, and which are ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, to be encountered in time. Thus entities within-the-world become accessible as 'being in time'. We call the temporal attribute of entities within-the-world "within-time-ness" [die Innerzeitkeit]. [§66 382]

Far from excluding such a multiplicity, the primordial totality of Dasein's constitution as articulated demands it. The primordiality of a state of Being does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological source of Dasein's Being is not 'inferior' to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any 'springing-from' is degeneration. If we penetrate to the 'source' ontologically, we do not come to things which are ontically obvious for the 'common understanding'; but the questionable character of everything obvious opens up for us. [§67 383]

Our investigation set out to describe Being-in-the-world, so that from the beginning we could secure an adequate phenomenological horizon as opposed to those inappropriate and mostly inexplicit ways in which the nature of Dasein has been determined beforehand ontologically. Being-in-the-world was first characterized with regard to the phenomenon of the world. And in our explication this was done by characterizing ontico-ontologically what is ready-to-hand and

present-at-hand 'in' the environment, and then bringing within-the-world-ness into relief, so that by this the phenomenon of worldhood in general could be made visible. But understanding belongs essentially to disclosedness; and the structure of worldhood, significance, turned out to be bound up with that upon which understanding projects itself—namely that potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein exist. [§67 383-4]

Resoluteness, which we have characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, represents an authentic disclosedness of Dasein—a disclosedness which constitutes an entity of such a kind that in existing, it can be its very 'there'. Care has been characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, but only in its basic features. To exhibit its concrete temporal Constitution, means to give a temporal Interpretation of the items of its structure, taking them each singly: **understanding, state-of-mind, falling,** and **discourse**. Every understanding has its mood. Every state-of-mind is one in which one understands. The understanding which one has in such a state-of-mind has the character of falling. The understanding which has its mood attuned in falling, Articulates itself with relation to its intelligibility in discourse. The current temporal Constitution of these phenomena leads back in each case to that one kind of temporality which serves as such to guarantee the possibility that understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse, are united in their structure. [§68 384]

Resoluteness has turned out to be a kind of existing which is primordial and authentic. Proximally and for the most part, to be sure, Dasein remains irresolute; that is to say, it remains closed off in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to which it brings itself only when it has been individualized. [§68 386]

Understanding is never free-floating, but always goes with some state-of-mind. The "there" gets equiprimordially disclosed by one's mood in every case-or gets closed off by it. Having a mood brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness in such a manner that this thrownness is not known as such but disclosed far more primordially in 'how one is'. Existentially, "Being-thrown" means finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other. One's state-of-mind is therefore based upon thrownness. My mood represents whatever may be the way in which I am primarily the entity that has been thrown. [§68 389]

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future ; one's state-of-mind, however, temporalizes itself primarily in having been…. The thesis that 'one's state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been' means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something. [§68 390]

Only an entity which, in accordance with the meaning of its Being, finds itself in a state-of-mind [sich befindet]-that is to say, an entity, which in existing, is as already having been, and which exists in a constant mode of what has been-can become affected. Ontologically such affection

presupposes making-present, and indeed in such a manner that in this making-present Dasein can be brought back to itself as something that has been. [§68 396]

Just as understanding is made possible primarily by the future, and moods are made possible by having been, the third constitutive item in the structure of care-namely, falling-has its existential meaning in the Present. Our preparatory analysis of falling began with an Interpretation of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity…[§68 396-7]

Awareness in the broader sense lets what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand be encountered 'bodily' in themselves with regard to the way they look. Letting them be thus encountered is grounded in a Present. This Present gives us in general the ecstatical horizon within which entities can have bodily presence. Curiosity, however, does not make present the present-at-hand in order to tarry alongside it and understand it; it seeks to see only in order to see and to have seen. [§68 397]

As regards their temporal meaning, the characteristics of falling which we have pointed out—temptation, tranquillization, alienation, self-entanglement—mean that the making-present which 'leaps away' has an ecstatical tendency such that it seeks to temporalize itself out of itself. When Dasein entangles itself, this has an ecstatical meaning. Of course when one speaks of the rapture with which one's existence is carried away in making present, this does not signify that Dasein detaches itself from its Self and its "I". Even when it makes present in the most extreme manner, it remains temporal-that is, awaiting and forgetful. In making present, moreover, Dasein still understands itself, though it has been alienated from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is based primarily on the authentic future and on authentically having been. But in so far as making-present is always offering something 'new', it does not let Dasein come back to itself and is constantly tranquillizing it anew. [§68 399]

