

THE WEIMAR ORIGINS OF RHETORICAL INQUIRY

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3: HEIDEGGERIAN FOUNDATIONS

A NEW ORIENTATION

The center of Martin Heidegger's oeuvre, I shall argue, is not *Being and Time*. It is a sequence of initiatives undertaken in and around 1924 when the essential components of his work began to take shape and before they were collated into and covered over by the formalism and terminological abstraction of the "masterwork" of 1927. Theodore Kisiel was brilliantly correct in his hypothesis that a genuinely phenomenological approach to Heidegger's phenomenology would trace the emergence of his project during the long period from 1916 to 1926 in which he published nothing. But Kisiel remained convinced that *Being and Time* was the apex of Heidegger's thought, the terminus ad quem.¹ We need not follow him in that, and I choose not to.

In order to show that there is nothing essential to the account of the Heideggerian foundations of rhetorical inquiry outlined in this chapter that one cannot get in the earlier texts, I do not cite *Being and Time*. Or rather, I make only one exception. I do consider one line from the magnum opus—namely, the assertion that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was "the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another" (*die erste systematische Hermeneutik der Alltäglichkeit des Miteinanderseins*).² I make this exception to prove the rule: this assertion is foundational to *Being and Time*, and yet it is essentially unintelligible if one is reading the masterwork and only the masterwork. The line is a remnant or an index of how the project came to be, and it can only be understood via the earlier work. Indeed, because he was working in the 1960s without the manuscript material that has now appeared in the *Gesamtausgabe* of Heidegger's collected writings,

1. Kisiel, *Genesis*, 2: this "is basically a Book of Genesis of a great classic, perhaps the most important, of twentieth-century philosophy."

2. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 138.

one pities someone like Klaus Dockhorn, who was more or less marooned on that sentence. He insisted that there must be a rhetorical foundation for *Being and Time* and thence for Gadamer's *Truth and Method*. I think he was right, but without the earlier materials he had no means of either demonstrating or exploring his intuition.³

My position is that if Heidegger only genuinely became Heidegger in *Being and Time* then he was taking up residence in a mausoleum. After the fact, he certainly experienced the contraption of his *Being-and-Time* self as a kind of burden. It brought no great adversary. The long-delayed second part never appeared. He conceded he had no choice but to rewrite it continually from the beginning.⁴ And the raft of neologisms coined in the work did not endure. Perhaps those terms endured for the Heideggerians; for Heidegger, they did not. "Murky" (*Trübe*) and "doubtful" (*zweifelhafte*) sources though they seemed to be to Heidegger himself, the lecture courses and public talks in the years leading up to the big book are fresher, more forthright, richer.⁵

At the heart of the creativity I am identifying in 1924 were Heidegger's engagements with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Plato's *Sophist*. These were, respectively, the two texts at the center of his Summer Semester 1924 and Winter Semester 1924–1925 lecture courses, given soon after his arrival at the University of Marburg in October 1923. In Heidegger's appropriation, these Greek texts were to be acid baths for the "basic concepts" (*Grundbegriffe*) encasing philosophical inquiry. These concepts—"nature" (*phusis*, *Natur*), "motion" (*kinēsis*, *Bewegung*), "reality" (*energeia*, *Wirklichkeit*), for example—had been received, refracted, and pirated countless times in the history of philosophy since the "beginning" of their etymological odyssey in Greece.⁶ Inventive and excoriating, Heidegger's philological investments were designed to underwrite his rejection of the early twentieth-century German philosophical establishment: Marburg neo-Kantianism, Southwest philosophy of values, Husserlian phenomenology—all of them.⁷ Having been Husserl's assistant at Freiburg, Heidegger began to disaffiliate from the founder of phenomenology as soon as he got to Marburg in 1923, and the method of choice was, in the first place, etymology. Throw off the German neologism *Phänomenologie*, he said. And return to the "appearing" (*phainō*) as "a self-showing" (*sich zeigen*).⁸

Did affiliation with the Greek version of philosophical inquiry entail an inherited enmity for rhetoric and sophistic? No. Enlisting Heidegger in the

3. Dockhorn, review of *Wahrheit und Methode*, 186.

4. Heidegger, *Überlegungen II–VI*, 9, 22, 184.

5. Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 91, 147.

6. Heidegger, "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles," 249.

7. For example, Heidegger, *Platons Lehre der Wahrheit*, 68, 70, 73.

8. Heidegger, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, 6–7.

old war between philosophers and rhetoricians would occlude everything that is new and creative and useful in his early work. To be blunt, the core Heideggerian category of *Dasein* was a rhetorical category. When the term is rendered as “being” (as it usually is), it is difficult to perceive rhetorical edge. Here, I shall render the term somewhat unusually—but with justification, I think—as “situated presencing.” Neither being-here nor being-there, *Dasein* was rather the matrix of tensions set out by the articulation of a situatedness. And, of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, situating is an exquisitely rhetorical task. As presencing, *Dasein* was a finding and locating of oneself in a particular situation of speaking and listening. In fact, Heidegger’s project was to rewrite Greek ontology by recentering it from the necessary to the possible, *to* that which could be otherwise *from* that which could not. Those who have emphasized rhetoric’s affiliation with contingency have an ally in Heidegger. The core work of this chapter will be to articulate a rhetorical Heidegger and a Heideggerian rhetoric centered on the varieties of possibility he discerned.

This chapter establishes foundations for rhetorical inquiry by identifying and clarifying key concepts around appearance that will be taken up and developed further—sometimes in quite unexpected ways—in the remainder of this book. Absolutely central is the idea of the phenomenon that defines itself in the moment of its appearance that I have taken up from Heidegger. This formulation is a redescription of Heidegger’s account of truth as *alētheia*. In that account, truth becomes a process of disclosing in appearance. This is a truth that is neither a correspondence between an assertion and a state of affairs in the world nor a coherence between one assertion and another. In subsequent chapters, this Heideggerian interpretation of appearance will become first a concern for the space of appearance (in Arendt) and then a focus on the dialectical self-splitting energies at work in the moment of intensified appearance (in Benjamin). Finally (in Warburg), it will become a hypothesis about how splaying the moment of self-defining appearance into a number of images mounted on an image table sensitizes sense, enables imagination to trace multiple potential continuations, and lays out a new account of freedom.

