The End of Division One

Passages from §§43-44 of *Being and Time*

The question of the meaning of Being becomes possible at all only if there is something like an understanding of Being. Understanding of Being belongs to the kind of Being which the entity called "Dasein" possesses. [§43 244]

Summary of "metaphysics of presence":
In our pursuit of the tasks of a preparatory existential analytic of Dasein there emerged an Interpretation of understanding, meaning, and interpretation. Our analysis of Dasein's disclosedness showed further that, with this disclosedness, Dasein, in its basic state of Being-in-the-world, has been revealed equiprimordially with regard to the world, Being-in, and the Self. Furthermore, in the factical disclosedness of the world, entities within-the-world are discovered too. This implies that the Being of these entities is always understood in a certain manner, even if it is not conceived in a way which is appropriately ontological. To be sure, the pre-ontological understanding of Being embraces all entities which are essentially disclosed in Dasein; but the understanding of Being has not yet Articulated itself in a way which corresponds to the various modes of Being. At the same time our interpretation of understanding has shown that, in accordance with its falling kind of Being,—it has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself [sich verlegt] into an understanding of the 'world'. Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the world. Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things which are (res) present-at-hand. "Being" acquires the meaning of "Reality". Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being. Corresponding to this way in which the understanding of Being' has been diverted, even the ontological understanding of Dasein moves into the horizon of this conception of Being. Like any other entity, too is Dasein present-at-hand as Real. In this way "Being in general" acquires the meaning of "Reality". Accordingly the concept of Reality has a peculiar priority in the ontological problematic. By this priority the route to a genuine existential analytic of Dasein gets diverted, and so too does our very view of the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand within-the-world. It finally forces the general problematic of Being into a direction that lies off the course. The other modes of Being become defined negatively and privatively with regard to Reality.

Thus not only the analytic of Dasein but the working-out of the question of the meaning of Being in general must be turned away from a one-sided orientation with regard to Being in the sense of Reality. We must demonstrate that Reality is not only one kind of Being among others, but that ontologically it has a definite connection in its foundations with Dasein, the world, and readiness-to-hand. [§43 245]

These investigations, which take precedence over any possible ontological question about Reality, have been carried out in the foregoing existential analytic. According to this analytic, knowing is a founded mode of access to the Real. The Real is essentially accessible only as entities within-the-world. All access to such entities is founded ontologically upon the basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even more primordial state of Being (ahead of itself—Being already in a world—as Being alongside entities within-the-world). [§43 246]

The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it? [§43 246]

But the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the 'world' has in each case been discovered too. Of course entities within-the-world in the sense of the Real as merely present-at-hand, are the very things that can remain concealed. But even the Real can be discovered only on the basis of a world which has already been disclosed. And only on this basis can anything Real still remain hidden. [§43 247]

When Kant uses the term 'Dasein' he has in mind the Being-present-at-hand of consciousness just as much as the Being-present-at-hand of Things. [§43 247]

*The Being-present-at-hand-together of the physical and the psychical is completely different ontically and ontologically from the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world*. [§43 248]

Our task is not to prove that an 'external world' is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein's falling and in the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been diverted to Being as presence-at-hand—a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself. [§43 250]

Along with Dasein as Being-in-the-world, entities within-the-world have in each case already been disclosed. This existential-ontological assertion seems to accord with the thesis of realism that the external world is Really present-at-hand. In so far as this existential assertion does not deny that entities within-the-world are present-at-hand, it agrees doxographically, as it were—with the thesis of realism in its results. But it differs in principle from every kind of realism; [§43 251]