When the "there" has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding state-of-mind, and falling; and this disclosedness becomes Articulated by discourse. [§68 400]

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which 'is in the process of having been'. All the same, one's state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is 'making present'. And all the same, the Present 'leaps away' from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporaliz;es itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity

with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling—that is, the unity of the care-structure. [§68 401]

…we gave a rather thorough Interpretation of that everyday mode of Being-in-the-world which is closest to us—concernful Being alongside the ready-to-hand within-the-world. [§68 402]

Our Interpretation of the temporality of Being alongside what is ready-to-hand and present-at Hand alongside circumspectively as well as with within-the-world-Being theoretical concern-shows us at the same time how this temporality is already the advance condition for that possibility of Being-in-the-world in which Being alongside entities within-the-world is grounded. [§68 402]

The awaiting of what it is involved in, and-together with this awaiting-the retaining of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present. [§68 404]

The awaiting of the "towards-which" is neither a considering of the 'goal' nor an expectation of the impendent finishing of the work to be produced. It has by no means the character of getting something thematically into one's grasp. Neither does the retaining of that which has an involvement signify holding it fast thematically. [§68 405]

Important passage on the emergence of the present-at-hand from the ready-to-hand:
In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a 'practical' way, to 'theoretical' exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the 'emergence' of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis. So if one posits 'practical' concern as the primary and predominant kind of Being which factical Dasein possesses, the ontological possibility of 'theory' will be due to the absence of praxis—that is, to a *privation*. But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concernful dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder. Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich-umsehen]. But this is by no means the way in which the 'theoretical' attitude of science is reached. On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a more precise kind of circumspection, such as 'inspecting', checking up on what has been attained, or looking over the 'operations' ["Betrieb"] which are now 'at a standstill'.
Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer 'theory' that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers', remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand

equipment with which one is concerned. 'Practical' dealings have their own ways of tarrying. And just as *praxis* has its own specific kind of sight ('theory'), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own. Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment often requires a complicated 'technical' set-up for the experimental design. Observation with a microscope is dependent upon the production of 'preparations'. Archaeological excavation, which precedes any Interpretation of the 'findings', demands manipulations of the grossest kind. But even in the 'most abstract' way of working out problems and establishing what has been obtained, one manipulates equipment for writing, for example. However 'uninteresting' and 'obvious' such components of scientific research may be, they are by no means a matter of indifference ontologically. The explicit suggestion that scientific behaviour as a way of Being-in-the-world, is not just a 'purely intellectual activity', may seem petty and superfluous. If only it were not plain from this triviality that it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary between 'theoretical' and 'atheoretical' behaviour really runs! [§69 409]

Circumspection operates in the involvement-relationships of the context of equipment which is ready-to-hand. Moreover, it is subordinate to the guidance of a more or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the current equipment-world and of the public environment which belongs to it. This survey is not just one in which things that are present-at-hand are subsequently scraped together. What is essential to it is that one should have a primary understanding of the totality of involvements within which factical concern always takes its start. Such a survey illumines one's concern, and receives its 'light' from that potentiality-for-Being on the part of Dasein for the sake of which concern exists as care. In one's current using and manipulating, the concernful circumspection which does this 'surveying', brings the ready-to-hand closer to Dasein, and does so by interpreting what has been sighted. This specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively, we call "deliberating" [Uberlegung]. The scheme peculiar to this is the 'if-then'; if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed. [§69 410]

But if deliberation is to be able to operate in the scheme of the 'if-then', concern must already have 'surveyed' a context of involvements and have an understanding of it. That which is considered with an 'if' must already be understood as something or other. This does not require that the understanding of equipment be expressed in a predication. The schema 'something as something' has already been sketched out beforehand in the structure of one's pre-predicative understanding. [§69 411]

The way the Present is rooted in the future and in having been, is the existential-temporal condition for the possibility that what has been projected in circumspective understanding can be brought closer in a making-present, and in such a way that the Present can thus conform itself to

what is encountered within the horizon of awaiting and retaining; this means that it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure….Like understanding and interpretation in general, the 'as' is grounded in the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality. [§69 411]

In our fundamental analysis of Being, and of course in connection with the Interpretation of the 'is' (which, as a copula, gives 'expression' to the addressing of something as something), we must again make the phenomenon of the "as" a theme and delimit the conception of this 'schema' existentially. [§69 411-12]