Before taking up the challenges of interpreting Arendt, Benjamin, and Warburg as inferential fabrics within the broader narrative of the Weimar origins of rhetorical inquiry, we need to establish the Heideggerian foundation, and there are five key elements here. First, the Heideggerian account of temporality is the grammar within which *Dasein* as situated presencing happens, and in order to see that the situation of presencing is actually a rhetorical process and talent we need to work through the initial formulations of Heidegger’s rejection of previous philosophies of time. Second, to appreciate how rhetoric’s eclectic array of sensitivities to historical process

and emotional tincture are integral to the task of presencing, we need to recognize that the temporal manifold of past, present, and future emphasized in Heideggerian temporalization is actually a redescription of the Greek modalities of *entelecheia* (as duration qua achievedness), *energeia* (as activation or performance or unfolding), and *dunamis* (as potentiality). Third, turning explicitly to the Heideggerian reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Summer Semester 1924, we discover that rhetoric is intimately bound up with the faculties that are essential to the situation of presencing and that as a result rhetoric is inseparable from the kind of *epideixis* that sharpens Heidegger's phenomenology of self-definition. Fourth, in this 1924 reception, we find that rhetoric was more of a hermeneutic than a speech performance, and this allows us to see that—as a set of concepts and practices oriented to the presentation of complex situations, processes, and possibilities—rhetoric was intensively concerned with *Dasein* itself qua situated presencing. Pursuant to this emphasis, the term “rhetoric” in this chapter will predominantly mean “the tissue of theoretical insights penned in the name of rhetoric as an analytic practice.” Fifth, because of the biographical and conceptual proximity of the trajectory for rhetorical inquiry identified here to the one that propelled Heidegger into the Nazi Party in the early 1930s, I work in the final section of this chapter to show how we can take up a sequence in early Heideggerian thought without becoming committed to the particular continuation the man himself chose.

THE TIME STRUCTURE OF SITUATEDNESS

We need to have the concept of “situatedness” (*Befindlichkeit*) at our fingertips if we are to reconstruct the trajectory that took Heidegger from time and modality through rhetoric to a historiography of the massification of means and potentialization. It is absolutely critical to understand that situatedness cannot be read as either a fundamental set of facts about a situation or an array of projections foisted on a pliant “nature” to generate a situation where none had existed “objectively.” Time and space were not dimensions of being that existed somehow “outside” the world. Nor were they projections of the human imagination. Instead, both time and space were differentials in appearing that human articulation could sharpen and enrich. In this way, any reconstruction of something like a “situation” as a scene for rhetoric within the Heideggerian vocabulary needs to begin with a reenactment of Heidegger's thinking on space and—more especially—time.

Temporality was at the core of Heidegger's conceptions of situatedness, and as an indicative sample of his own most distinctive thoughts on temporality we may take up “The Concept of Time,” a lecture he gave to the Marburg Theological Faculty on July 25, 1924. This talk condensed a manuscript

bearing the same title that Friedrich-Wilhelm v. Hermann has called the “floor plan” (*Grundriß*) or even “originary draft” (*Urfassung*) of *Being and Time*.⁹ In this talk, Heidegger’s fundamental assertion was that “futurity endows time, it lays the present out and lets the past repeat itself in the mode of its having been lived.”¹⁰ Time itself was a spanning of tense—an orientation to the future, a pulling through the present, a repetition of the past as memory, as habit, as counterpoint against which a movement might distinguish itself. The present participle in my rendition of *Dasein* as “situated presencing” commits to this sense of spanning in tense itself—tense as tension.

One cannot grasp the subtle radicalness of Heidegger’s conception of time without beginning with stark denials: the future does not and will not exist; the past does not and did not exist.¹¹ That is, the future may not be thought of as something like a place, existing already “out in front of us.” Similarly, the past may not be thought of as a place, safely archived away, waiting to be dusted off and put on display. Look more closely instead at what Heidegger took from Henri Bergson: “we are always in the process of opening up before us space,” Heidegger affirmed (using Bergson’s words). We are always in the process “of closing up behind us duration.”¹² Instead of past and future as preexisting but distant dimensions, one has possible motions marking out space and an array of endurances characterized by their quality of already being there at the opening of a scene. Past and future are aspects or modes of presentness. The past is that which endures in the present, and the future is that which is already in the present but indeterminately in the mode of possibility.

Along with conventional understandings of past and future, we must similarly eviscerate conventional understandings of the present. For Heidegger, the present was not a point. It could not be understood as a still life, tableau, or snapshot. Instead, the present would be a stretching, a collision and, as it were, a mutual rebounding of past and future. Past and future were the distinctive spanning, gathering, and interpreting capacity of a presencing that was a situatedness capable of inference. This would be the sense that Heidegger later lifted from Nietzsche, for whom the “moment” or the “blink of an eye” (*Augenblick*) was, in fact, the meeting of two timelines—one past, one future. But this “meeting” was not continuation but rather

9. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 132–33.

10. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (Vortrag 1924),” 118: “Zukünftigsein gibt Zeit, bildet die Gegenwart aus und läßt die Vergangenheit im Wie ihres Gelebtheins wiederholen.”

11. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 18.

12. Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, 161: “Nous sommes en d’ouvrir toujours devant nous l’espace, de refermer toujours derrière nous la durée.” Quoted by Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 1—see also 259.

collision. As Nietzsche imagined it, past and future were timelines that flowed in opposite directions, the future pushing back against the past.¹³ In place of “the present,” insert the *Da* of *Da-sein*. Not “being-here” or “being-there” but both at once, the *Da* was a stretching or dilation produced in encounter. And this spanning of the present by encounter was “experience” (*Erfahrung*). As the Heidegger of Winter Semester 1920–1921 put it, experience “does not mean ‘to take note of’ but rather a kind of setting-of-oneself-over-against, a self-reporting of the matrix of the experiencing.”¹⁴ On this account, waiting, too, was a motion (holding or resisting), and there would be many ways of being-stationary in presencing. The coiled quality of the sprinter at the start line was not the same stasis as a peasant woman kneeling at a wayside shrine. Pasts and futures extended through the “point” of the sprinter’s motionlessness. The splay of the fingers was already a future.¹⁵

The present was not a point but a presence, or rather the present was a presencing with a variety of extensions, and here we are already on the way to the hypothesis that a phenomenon will define itself in the moment of its most extreme presencing. In Winter Semester 1920–1921, Heidegger was casting about for words with which to express the temporalization of this coming into presence. Eschewing a number of other philosophical vocabularies for expressing the relationship between “the temporal” (*das Zeitliche*) and “the supratemporal” (*das Überzeitliche*), he took up the idiom of Parousia.¹⁶ The historical appearance, when it appeared intensively, simply *was* itself. On this account, the appearance did not represent or imitate or participate. It was. At first, this was an explicitly Christian Parousia on the model of the second coming.¹⁷ What might this mean? It meant that if one wanted a definition of courage, one’s task was to show the genuinely courageous act as it had manifested itself specifically in historical time. Definition, one might say, was not a semantic issue but rather a historiographic one. Only stories could genuinely define. Later, such presence denoted the span of the “phenomenon” (*Phänomen*) itself, which was “that which shows itself *as* a showing of itself.”¹⁸ This was the point that Heidegger would transform into a philosophical position on truth.