As compared with realism, idealism, no matter how contrary and untenable it may be in its results, has an advantage in principle, provided that it does not misunderstand itself as 'psychological' idealism. If idealism emphasizes that Being and Reality are only 'in the consciousness', this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained

through entities. But as long as idealism fails to clarify what this very understanding of Being means ontologically, or how this understanding is possible, or that it belongs to Dasein's state of Being, the Interpretation of Reality which idealism constructs is an empty one. Yet the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities and that Reality is possible only in the understanding of Being, does not absolve us from inquiring into the Being of consciousness, of the res cogitans itself. If the idealist thesis is to be followed consistently, the ontological analysis of consciousness itself is prescribed as an inevitable prior task. Only because Being is 'in the consciousness'-that is to say, only because it is understandable in Dasein—can Dasein also understand and conceptualize such characteristics of Being as independence, the 'in-itself', and Reality in general. Only because of this are 'independent' entities, as encountered within-the-world, accessible to circumspection. [§43 251]

If what the term "idealism" says, amounts to the understanding that Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic. If so, Aristotle was no less an idealist than Kant. [§43 251]

If the term "Reality" is meant to stand for the Being of entities present-at-hand within-the-world (res) (and nothing else is understood thereby), then when it comes to analysing this mode of Being, this signifies that entities within-the-world are ontologically conceivable only if the phenomenon of within-the-world-ness has been clarified. But within-the-worldness is based upon the phenomenon of the world, which, for its part, as an essential item in the structure of Being-in-the-world, belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Being-in-the-world, in turn, is bound up ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein's Being, and we have characterized care as such a totality. But in this way we have marked out the foundations and the horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of Reality is to be possible. Only in this connection, moreover, does the character of the "in-itself" become ontologically intelligible. By taking our orientation from this context of problems, we have in our earlier analyses Interpreted the Being of entities within-the-world. [§43 252]

If the 'cogito sum' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The 'sum' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that "I am in a world". As such an entity, 'I am' in the possibility of Being towards various ways of comporting myself—namely, cogitations—as ways of Being alongside entities within-the- world. Descartes, on the contrary, says that *cogitationes* are present-at-hand, and that in these an ego is present-at-hand too as a worldless *res cogitans*. [§43 253]

"Reality", as an ontological term, is one which we have related to entities within-the-world. If it serves to designate this kind of Being in general, then readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand function as modes of Reality. If, however, one lets this world have its traditional signification, then it stands for Being in the sense of the pure presence-at-hand of Things.
But not all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of Things…
No matter how this Being of 'Nature' may be Interpreted, all the modes of Being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of Being-in-the world. From this there arises the insight that among the modes of Being of entities within-the-world, Reality has no priority, and that Reality is a kind of Being which cannot even characterize anything like the world or Dasein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. [§43 24-5]

[T]he fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself it is. Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in-itself '. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be. [§43 255]

Being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being; that is to say, Reality (not the Real) is dependent upon care. [§43 255]

Entities with Dasein's kind of Being cannot be conceived in terms of Reality and substantiality; we have expressed this by the thesis that the substance of man is existence. [§43 255]

What ontico-ontological connection does 'truth' have with Dasein and with that ontical characteristic of Dasein which we call the "understanding of Being"? [§44 256]

There are three theses which characterize the way in which the essence of truth has been traditionally taken and the way it is supposed to have been first defined:
(1) that the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment);
(2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgment with its object;
(3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as 'agreement'. [§44 257]

But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it

is 'true'. The Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither of these? How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? [§44 259]

Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. [§44 260]

Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. And what does one's perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one's assertion. What comes up for confirmation is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the assertion is made-which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncovers the entity towards which it is. What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion. [§44 261]
[BB: Note the Wittgenstein-McDowell point being made here: when I say and mean that things are thus-and-so, my thought and my meaning do not stop anywhere short of the fact that things are thus-and-so.]

In citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems. [§44 262]

In proposing our 'definition' of "truth" we have not shaken off the tradition, but we have appropriated it primordially. [§44 262]

Being-true as Being-uncovering, is a way of Being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called 'true' in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering. Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within-the-world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are 'true' in a second sense. What is primarily 'true'-that is, uncovering-is Dasein. "Truth" in the second sense does not mean Being-uncovering (uncovering), but Being-uncovered (uncoveredness). [§44 263]

Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is grounded in the world's disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its "there". Disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains

equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self. In its very structure, care is ahead of itself—Being already in a world—as Being alongside entities within-the-world; and in this structure the disclosedness of Dasein lies hidden. With and through it is uncoveredness; hence only with Dasein's disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. [§44 263]

(1) To Dasein's state of Being, **disclosedness** in general essentially belongs.
It embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care. To care belongs not only Being-in-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world. The uncoveredness of such entities is equiprimordial with the Being of Dasein and its disclosedness.
(2) To Dasein's state of Being belongs **thrownness**; indeed it is constitutive for Dasein's disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-world. Disclosedness is essentially factical.
(3) To Dasein's state of Being belongs **projection**—disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-Being. As something that understands, Dasein can understand itself in terms of the 'world' and Others or in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The possibility just mentioned means that Dasein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-for Being. This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the truth of **existence**. This becomes existentially and ontologically definite only in connection with the analysis of Dasein's authenticity.
(4) To Dasein's state of Being belongs **falling**. Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has diverted itself thither. Its absorption in the "they" signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Being towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities have not been completely hidden; they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance. Likewise what has formerly been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised. Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. [§44 264]

To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein's facticity. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'. But only in so far as Dasein 'has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. [§44 265]

…a primordial understanding of its own Being thus make itself known—the understanding (even if it is only pre-ontological) that Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the world? [§44 265]

The existential-ontological condition for the fact that Being-in-the-world is characterized by 'truth' and 'untruth', lies in that state of Dasein's Being which we have designated as **thrown projection**. This is something that is constitutive for **the structure of care**. The upshot of our existential-ontological Interpretation of the phenomenon of truth is (1) that truth, in the most primordial sense, is Dasein's disclosedness, to which the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world belongs; and (2) that Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth. [§44 265] [BB: These passages articulate a basis for the Chiaroscuro Principle.]

Assertion and its structure (namely, the apophantical "as") are founded upon interpretation and its structure (viz, the hermeneutical "as") and also upon understanding-upon Dasein's disclosedness. [§44 266]

Our Being alongside entities within-the-world is concern, and this is Being which uncovers. To Dasein's disclosedness, however, discourse belongs essentially. Dasein expresses itself [spricht sich aus]: it expresses itself as a Being-towards entities—a Being-towards which uncovers. And in assertion it expresses itself as such about entities which have been uncovered. Assertion communicates entities in the "how" of their uncoveredness. When Dasein is aware of the communication, it brings itself in its awareness into an uncovering Being-towards the entities discussed. The assertion which is expressed is about something, and in what it is about [in ihrem Worüber] it contains the uncoveredness of these entities. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. What is expressed becomes, as it were, something ready-to-hand within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again. Because the uncoveredness has been preserved, that which is expressed (which thus is ready-to-hand) has in itself a relation to any entities about which it is, an assertion. Any uncoveredness is an uncoveredness of something. Even when Dasein speaks over again what someone else has said, it comes into a Being-towards the very entities which have been discussed. But it has been exempted from having to uncover them again, primordially, and it holds that it has been thus exempted.…In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one's own uncovering, but rather by hearsay of something that has been said. [§44 266]

*When the assertion has been expressed, the uncoveredness of the entity moves into the kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world. But now to the extent that in this uncoveredness, as an uncoveredness **of** something, a relationship to something present-at-hand persists, the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand intellectus and res—a relationship that is present-at-hand itself.* [§44 266]

Though it is founded upon Dasein's disclosedness, the existential phenomenon of uncoveredness becomes a property which is present-at-hand but in which there still lurks a relational character; and as such a property, it gets broken asunder into a relationship which is present-at-hand. Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities—a Being which itself uncovers—has become truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth. [§44 267]

Yet that which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations existentially and ontologically, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us. [§44 267]