The ready-to-hand can become the 'Object' of a science without having to lose its character as equipment. A modification of our understanding of Being does not seem to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis of the theoretical attitude 'towards Things'. Certainly not, if this "modification" is to imply a change in the kind of Being which, in understanding the entity before us, we understand it to possess. In our first description of the genesis of the theoretical attitude out of circumspection, we have made basic a way of theoretically grasping entities within-the-world—physical Nature—in which the modification of our understanding of Being is tantamount to a change-over. In the 'physical' assertion that 'the hammer is heavy' we overlook not only the tool-character of the entity we encounter, but also something that belongs to any ready-to-hand equipment: its place. Its place becomes a matter of indifference. This does not mean that what is present-at-hand loses its 'location' altogether. But its place becomes a spatia-temporal position, a 'world-point', which is in no way distinguished from any other. [§69 413]

The classical example for the historical development of a science and even for its ontological genesis, is the rise of mathematical physics. What is decisive for its development does not lie in its rather high esteem for the observation of' facts', nor in its 'application' of mathematics in determining the character of natural processes ; it lies rather in the way in which Nature herself is mathematically projected. In this projection something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time). Only 'in the light' of a Nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like a 'fact' be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited in terms of this projection. [§69 414]

Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact that it is binding for 'Every man'; it consists rather in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered—by the prior projection of their state of Being. [§69 414]

The scientific projection of any entities which we have somehow encountered already lets their kind of Being be understood explicitly and in such a manner that it thus becomes manifest what

ways are possible for the pure discovery of entities within-the-world. The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by this understanding), and the sketching-out of the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such entities—all these belong to the totality of this projecting ; and this totality is what we call "*thematizing*". Its aim is free the entities we encounter within-the-world, and to free them in such a way that they can 'throw themselves against' a pure discovering—that is, that they can become "Objects". Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine their character 'Objectively'. Being which Objectifies and which is alongside the present-at-hand within-the world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of *making-present*. This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness by which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the 'truth'. This projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. [§69 414-15]

If, moreover, thematizing modifies and Articulates the understanding of Being, then, in so far as Dasein, the entity which thematizes, exists, it must already understand something like Being. Such understanding of Being can remain neutral. In that case readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished; still less have they been conceived ontologically. But if Dasein is to be able to have any dealings with a context of equipment, it must understand something like an involvement, even if it does not do so thematically: a world must have been disclosed to it. With Dasein's factical existence, this world has been disclosed, if Dasein indeed exists essentially as Being-in-the-world. [§69 415]

Circumspective concern includes the understanding of a totality of involvements, and this understanding is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of the "in-order-to", the "towards-which" ,the "towards-this", and the "for-the-sake-of". The interconnection of these relationships has been exhibited earlier as "significance". Their unity makes up what we call the "world". The question arises of how anything like the world in its unity with Dasein is ontologically possible. In what way must the world be, if Dasein is to be able to exist as Being-in-the-World? [§69 415]

Dasein exists for the sake of a potentiality-for-Being of itself. In existing, it has been thrown; and as something thrown, it has been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is-namely, for the sake of itself. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it understands itself in the way its "for-the-sake-of-itself" is thus connected with some current "in order-to". *That inside which* existing Dasein understands *itself*, is 'there' along with its factical existence. That inside which one primarily under stands oneself has Dasein's kind of Being. Dasein is its world existingly. [§69 416]

The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon. Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a 'whither' to which one is carried away. this "whither" of the ecstasis we call the "horizonal schema". In each of the three ecstases the ecstatical horizon is different. The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally whether authentically or inauthentically, is the "for-the-sake-of-itself". The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be taken as that in the face of which it has been thrown and that *to which* it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizonal schema of *what has been*. In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown, Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present. The horizonal schema for the Present is defined by the "in-order-to". [§69 416]

Thus the significance-relationships which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material. What is rather the case is that factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the "there", comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities understandingly is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present ; that is why we call them entities "within-the-world". The world is, as it were, already 'further outside' than any Object can ever be. [§69 417]