Attending to the presencing that might be its own definition, Heidegger’s

13. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1:311.

14. Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, 9: “[Erfahrung] heißt nicht ‘zur Kenntnis nehmen,’ sondern das Sich-Auseinander-Setzen mit, das Sich-Behaupten der Gestalten des Erfahrenen.”

15. Heidegger, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik*, 217–18.

16. Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*, 45.

17. Heidegger, 97.

18. Heidegger, *Ontologie*, 67: “das, was sich zeigt, als sich zeigendes.”

Phänomenologie actively rejected the connotations of the German word, distanced itself from Husserl, and attempted to rejuvenate the concept through its Greek etymology. In the context of rhetorical inquiry, we should understand Heideggerian phenomenology as both the articulation of a rhetorical idiom for presencing and an account of the various faculties of the soul coinvolved in such presencing. Mind, or rather *psuchē*, was an array of sensitivities to motion that was indistinguishable from the world because it was part of the world's movements. Heidegger was emphasizing such sensitivity to the motions of presencing when he said that the Aristotelian analysis of the soul built up a concatenation of life capacities founded on "moving" (*kinein*) and "distinguishing" (*krinein*).¹⁹ Alongside the significant investment that Heidegger made in *phronēsis* in the Winter Semester lectures of 1924–1925, we find also *krinein*, fashioned as a "distinguishing, a raising up of one thing over against another, or indeed against the background of the genus."²⁰ This process of raising up against the background of a genus by calling attention to certain aspects of an appearance was absolutely essential to the process of naming that I shall put close to the center of Heidegger's project. And this was more than a narrowly aesthetic project, because for the early Aristotelian Heidegger, all distinctions in sensation are sensitivities of the soul pertaining to possibilities for motion.

Heidegger's project entailed no commitment to a necessitarianism in which every effect was unavoidably and absolutely the slave of its cause. The project entailed neither a belief in the unity of a phenomenon involving multiple causes and multiple effects nor a concomitant phenomenology dedicated to the task of articulating such complexity. Heidegger was committed to an older, and in various ways Greek, account of change. The step toward necessitarianism becomes more difficult to resist when one treats change of place as the paradigm for all motion. For Heidegger (as for Aristotle), however, "sensing" (*aisthesis*) was itself a motion—not in the modern sense of a "change of location" (*Platzwechsel*) but in the sense of a "becoming other" (*alloiosis*, *Anderswerden*). Motion was simply "change."²¹ For Heidegger, casting change of place as the essence of motion was characteristic of a post-seventeenth-century scientific worldview, which he read as a corruption or flattening out of the basic concept of *kinēsis*.

In his paraphrase of the Aristotelian program, motion qua *kinēsis*

19. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 30–31 and 44, where *krinein* was *Abheben und Bestimmen*. The point recurred during the next semester: Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 38–39.

20. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 243: "unterscheiden, abheben eines gegen ein anderes, und zwar das *genos*." Heidegger also emphasized the relationship between *krinein* and *Urteil* in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, 93.

21. Heidegger, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, 29. See also Heidegger, "Der Begriff der Zeit (1924)," 78.

included all the various modes of change—"all versions of a capsizing from-to" (*alle Phänomene des Umschlagens von-zu*). *Kinēsis* was simply "becoming otherwise" (*das heteron*).²² At the same time, *kinēsis* was also the "stubbornness" that might hold an appearance in a state of "achievedness" (*entelecheia*).²³ This was a being inured, coated, impervious, indifferent, or inert. In this way, change was an index of being susceptible. Here, the touchstone text was Aristotle's *Peri psychēs*, where the metaphors of choice were wax and imprinting. For Heidegger, the title of this work became an impediment when translated as *Über die Seele*, as "On the Soul," or, for that matter, as *De Anima*. The preferable alternative—per the *Nachschrift* made by Helene Weiss and Herbert Marcuse from Heidegger's Winter Semester 1923–1924 lecture cycle—was "On Being in the World" (*Über das Sein in der Welt*).²⁴ More crucial was the tactical, local discerning of phenomena that were *processes* with a range of different scales, paces, and media.

The account of change that Heidegger was attaching to his theorization of time might seem to suggest that his was a "temporal idealism" in which the individual conjures temporality into existence by remembering and projecting out from the perspective of the present, but—*pace* William Blattner—the account of temporality being rehearsed here was realist rather than idealist. Heidegger was not saying that time would be the mental life of memory and imagination pushing out from a particular point that we might term "attention." He rejected talk of what he called "the spheric" (*das Sphärische*), in which the world was pushed back and understood as a panoply of projections onto the IMAX screen of consciousness.²⁵ In his 1924 anticipations of *Being and Time*, Heidegger famously asked "am I myself time?"²⁶ He was not suggesting that time would be simply the recollections and anticipations that carved out an awareness that was in each case "mine." He was saying that time would be the motions passing through the in-each-case-mine that also, crucially, found some form of articulation. When he ventured the formulation that "time functions as a principle of individuation," Heidegger was arguing that time was the infinitely specifiable array of trajectories structuring a life: the repetitions of morning ablution; the pendula of commuting (or their absence); the work temporalities of shift and project and semester (or their absence); the affective attachments and protomovements of desire and aversion; sheer emotional sensitivity to the representations of others (irascibility, volubility, "shame-ability"); the public character that was being cast by the layering of conspicuous actions;

22. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 541.

23. Heidegger, "Der Begriff der Zeit (1924)," 78.

24. Heidegger, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, 293.

25. Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter?," in *Holzwege*, 278.

26. Heidegger, "Der Begriff der Zeit (1924)," 83: "Bin *ich* die Zeit?"

the public accelerations and decelerations of capital in inflation, interest, and wage; the biographical narration of a span between birth and death.²⁷ All of these were versions of an assertion that time was a structuring and calibrating of motions relative to each other.

