

Passages from *Being and Time* §§1-8

...the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way.

...we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being.

Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not *know* what 'Being' means. But even if we ask, 'What *is* "Being"?', we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptionally what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed.

But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact. [§1, 5, MR 25]

Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the 'there is'. ['Sein liegt *im* Dass. und Sein, in Realität, Vorhandenheit, Bestand, Geltung, Dasein, im "es gibt".'] [§2, 7, MR26]

Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer-transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of *Being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "*Dasein*". If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being. [§2,7,MR27]

One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. Otherwise there could have been no ontological knowledge heretofore. One would hardly deny that factually there has been such knowledge. Of course 'Being' has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a *concept* at one's disposal—not as the sort of thing we are seeking. [§2,8,MR27]

Being is always the Being of an entity. The totality of entities can, in accordance with its various domains, become a field for laying bare and delimiting certain definite areas of subject-matter. These areas, on their part (for instance, history, Nature, space, life, Dasein, language, and the like), can serve as objects which corresponding scientific investigations may take as their respective themes. [§3,9,MR29]

[Kant's] transcendental logic is an *a priori* logic for the subject-matter of that area of Being called "Nature". [§3,11,MR31]

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities.

Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being.

And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly.

It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it.

Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.

Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.

Here "Being-ontological" is not yet tantamount to "developing an ontology".

So if we should reserve the term "ontology" for that theoretical inquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we have had in mind in speaking of Dasein's "Being-ontological" is to be designated as something "pre-ontological".

It does not signify simply "being-ontical", however, but rather "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being". [§4,12,MR32]

So far as existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. By "existentiality" we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea of such a constitutive state of Being, the idea of Being is already included. And thus even the possibility of carrying through the analytic of Dasein depends on working out beforehand the question about the meaning of Being in general.

Sciences are ways of Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself. But to Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially.

Thus Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 'world', and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world. So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic. [§4,13, MR33]

Therefore *fundamental ontology*, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*. [§4,13.MR34]

Here the priority of 'Dasein' over all other entities emerges, although it has not been ontologically clarified. This priority has obviously nothing in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities. [§4,14,MR34]

BB: The defensiveness gives this remark away.

Here the expression of an aspiration is put in the form of the announcement of an achievement.

MH's self-described *Kehre* has at its core rejecting this feature of *SZ*, which he came to see as

precisely a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of beings. He here marks a *major* challenge to his way of proceeding.

the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology .
[§4,14,MR35]

If to Interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself—the pre-ontological understanding of Being. [§4,14,MR35]

§5. The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as Laying Bare the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General

In demonstrating that Dasein is ontico-ontologically prior...

Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is closest: we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is farthest. To be sure, its ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner.

The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant—in terms of the 'world'. [§5, 15, MR36]

Dasein is ontically 'closest' to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger.

Not only, however, does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time; accordingly there are many ways in which it has been interpreted, and these are all at Dasein's disposal. [§5, 16, MR37]

Thus an analytic of Dasein must remain our first requirement in the question of Being.

...it is to be shown as it is *proximally and for the most part*—which we shall exhibit—not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. [§5, 17, MR38]

We shall point to *temporality* as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein".

We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state. Dasein *is* in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being.

[Dasein *ist* in der Weise, seiend so etwas wie Sein zu verstehen.']

Keeping this interconnection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with *time* as its standpoint.

Time must be brought to light-and genuinely conceived-as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, *time* needs to be *explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.* [§5, 17, MR39]

The Fact remains that time, in the sense of 'being [sein] in time', functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has come to have this distinctive ontological function...[§5, 18, MR39]

Thus the way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we shall call its "*Temporal*" determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the *Temporality of Being*. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered. [§5, 19, MR40]

In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is 'what' it already was. It *is* its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along 'behind' it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein 'is' its past in the way of *its* own Being, which, to put it roughly, 'historizes' out of its future on each occasion. Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both in to and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. [§6, 20, MR41]

Dasein can discover tradition, preserve it, and study it explicitly. [§6, 20, MR41]

If historiography is wanting, this is not evidence *against* Dasein's historicity; on the contrary, as a deficient model of this state of Being, it is evidence for it. Only because it is 'historical' can an era be unhistoriographical. [§6, 20, MR42]

The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an historical inquiry, gives us the assignment [Anweisung] of inquiring into the history of that inquiry itself, that is, of becoming historiographical. [§6, 20, MR42]

Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. [§6, 20, MR42]

When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. [§6, 21, MR43]

in the medieval ontology the meaning of Being for such an *ens* had been fixed by understanding it as an *ens creatum*. God, as *ens infinitum*, was the *ens increatum*. [§6, 24, MR46]

the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented towards the 'world' or 'Nature' in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 'time' that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this (though of course it is *mere* outward evidence) is the treatment of the meaning of Being as *parousia* or *ousia*, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, 'presence' ["Anwesenheit"]. Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time-the '*Present*'. [§6, 25, MR47]

legein itself---or rather *noein*, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being-has the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with regard to the Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (*ousia*). [§6, 26, MR48]

In provisionally characterizing the object which serves as the theme of our investigation (the Being of entities, or the meaning of Being in general), it seems that we have also delineated the method to be employed. The task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief. [§7, 27, MR49]

The expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a *methodological conception*... Thus the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' [§7, 28, MR50]

If we say that the basic signification of *logos* "discourse", then this word-for-word translation will not be validated until we have determined what is meant by "discourse" itself. The real

signification of "discourse", which is obvious enough, gets instantly covered up by the later history of the word, *logos*, and especially by the numerous and arbitrary Interpretations which subsequent philosophy has provided. *Logos* gets 'translated' (and this means that it is always getting interpreted) as "reason", "judgment", "concept", "definition", "ground", or "relationship". But how can 'discourse' be so susceptible of modification that *logos* can signify all the things we have listed, and in good scholarly usage? Even if *logos* is understood in the sense of "assertion", but of "assertion" as 'judgment', this seemingly legitimate translation may still miss the fundamental signification, especially if "judgment" is conceived in a sense taken over from some contemporary 'theory of judgment'. *Logos* does not mean "judgment"...[§7, 32, MR55]

[B]ecause the *logos* is a letting-something-be-seen, it can *therefore* be true or false.
[§7, 32, MR55]

seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure *noein* is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. [§7, 33, MR57]

What is it that by its very essence is *necessarily* the theme whenever we exhibit something *explicitly*? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.

Yet that which remains *hidden* in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets *covered up* again, or which shows itself only '*in disguise*', is not just this entity or that, but rather the *Being* of entities, as our previous observations have shown.

This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. [§7, 35, MR59]

Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision, *Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible*. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon" what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives. [§7, 35, MR60]

Covered-up-ness is the counterconcept to 'phenomenon'. [§7, 36, MR60]

With regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities—ontology. In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem—the question of the meaning of Being in general. Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a

method lies in *interpretation*. The *logos* of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a *hermeneuen* through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are *made known* to Dasein's understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a *hermeneutic* in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also becomes a 'hermeneutic' in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends. And finally, to the extent that Dasein, as an entity with the possibility of existence, has ontological priority over every other entity, "hermeneutic", as an interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the third and specific sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence; and this is the sense which is philosophically *primary*.
[§7, 37-8, MR62]

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple*. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*. Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis*. [§7, 38, MR62]

[I]t is one thing to give a report in which we tell about *entities*, but another to grasp entities in their *Being*. [§7, 38, MR63]

And where our powers are essentially weaker, and where moreover the area of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which was presented to the Greeks, the harshness of our expression will be enhanced, and so will the minuteness of detail with which our concepts are formed. [§7, 38, MR63]

The question of the meaning of Being is the most universal and the emptiest of questions, but at the same time it is possible to individualize it very precisely for any particular Dasein. If we are to arrive at the basic concept of 'Being' and to outline the ontological conceptions which it requires and the variations which it necessarily undergoes, we need a clue which is concrete. We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way of an Interpretation of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it; the universality of the concept of Being is not belied by the relatively 'special' character of our investigation. But this very entity, Dasein, is in itself 'historical', so that its ownmost ontological elucidation necessarily becomes an 'historiological' Interpretation. [§8, 39, MR63]

[O]ur treatise will thus have two parts:

Part One: the Interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being,

Part Two: basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.

Part One has *three divisions*

1. the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein;
2. Dasein and temporality;
3. time and Being.

Part Two likewise has *three divisions* ;

1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic of Temporality;
- 2, the ontological foundation of Descartes' '*cogita sum*', and how the medieval ontology has been taken over into the problematic of the '*res cogitans*';
3. Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.

Note: Part Two and the third division of Part One have never appeared.

[§8, 39-40, MR64]