A L L our efforts in the existential analytic serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of Being in general. To work out this question, we need to delimit that very phenomenon in which something like Being becomes accessible—the phenomenon of the understanding of Being. But this phenomenon is one that belongs to Dasein's state of Being. Only after this entity has been Interpreted in a way which is sufficiently primordial, can we have a conception of the understanding of Being, which is included in its very state of Being; only on this basis can we formulate the question of the Being which is understood in this understanding, and the question of what such understanding 'presupposes'. Even though many structures of Dasein when taken singly are still obscure, it seems that by casting light upon temporality as the primordial condition for the possibility of care, we have reached the primordial Interpretation ofDasein which we require. We have exhibited temporality with a view to Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. We have then confirmed the temporal Interpretation of care by demonstrating the temporality of concemful Being-in-the-world. Our analysis of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has revealed that in care is rooted an equiprimordial connectedness of death, guilt, and conscience. Can Dasein be understood in a way that is more primordial than in the projection of its authentic existence? [§72 424]

It may be that as regards Being-towards-the-end the question itself may even have found its answer. But death is only the 'end' of Dasein; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which Dasein's totality is closed round. The other 'end', however, is the 'beginning', the 'birth'. Only that entity which is 'between' birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking. Accordingly the orientation of our analytic has so far remained 'one-sided', in spite of all its tendencies towards a consideration of *existent* Being-a-whole and in spite of the genuineness with which authentic and inauthentic Being-towards-death have been explicated. Dasein has been our theme only in the way in which it exists 'facing forward', as it were, leaving 'behind it' all that has been. Not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticed; but so too, and above all, has the way in which Dasein stretches along between birth and death. The connectedness of life', in which Dasein somehow maintains itself constantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-whole. [§72 425]

We have defined "resoluteness" as a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty—a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety. Resoluteness gains its authenticity as Anticipatory resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and to take it over wholly. The resolute taking over of one's factical 'there', signifies, at the same time, that the Situation is one which has been resolved upon. [§72 434]

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness, as thrown, *takes over*. In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a *handing down* to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily *as* having thus come down. If everything 'good' is a heritage, and the character of 'goodness' lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness. The more authentically Dasein resolves—and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility—the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out. Only Being free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate* [Schicksals]. This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. [§74 435]

Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities—the power of projecting oneself upon one's own Being-guilty, As such, fate requires as the ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being of care—that is to say, temporality. Only death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate ; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence.
Only an entiyy which, in its Being, is essentially **futural**, so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical "there" by shattering itself against death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of **having-been**, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be **in the moment of vision** for 'it's time'. Only authentic temporaliry which at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate—that is to say, authentic historicality. [§74 436-7]

Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. [§74 437]

Authentic Being towards-death—that is to say, the finitude of temporality—is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicality. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this, no historiology is as yet needed.
Resoluteness implies handing oneself down by anticipation to the "there" of the moment of vision ; and this handing down we call "**fate**". This is also the ground for **destiny**, by which we understand Dasein's historizing in Being-with Others. In repetition, fateful destiny can be dis closed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. [§74 438]

This question does not ask how Dasein gains such a unity of connectedness that the sequence of 'Experiences' which has ensued and is still ensuing can subsequently be linked together; it asks rather in which of its own kinds of Being Dasein as loses itself in such a manner that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal, and think up for itself a unity in which that "together" is embraced. Our lostness in the "they" and in the world-historical has earlier been revealed as a fleeing in the face of death. Such fleeing makes manifest that Being-towards-death is a basic attribute of care. Anticipatory resoluteness brings this Being-towards Death into authentic existence. The historizing of this resoluteness, however, is the repetition of the heritage of possibilities by handing these down to oneself in anticipation; and we have Interpreted this historizing as authentic historicality. Is perhaps the whole of existence stretched

along in this historicality in a way which is primordial and not lost, and which has no need of connectedness ? The Self's resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction, is in itself a *steadiness which been stretched along*—the steadiness with which Dasein as fate 'incorporates' into its existence birth and death and their 'between', and holds them as thus 'incorporated', so that in such constancy Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision for what is world-historical in its current Situation. [§75 442]

Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. [§75 443]

As fate, resoluteness is freedom to give up some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible Situation or other. The steadiness of existence is not interrupted thereby but confirmed in the moment of vision. This steadiness is not first formed either through or by the adjoining of 'moments' one to another ; but these arise from the temporality of that repetition which is futurally in the process-of-having-been-a temporality which has already been stretched along. [§75 443]

Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing. That which is familiar prescientifically in Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the Being which is specific to it. With this projection, the realm of entities is bounded off. The ways of access to them get 'managed' methodologically, and the conceptual structure for interpreting them is outlined. [§76 445]

Everyday Dasein, the Dasein which takes time, comes across time proximally in what it encounters within-the-world as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. The time which it has thus 'experienced' is understood within the horizon of that way of understanding Being which is the closest for Dasein ; that is, it is understood as something which is itself somehow present-at-hand. [§78 457]