The assertion that the primary constituents of time and space were differentials among processes rather than measurements generated by means of some exterior metric was subtle and difficult to grasp, but it was crucial to Heidegger's broader project, and we must secure the thought. To that end, we can compare the spanning of time and space to the scenes orchestrated by the film director George Cukor, in which bodies, exhibiting trajectories, move through shots and intersect at underdetermined angles. The effect conjured is at once disheveled and choreographic as the constellations of motion coalesce, for a time, into form before they deliquesce beyond gestalt. In this fantasy, fleeting alignment constitutes a center in time and space, a "present" complete with and extended into before and after. Like space, time might be constituted by the motions of the phenomenon that brought its own backgrounds into being. "Background" is a spatial metaphor, but the grammars of temporality—for instance, the tensings of pluperfect, imperfect, and future perfect—reinforce the fact of "emerging." As Heidegger would later characterize it, "sculpture" (*die Plastik*) was "an embodying activation of place and thus an opening of spaces, possibilities for human living."²⁸ All phenomena would structure their own time by means of the differentiation of their various calibrations of emergence. That is, the performed poem would have background temporalities in which it nestled qua event, and in its scansion that poem would generate a specific simultaneity of diverse motions. Scanning spans.

Understood as an interrelation among movements, the appearance of time itself in the emergence of a phenomenon would depend on "situated presencing" (*Dasein*), which was not something that would happen automatically given that it depended on forms of synchronization that would sometimes take the form of articulation. Motion's worldliness—its capacity to bring complex time spaces into being—would rely on sensitivities that could move along with it, trace its trajectories, and gather its complexities. Narrative would be a kind of selection making it possible to follow motions extending beyond the parameters of the most basic modes of being-in-the-world—namely, touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight. As Rilke put it (in a line collected by Heidegger), "we [human beings] are the bees of

27. Heidegger, 82: "die Zeit gilt als ein *principio individuationis*."

28. Heidegger, *Die Kunst und der Raum*, 13: "ein verkörperndes Ins-Werk-Bringen von Orten und mit diesen ein Eröffnung von Gegenden möglichen Wohnens der Menschen, möglichen Verweilens der sie umgebenden, sie angehenden Dinge."

the invisible.”²⁹ The worlding effected by human beings was, in essence, a bringing into being of complex temporal manifolds.

As Heidegger maintained (even to the end of his life), “the fundamental thought in my thinking is simply that being [*das Sein*]—or, rather, the manifestation [*die Offenbarkeit*] of being—needs humans and that, by the same token, humans are only humans insofar as they stand in that manifestation of being.”³⁰ “Manifestation” (*Offenbarkeit*) here stressed a kind of counterpositioning and reciprocal inscribing that emerged when a phenomenon stretched attention out beyond the boundaries of what we conventionally refer to as the “recent past” and the “near future.” I both structure and am structured by the phenomenon to which I call attention. All souls would have their modes of “distinguishing” and “moving” (*krinein* and *kinein*), and all souls would have their own affordances—neither “material” nor “immaterial”—for participating in the articulation of being qua presencing as a motley of causes, actions, effects, and responses. Nevertheless, the wealth of human capacities for complex pasts, complex futures, and complex counterfactuals would make humanity’s contribution to such articulation distinctive.

THE MODAL DIMENSIONS OF SITUATEDNESS

Ultimately, we cannot articulate the Heideggerian account of time without a robust revision of thoughts about modality. Conventionally enumerated, the modal categories are possibility, impossibility, and necessity. In Heidegger, we see that these categories—possibility especially—are constitutive of time itself. The possibility of an action in the future simply is the configuration of a particular “temporalization” (*Zeitigung*). We are now in a position to understand this temporalization as the spanning of presence qua coming into being and passing away. One of Heidegger’s most crucial assertions is that being does not exhibit constancy. The totality of being in a world ebbs and flows without possessing any kind of absolute “quantity.” Within a Heideggerian frame of reference, this conclusion derives from a rereading of “possibility” (*Möglichkeit*) as lack of specification. It is not that possibility is not. It is rather that possibility is a presencing that is vague such that it can still become many or at least several things. Again, situatedness is an articulation of temporalization (*Zeitigung*) that participates in the progressive determination of what will almost always remain a somewhat

29. Cited by Heidegger, “Wozu Dichter?,” in *Holzwege*, 284: “wir sind die Bienen des Unsichtbaren.”

30. Heidegger, *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*, 69: “der Grundgedanke meines Denkens ist gerade der, daß das Sein beziehungsweise die Offenbarkeit des Seins den Menschen braucht und daß umgekehrt der Mensch nur Mensch ist, sofern er in der Offenbarkeit des Seins steht.”

indeterminate field. Necessity happens rarely or never. The articulation of possibilities—and modality more generally—simply is the articulation of situatedness.

In order to develop his account of temporalization by expressing its connection to modality, Heidegger invested a great deal of intellectual energy in the basic modalities of Greek ontology, where the key terms were *entelecheia*, *energeia*, and *dunamis*. To trace his thought, we need to work through these modalities ourselves.

On the account fashioned by Heidegger, *entelecheia* was a being-in-a-state-of-finishedness (*Fertigsein*). This was a reading of the Greek term that Heidegger took up from Hermann Diels, although Diel's gloss is now disputed.³¹ As a movement, *entelecheia* was a having come to an enduring halt, completion. It was "the entity that holds itself in the most proper possibility of its own being, so that its possibility is achieved" and thereby, in a sense, exhausted.³² True, Aristotle's example had been the motions of the heavens. An ur-form of *entelecheia* was circularity or orbit. Such motions were not motionless as such, but they had come to a developmental halt in the sense that they had achieved—or were believed to have achieved—an enduring stability exhibiting itself as repetition. In Heidegger's Summer Semester 1924 paraphrase, "being [*das Seiende*] as *kosmos* is characterized by means of the presence of that which is always already there, *Parousia*."³³ And here *kosmos* is to be understood less in the sense of "universe" and more in the sense of "order" as an array of precise displacements constituting "ornament."

Crucially, *entelecheia* would actually have a much broader everyday character for Heidegger. The heavens were the primordial everyday—each and every day. But the workaday frames of the home, the studio, and the built environment had also come to an end, in the sense that they endured in the states that defined them. Having been constructed, they were "achieved" (*hergestellt*). Or, rather, their decay was gradual enough that it might look like stasis, their maintenance cyclical enough that care was constant or reliably seasonal. For this reason, pastness was very often an environment of everyday durations set out by fashioned matter. These were objects (the desk) and frames (the house) that marked out a kind of ersatz givenness on account of their relative immobility.

31. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 296, where he cited Hermann Diels, "Etymologica." Diels distinguished quite strictly between *energeia* and *entelecheia*, and Heidegger followed him in this. More recent scholars have disagreed. See Chen, "Relation Between the Terms *Energeia* and *Entelecheia*," 12–17, and Gonzales, "Whose Metaphysics of Presence?" 533–68.

32. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 90: "ein solches Seiendes, das sich selbst hält in seiner eigentlichen Seinsmöglichkeit, so daß die Möglichkeit vollendet ist."

33. Heidegger, 267: "das Seiende als *kosmos* ist charakterisiert durch die Gegenwärtigkeit dessen, was immer schon da ist, *parousia*."

If *entelecheia* named the ways in which the past might be a dimension of the present as duration, *energeia* named processes of emergence against the background of duration. *Energeia* was thus a “being-in-action qua activation” (*Im-Werke-Sein*). This was not an achieved form in the manner of *entelecheia*. *Energeia* was on the way to achieving form.³⁴ It was a reaching for form that emerged out of the background of achieved form, *entelecheia*. To call *energeia* the modality of the present would activate received and unhelpful understandings of time. It was instead a *commencing* of performance. Just so, in the later essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the rising out of a background that was the “work or working of art” was, precisely, an *energeia*.³⁵ Figure and ground relations in works of figural art were particularly evocative of the moment that Heidegger wished to isolate—namely, the moment in which an artistic process brought something into view.

Heidegger struggled with different ways of rendering the Greek term in German. He avoided the term *Wirklichkeit*, which did, in some ways, seem to be the most obvious candidate. Literally, the term denoted something like “work-li-ness” (the quality of being at work, in play, in process). Usage had overwritten the literal meaning of the term, however. To Heidegger’s ear, it retained only an abstract philosophical status, denoting something in the vicinity of the English terms “reality” or “actuality.”³⁶ For a time (in the earlier 1920s), Heidegger’s German substitute for *energeia* was *Zeitigung* itself. This term denoted not only a “producing, yielding, or activating” but also—more literally—“the giving of a temporal structure to something, laying it out in time” or “possessing futurity.” This was an impending future as form.³⁷ Heidegger’s Summer Semester 1922 lecture course had been completely saturated in the term *Zeitigung*, where it meant not only “execution” or “implementation” (*Vollzug*) but also *energeia*.³⁸ This was an emerging from a background, but it was also the specifying of a temporal domain. *Energeia* as *Zeitigung* was a narrowing of focus between past and future.

As a performance that alluded to but had not yet specified form, *energeia* required the invention of *dunamis*, which became the specific time quality of a performance that could be but was not. In many ways, *dunamis* was the modality most difficult to think. To Plato, for instance, conceiving of *dunamis* appeared to entail speaking somehow of the being of nonbeing. This was a “being-in-a-state-of-nonactualized-possibility” (*Möglichsein*). Possibility, on this account, was not some raw logical or physical “compatibility-with.” It was, instead, a kind of *indeterminateness* in being such that the range

34. Heidegger, 70.

35. Heidegger, “Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in *Holzwege*, 28 (*Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen*), 68 (*energeia*).

36. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 70.

37. See, for example, Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen*, 76–77.

38. Heidegger, 42, 102ff.

of coming states for a given phenomenon was neither entirely open nor whittled down to one. That is to say—and this is a crucial point—possibility was an embedded and vague futurity. More precisely (in a better and more surprising formulation), possibility was the future that already existed in the present as vagueness.

As Heidegger had put it in “The Concept of Time” of 1924 (the manuscript, not the talk), futurity would be an inseparability of the “can” from the “is.” That is, “so far as being-there”—facticity, embeddedness, situatedness—“is determinate on account of this ‘I can,’ the ensuing ‘being-in-the-midst-of’ [*Insein*] emerges as being-possible [*Möglichsein*],” and “a facticity always is—authentically or inauthentically—that which it can be.”³⁹ The nonbeing of possibility was not a form of radical disappearance or nothingness. Its nonbeing was rather a limited explicitness, a being-in-a-state-of-partial-concealment. Possibility was an “absence” (*Abwesenheit*) but in the mode of “privation” (*steresis*). It was a darkness, but positively so, in the sense that it marked out the possibility of light. This was a blurriness that could sharpen into a number of different phenomena.⁴⁰ As Heidegger put it in Summer Semester 1924, such an “absence” (*Abwesenheit*) was “not simply nothing but rather a certain something in the manner of a deficiency” or lack of clarity.⁴¹

Dunamis was a corollary of *energeia*. One could not conceive of capacity without a concept of activity. Possibility was the nonactivity of an activity that was, in some sense, proximate. The possible was not something detachable from the actual because it could not be understood as a variety of scenarios out there in the future. The possible was already making its presence felt as an underdetermining of the world. *Dasein* simply was *Möglichsein*; “situated presencing” simply was “being-possible.” Thus, “experience” (*Erfahrung*) itself was not quarantined in some time slice of the now. Experience was *itself* trajectory. As Heidegger had put it in Summer Semester 1921, “the *direction of experiencing reveals*: possibles *unlock possibilities*, but only when these possibilities are experienced as directions, that is, when the facticity of a life lives in directed execution—qua directed.”⁴²

39. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 44: “sofern das Dasein durch dieses ‘ich kann’ bestimmt ist, offenbart sich schon sein nächstes Insein als Möglichsein,” and “es ist immer—ob eigentlich oder uneigentlich—was es sein kann.”

40. Heidegger, *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, 10: “die Dunkelheit ist *en dunamei on*, etwas durchaus Positives.”

41. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 33: “nicht einfach nichts, sondern es ist etwas da, aber in einem Mangel.”

42. Heidegger, *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, 253: “die *Richtung des Erfahrens zeigt an*: Möglichen, *schließt Möglichkeiten auf* das aber nur dann, wenn sie als Richtungen erfahren werden, d. h., wenn die Faktizität des Lebens selbst in gerichteten Vollzugs—als gerichtetem—lebt.”