Dasein, in its concernful absorption, understands itself in terms of what it encounters within-the-world. The uncoveredness which belongs to uncovering, is something that we come across proximally within-the-world in that which has been expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Not only truth, however, is encountered as present-at-hand: **in general our understanding of Being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as present-at-hand**. If the 'truth' which we encounter proximally in an ontical manner is considered ontologically in the way that is closest to us, then the *logos* (the assertion) gets understood as *logos tinos*—an assertion *about* something, an uncoveredness of something; but the phenomenon gets Interpreted as something present-at-hand with regard to its possible presence-at-hand. Yet because presence-at-hand has been equated with the meaning of Being in general, the question of whether this kind of Being of truth is a primordial one, and whether there is anything primordial in that structure of it which we encounter as closest to us, cannot come alive at all. *The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle*. [§44 268]

Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial 'locus' of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the *logos* is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the *logos*: the *logos* is that way of comporting oneself which can also cover things up. [§44 268]
[BB: Cf. Irad Kimhi in *Thought and Being*.]

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. ' There is' truth only in so far as Dasein *is* and so long as Dasein *is*. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever—these are true only as long as Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness,

cannot be. Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not 'true'; it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this 'restriction' imply that the Being-true of 'truths' has in any way been diminished.

To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to 'truth'. [§44 269]

Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein's Being. Does this relativity signify that all truth is 'subjective'? If one Interprets 'subjective' as 'left to the subject's discretion', then it certainly does not. For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes asserting out of the province of 'subjective' discretion, and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the entities themselves. And only because 'truth', as uncovering, is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, can it be taken out of the province of Dasein's discretion. Even the 'universal validity' of truth is rooted solely in the fact that Dasein can uncover entities in themselves and free them. Only so can these entities in themselves be binding for every possible assertion-that is, for every way of pointing them out. [§44 270]

But Dasein is already ahead of itself in each case; this is implied in its state-of-Being as care. It is an entity for which, in its Being, its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue. To Dasein's Being and its potentiality-for-Being as Being-in-the-world disclosedness and uncovering belong essentially. To Dasein its potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world is an issue, and this includes concerning itself with entities within-the-world and uncovering them circumspectively. In Dasein's state-of-Being as care, in Being-ahead-of-itself, lies the most primordial 'presupposing'. Because this presupposing of itself belongs to Dasein' s Being, 'we' must also presuppose 'ourselves' as having the attribute of disclosedness. [§44 271]

The Being of truth is connected primordially with Dasein. And only because Dasein *is* as constituted by disclosedness (that is, by understanding), can anything like Being be understood; only so is it possible to understand Being.
Being (not entities) is something which 'there is' only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far as and as long as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially. What does it signify that Being 'is', where Being is to be distinguished from every entity? One can ask this concretely only if the meaning of Being and the full scope of the understanding of Being have in general been clarified. Only then can one also analyse primordially what belongs to the concept of a science of Being as such, and to its possibilities and its variations. And in demarcating this research and its

truth, the kind of research in which entities are uncovered, and its accompanying truth, must be defined ontologically.

The answer to the question of the meaning of Being has yet to be given (steht . . . aus]. What has our fundamental analysis of Dasein, as we have carried it out so far, contributed to working out this question? By laying bare the phenomenon of care, we have clarified the state of Being of that entity to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. At the same time the Being of Dasein has thus been distinguished from modes of Being (readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, Reality) which characterize entities with a character other than that of Dasein. Understanding has itself been elucidated; and at the same time the methodological transparency of the procedure of Interpreting Being by understanding it and interpreting it, has thus been guaranteed. If in care we have arrived at Dasein's primordial state of Being, then this must also be the basis for conceptualizing that understanding of Being which lies in care; that is to say, it must be possible to define the meaning of Being. But is the phenomenon of care one in which the most primordial existential-ontological state of Dasein is disclosed? And has the structural manifoldness which lies in this phenomenon, presented us with the most primordial totality of factical Dasein's Being? Has our investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view as a whole? [§44 272-3]

[End of Division One.]