Summary:
Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the 'world', and falls into it concernfully. As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly thrown—this entity has been disclosed as a "there". As being with Others, it maintains itself in an average way of interpreting-a way which has been Articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-the-world has always expressed itself, and as Being alongside entities encountered within-the-world, it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the very object of its concern and discussing it,

The concern of circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality-indeed in the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits. Such concern, as concernfully reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions, always says (whether audibly or not) that something is to happen 'then', that something else is to be attended to 'beforehand', that what has failed or eluded us 'on that former occasion' is something that we must 'now' make up for. [§79 458]

Why is it that when Dasein addresses itself to the objects of its concern, it also expresses a 'now that . . .', a 'then, when .. . ' , or an 'on that former occasion, when . . .' , even though it does so mostly without uttering it? First, because in addressing itself to something interpretatively, it expresses itself too; that is to say, it expresses its Being alongside the ready-to-band—a Being which understands circumspectively and which uncovers the ready-to-hand and lets it be encountered. And secondly, because this very addressing and discussing which interprets itself also-is based upon a making-present and is possible only as such. [§79 460]

Although one can concern oneself with time in the manner which we have characterized—namely, by dating in terms of environmental events—this always happens basically within the horizon of that kind of concern with time which we know as astronomical and calendrical time-reckoning. Such reckoning does not occur by accident, but has its existential-ontological necessity in the basic state of Dasein as care. Because it is essential to Dasein that it exists fallingly as something thrown, it interprets its time concernfully by way of time-reckoning. In this, the 'real' making-public of time gets temporalized, so that we must say that Dasein's thrownness is the reason why 'there is' time publicly. [§80 464]

The Being of Dasein is care. This entity exists fallingly as something that has been thrown. Abandoned to the 'world' which is discovered with its factical "there", and concernfully submitted to it, Dasein awaits its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it awaits it in such a manner that it 'reckons' on and 'reckons' with whatever has an involvement for the sake of this potentiality-for-Being-an involvement which, in the end, is a distinctive one. Everyday circumspective Being-in-the-world needs the possibility of sight (and this means that it needs brightness) if it is to deal concernfully with what is ready-to-hand within the present-at-hand. With the factical disclosedness of Dasein's world, Nature has been uncovered for Dasein. In its thrownness Dasein has been surrendered to the changes of day and night. Day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight;night takes this away. [§80 465]

This public dating, in which everyone assigns himself his time, is one which everyone can 'reckon' on simultaneously; it uses a publicly available measure. This dating reckons with time in the sense of a measuring of time; and such measuring requires something by which time is to be measured—namely, a clock. This implies that along with the temporality of Dasein as thrown, abandoned to the 'world', and giving itself time, something like a 'clock' is also discovered—that is, something ready-to-hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible in one's

making present awaitingly. The Being which has been thrown and is alongside the ready-to-hand is grounded in temporality. [§80 466]

The current 'now that so and so . . .' is as such either appropriate or inappropriate. Not only is the 'now' (and so too any mode of interpreted time) a 'now that . . .' which is essentially datable; but as such it has essentially, at the same time, the structure of appropriateness or inappropriateness. Time which has been interpreted has by its very nature the character of 'the time for something' or 'the wrong time for something'. When concern makes present by awaiting and retaining, time is understood in relation to a "for-which"; and this in turn is ultimately tied up with a "for-the-sake-of-which" of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. With this "in-order-to" relation, the time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier become acquainted as significance, and which constitutes the worldhood of the world. [§80 467]

Saying "now", however, is the discursive Articulation of a making-present which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting. The dating which is performed when one uses a clock, turns out to be a distinctive way in which something present-at-hand is made present. Dating does not simply relate to something present-at-hand; this kind of relating has itself the character of measuring. [§80 469]

We have exhibited datability as the first essential item in the time with which we concern ourselves. This is grounded in the ecstatical constitution of temporality. The 'now' is essentially a "now that . . ." . The datable "now", which is understood in concern even if we cannot grasp it as such, is in each case one which is either appropriate or inappropriate. Significance belongs to the structure of the "now". We have accordingly called the time with which we concern ourselves "world-time". In the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of "nows", both datability and significance are missing. These two structures are not permitted to 'come to the fore' when time is characterized as a pure succession. The ordinary interpretation of time covers them up. [§81 474]