Possibility might be a “horizon of expectation” (*Erwartungshorizont*), but experience and expectation were indistinguishable. They constituted the selfsame spanning.⁴³ “Life,” Heidegger confirmed, simply “is its particular possibilities.”⁴⁴ For this reason, it was impossible to distinguish being from nonbeing in a radical way. Where there was motion, there was nonbeing. Where there was capacity for motion, there, too, was nonbeing.

Although it is important to specify in sequence the conceptual fields of *entelecheia*, *energeia*, and *dunamis*, it is equally important to see that they must always be understood together. Just so, the temporality of activation did not overwrite those of the other modalities but instead depended on them. Indeed, activation was a change that could structure predication. The kind of “change” (*alloiosis*) that did not alter the identity of a phenomenon generated a distinction between “that which had already been present” (*hypokeimenon*) and “that which then appeared subsequently” (*to sumbebēkos*). Later, this distinction would be reduced to a logical separation of accident from substance in the context of predication. In this process of philosophical conceptualization, however, the “accidental” quality that could attach to a substance—but was not necessary to its nature—came to lose its temporal span. Contingency, that is, was not the future revisability of all commitments. Contingency was instead the stretching of a present state back through its previous metamorphoses. Not “substance” as such, the *hypokeimenon* was more like a background, an already there, out of which deeds, matters, or going concerns (*pragmata*) would emerge.⁴⁵ Substances were not absolute; they *were* insofar as there was change, for change was at base different rates of change and was therefore constituted by relations within the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous.

Entelecheia, *energeia*, and *dunamis* were all complex modalities taking different forms, but *dunamis* qua possibility was particularly complex and complex in a counterintuitive way that we need to grasp. Possibility might structure a situation in a host of different ways. It was not simply the distinct possibility that gave a situation a very determinate structure in the mode of dread. Possibility was also a kind of oversupply of possibilities that shuttled between anxiety at permutations too numerous to follow and, crucially, a kind of jumble in which the capable-of-being-otherwise of an aspect glossed simply as lack of pertinence. Paraphrasing Augustine, Heidegger had described “possibility” (*Möglichkeit*) as “the real ‘burden’” (*der eigentlich “Last”*).⁴⁶ But this burden was also an underdetermination in being

43. Heidegger, 207.

44. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, 84: “Das Leben . . . ist seine Möglichkeiten.”

45. Heidegger, “Dasein und Wahrsein,” 75.

46. Heidegger, *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, 249.

that permitted multiple continuations. It was imprecise. Indeed, the greater the number of apparently unrelated characteristics attached loosely to a phenomenon, the greater was the sense in which that phenomenon *was* not and did not exist.

At a certain point, an oversupply of possibilities began to look like nothing in the sense of no-thing-in-particular. As Heidegger had put it in Summer Semester 1922, “that which is merely ‘accessory’ [*das Mithafte*] looks like something that approaches nonbeing.”⁴⁷ The jumble was a loose bundle of the “accidental” (*sumbebēkos*, *Mithafte*), where the “qualities” coincident with a phenomenon could not double as its definition. Indeed, under such conditions, it might be difficult to pull appearance out of the flux as *a* phenomenon at all. Such contingency did not possess defined contours of “coming-into-being” (*genesis*) or “passing-away” (*phthora*).⁴⁸ There would be alternating periods of slackness and tautness in being. At one extreme, there were periods in which the greater part of the information being received would be deemed immaterial—“noise.” At the other extreme, there would be moments of definition at which every aspect of a thing would appear to be essential to its being *that* thing and not another.

The “nothing” (*Nichts*) that was “being-possible” (*Möglichsein*) qua underdetermination and openness was the originary ground of affect, primarily fear but also its many species and configurations shading through dread and anxiety. Heidegger was appropriating this conception of “nothing” from ancient metaphysics, which, he argued, “understood nothingness in the sense of nonbeing, that is, the unformed matter that cannot fashion itself into a formed and thus appearance-offering being.”⁴⁹ As he said repeatedly in 1924 (in “The Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy” and “The Concept of Time”), “fear is a finding of oneself in the presence of nonbeing.”⁵⁰ Being-possible was a being-ambiguous. When Heidegger asked the apparently inscrutable question of why there was being and not much more nothing, he was actually pointing out that vagueness ought to be understood as a basic mode of being and that most vagaries are never tested. Testing a vagary would not mean finding out what that phenomenon had been all along but in an opaque way. Testing a vagary was in fact manipulating the circumstances of its existence such that it might be specified and rendered determinate for the first time. Heidegger was saying it is a wonder there is as much specificity in the world as there is.

47. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen*, 251: “es sieht das Mithafte als so etwas aus, das nahe am Nichtsein ist.”

48. Heidegger, 251.

49. Heidegger, *Was Ist Metaphysik?*, 25: “faßt das Nichts in der Bedeutung des Nichtseienden, d. h. des ungestalteten Stoffes, der sich selbst nicht zum gestalthaften und demgemäß ein Aussehen (*eidos*) bietenden Seienden gestalten kann.”

50. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 42: “die Angst ist das Sichbefinden vor dem Nichts.”

“Determination” qua *Bestimmung* could imply specification as distinct from the determinism that connoted necessity. In Heidegger, this denotation occasioned some surprising assertions about the nature of both “possibility” (*Möglichkeit*) and “necessity” (*Notwendigkeit*) that broke with earlier philosophical approaches. In the German philosophical tradition, there had been a particular sense in which *Möglichkeit* was *Notwendigkeit*. This was a species of possibility cast as the necessity that followed from autonomy. That is, per Kant, one could legislate a rule for oneself such that freedom and obligation coincided. In Heidegger’s 1919 Summer Semester articulation of the “philosophy of values” (*Wertphilosophie*), this line of thinking surfaced in the formulation that necessity was not a “factual ‘incapacity-to-do-otherwise’” (*faktisch “Nichtanderstunkönnen”*) but rather a “requirement of the ought” (*Notwendigkeit des Sollens*).⁵¹

Within the account that Heidegger was developing, however, necessity might be something that existed but only rarely in situations that had achieved an extraordinary degree of determinateness understood as extreme explication. In Summer Semester 1920, Heidegger identified “potency” (*Potenz*), which he thought of as the central tenet of psychology, as “the possibility of determination” (*die Möglichkeit der Bestimmung*) or the *specifying* of a rule in an act.⁵² Possibility was that which lay between the fully determinate and the entirely indeterminate. This was the domain of the imagination, which, Heidegger argued, had been the decisive and conceptually unmastered heart of Kant’s critiques. “Imagination” (*Einbildungskraft*) was both a power of immersion in the senses in the absence of an object (a power of “en-picture-ing”) and a power of establishing rules.⁵³ Possibility was not an “empty conceptual—logical—possibility, understood as whimsy [*Beliebigkeit*], such that a body might be placed either here or there,” unrelated to anything else and without consequence. Rather, “*dunamis* is a possibility that has a certain presketched quality, something that always carries with it a direction,” and “this [moderate] determinateness of *dunamis* belongs to the *topos* [the place or particular space of possibility] itself.”⁵⁴ In this way, possibility existed along the spectrum of determination. And, drawing on a different tradition in Summer Semester 1924, Heidegger also characterized “necessity” (*Notwendigkeit* qua *anagkaion*) as

51. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und transcendente Wertphilosophie*, 154.

52. Heidegger, *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks*, 106.

53. Heidegger, *Kant*, 121. *Einbildungskraft* was also ein *Vermögen der Regeln* (69, 142), the *Abbildung*, *Nachbildung*, and *Vorbildung* constitutive of time as spanning (166–67, 169), and a matrix of trajectories stretching out of the blurs of presence (178).

54. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 109: “leere begriffliche—logische—Möglichkeit, als Beliebigkeit, so daß es dem Körper freigestellt wäre, da oder dort zu sein.” Instead, “die *dunamis* ist eine Möglichkeit, die eine bestimmt vorgezeichnete ist, die immer eine Direktion in sich trägt,” and “dieses Bestimmtheit der *dunamis* gehört zum *topos* selbst.”

a “determination of being” (*Bestimmung des Seins*). In this appropriation of Greek thought, necessity was a narrowing of possibility and not simply its opposite. The *anagkaion* was the place of constraint, the prison, the bind.⁵⁵ The point carried two implications: first, absolute necessity might be rare or nonexistent; second, relative necessity—in which the range of possible motions was deeply but not absolutely restricted—was common.

RHETORIC, *EPIDEIXIS*, AND *ALĒTHEIA*

Heidegger’s most intensive engagement with rhetoric came in his Summer Semester 1924 lectures, “The Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy.” What we must notice there is the degree to which rhetoric was written into the very foundations of the Heideggerian project that we have been tracing in the previous sections on temporality and modality. As I am reconstructing it, this project was dedicated to the elaboration of a philosophical vocabulary apt to reveal how phenomena might name themselves in the course of appearing. This entailed a fundamental revision of the notion of “existence.” Such existence would not be constant. Instead, it would fluctuate as a phenomenon approached and then overshot self-definition as it cycled through *dunamis*, *energeia*, and *entelecheia* in the course of its temporalization. As we have seen in the two previous sections, Heidegger’s account of naming required a reconceptualization of time as a matrix of differentials structured by the narrativizations of such coming into being and passing away, and it required a repurposing of Greek categories of modality. It also required the construction of an account of truth as a being-true. In the current section, I turn to this account of being-true.

For Heidegger, truth would be a phenomenon in the moment of its self-definition. What is surprising about his 1924 “Basic Concepts” lectures, however, is the degree to which he recast rhetoric as the field of inquiry in which the life capacities essential to this process of unconcealing were themselves refined. In order to grasp this point, we have to overcome some remarkably stubborn misreadings of rhetoric’s relation to “being-true.” Having done that, we can understand how Heidegger could say, on a number of quite different occasions (and decades after 1924), that rhetoric stood at the core of naming. I am arguing that rhetoric was intimately related to the *epideixis* or “manifestation” project at the heart of Heideggerian thought. As Heidegger conceived it, rhetoric simply was one of the practices in which situated presencing happened.

We may anchor Heidegger’s engagement with the rhetorical tradition in a newly available text, “Situated Presencing and Being-True according

55. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 3.

to Aristotle,” which was published in an English edition and translation in 2007 and then in the original German in 2016 as *Dasein und Wahrsein (nach Aristoteles)*.⁵⁶ Heidegger delivered this talk on several occasions in late 1924. In reference to the lecture as it was given at the University of Cologne (hosted by Max Scheler, probably on December 3), Theodore Kisiel has done a great deal to contextualize the speech in the scene of the French occupation of the Ruhr from 1923 to 1925, calling it Heidegger’s “Ruhr-Speech.”⁵⁷ The lecture offers us early glimpses of the Heideggerian intuition that phenomena rather than representations “are true.” Above all else, however, we must understand that “being-true”—or “presencing truthfully”—is something that only emerges out of and always in relation to “situated presencing.”

On the account Heidegger was developing in 1924, the appearance of a thing genuinely as itself such that it might name itself took place in relation to the variety of other possible appearances of that thing. Recall that in its Aristotelian mode of *dunamis* rhetoric was for Heidegger a possibility. This was a major claim and not simply the imprecise repetition of a received topos. Heidegger was revealing a great deal about his own revision of Greek ontology when he said that “possibility” possesses a “greater worth than actuality.”⁵⁸ Here, Heidegger was inverting an Aristotelian topos. He meant that possibility was more primordial than actuality, because moments of extreme self-defining presencing would be relatively rare and because such presencing would emerge as the progressive exclusion of possible alternatives constituting the ambiguity of possibility as nonpresencing. Possibility was the primordial ambiguity out of which all actualization emerged. Because rhetoric was a possibility of specifying possible adjacencies, it was intimately bound up with the project of presencing itself. The Aristotelian rhetoric Heidegger was parsing revealed the stances that could credibly be taken up around an issue. For Heidegger, the implication was clear: the speaking that contributed to the genuine showing forth of a thing was also the speaking that contradistinguished that understanding of the thing from all of the credible and received forms clustered around it. “Initial breakthroughs in the opening of beings” will come to pass, said Heidegger, “with compendia of the dominant viewpoints of them, given that in most cases an element of the true phenomenon is contained there.”⁵⁹ Rhetoric, on Heidegger’s

56. See Heidegger, “Being-There and Being-True,” in *Becoming Heidegger*, 214–37; and Heidegger, “Dasein und Wahrsein,” 57–101.

57. See especially Kisiel, “Situating Rhetorical Politics,” 185–208.

58. Heidegger, “Dasein und Wahrsein,” 97: “Möglichkeit—höhere Dignität als die Wirklichkeit.”

59. Heidegger, “Dasein und Wahrsein,” 67: “vorbrechendes Erschließen des Seienden am Leitfaden der herrschenden Ansichten von ihm, in denen zumeist ein Stück von echt Gesehenem beschlossen liegt.”

account, was the diagnostic and descriptor of the domain of possibility out of which the presencing of being-true emerged. In the earlier 1920s, rhetoric was thus explicitly built into the foundations of Heideggerian inquiry.

We must notice and then avoid the trap into which one can fall while interpreting the lecture that Heidegger gave in Cologne. On account of its purposiveness, oratory would seem to be an other of “being-true” (*Wahrsein*), for in “being-true” the phenomenon would manifest itself. Because of Heidegger’s frequent but never entirely sustained denunciations of the concealment of being in the everydayness of established habits, readers sometimes lapse into the supposition that his basic project was a moralization of individual distinctiveness followed by a progressive abandonment of this position in his later work. Indeed, even in Brian Hansford Bowles’s preface to the English translation of the “Ruhr-Speech,” we are told that “since Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* deals not with philosophical statements but with the everyday mode of public discourse and its mode of concealing and unconcealing, Heidegger’s focus on it is only preliminary.”⁶⁰ To say this is to suppose that “facilitating by means of speech the appearance of a thing in its true form” (*aletheuein*) emerges from engagements with “philosophical statements” and not from engagements with “the everyday mode of public discourse.” Received Heidegger overwhelms our ability to perceive the real thought. “Sound not like *hoi polloi*,” we conjure Heidegger saying. “Fall not into the ways of the many, the mass, the average, the statistically generated (and degenerate), the indistinct, *the everyone and no one in particular*”—thus and so, the Heidegger of academic legend. These are Bowdlerized, received formulations that stand in the way of access to the novel Heideggerian position in 1924.

In order to identify and then reject the common misreading, we should take up a standard if usually implicit syllogism: Heidegger fetishized authenticity; rhetoric is the height of inauthenticity; ergo, Heidegger must have found rhetoric anathema. Yet he did not. To extract oneself from this mistake, one has to reconceive the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity. Not simply an opposite of authenticity, inauthenticity was its condition of possibility. That is, authenticity only ever emerged out of inauthenticity. Rhetoric was more basically preoccupied with identifying newer, more original, more pertinent modes of articulation. We read Heidegger saying that “the greatest among [the Greeks] undertook a struggle for [unconcealment, *Unverborgenheit*], a struggle against sophistic and rhetoric” and that “we can scarcely any longer comprehend the scale of this spiritual confrontation of the Greeks with themselves and their situated

60. Bowles, “Introduction to the Cologne Address,” in Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger*, 217.

presencing [*Dasein*].”⁶¹ Here, we must not fall into the trap of seeing just one more denigration of rhetoric, because the astounding fact in this particular construction is that Heidegger was aligning oratory with *Dasein* itself. Oratory is the embeddedness of “presencing” (*Sein*) in its “situatedness” (*Befindlichkeit*), and Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was the analytic of both.

“The possibility of an authentic speaking” (*die Möglichkeit eines eigentümlichen Sprechens*) emerged only on the basis of a received embedding of speech.⁶² On this account, rhetoric staged a fundamental confrontation between “the speaking that revealed a phenomenon” (*Rede*) and “the received, homeless, tone-deaf hear-then-say that lacked pertinence to the matter at hand” (*Gerede*). “Idle talk” (*Gerede*) was not radically other than genuine speech. It was a once-genuine speaking in the moment of its being repeated out of place.⁶³ One had to *begin* in one’s embeddedness and embark on the work of distinguishing there.⁶⁴ In a sense, such embeddedness was “the cluster of received opinions” (*endoxa*) that constituted an aporia, but aporia was to be understood in the potentially positive sense of an inability to mouth the assertions of others without arriving at a question.⁶⁵

In order to disabuse ourselves of the common error that Heidegger the authenticity fetishist could not have had any real interest in rhetoric, we have to recall that oratory (speech performance) was not identical with rhetoric (speech analysis). In fact, given its orientation to the specific situation, rhetoric was an analytic of the possibilities for “being-true” (*Wahrsein*) under conditions of “presencing within a particular spatiotemporal elaboration” (*Dasein*). Thus, for Heidegger, the crucial document of Greek speech was not Demosthenes and his speeches but rather Aristotle and his *Rhetoric*. Ignoring at that point—and, indeed, for the most part—the *Organon* (the prior and posterior analytics combined with the topics), Heidegger declared that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was “the fundamental doctrine of *logos*, the original ‘logic.’”⁶⁶ Thus, in the now classic formulations of the Summer Semester 1924 lectures on the basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was “a concrete documentation of the originality” (*der konkret Beleg für die*

61. Heidegger, “*Dasein und Wahrsein*,” 67: “die Größten unter ihnen führten den Kampf um sie, ein Kampf [?] gegen Sophistik und Rhetorik. Wir vermögen uns kaum mehr ein Bild zu machen von der Größe dieser geistigen Auseinandersetzung der Griechen mit sich selbst und ihrem *Dasein*.”

62. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 38.

63. Heidegger, “*Der Begriff der Zeit* (1924),” 35: “im *Gerede* verhärtet sich die Auslegung zu *Ausgelegtheit*.”

64. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 63–64.

65. Heidegger, 367.

66. Heidegger, “*Dasein und Wahrsein*,” 63: “*Rhetorik*—die Fundamentallehre vom *Logos*, die ursprüngliche ‘*Logik*.’”

Ursprünglichkeit) of the Greek view of *logos*.⁶⁷ Possessing it was “better than having a philosophy of language” (*besser, als wenn wir eine Sprachphilosophie hätten*).⁶⁸ Here was Heidegger weaving the *Rhetoric* into his broader history of European philosophy and its progressive deliquescence.

I am claiming that even as he played the type often enough denouncing “the everyone and no one in particular” was not Heidegger’s true project and that we should pay more attention instead to the points at which he said the indistinctness of the average had a positive role to play. As the Heidegger of Summer Semester 1923 had put it, “the indistinct and indiscriminate ‘they’ [*das Man*] actually has something positive about it; it is not simply a phenomenon of decadence; instead, it is a ‘how’ of factual being-there.” The famous category of *das Man* is a casing and frame for situatedness.⁶⁹ Again, note the peculiarity of Heidegger’s account of Aristotle: “this everyday speaking—and *this* is the true discovery made by Aristotle [!]
—is not directed at *alētheia* [truth as unconcealedness] but has nonetheless a certain propriety, because it belongs to the meaning of everyday life in that it moves within a certain perimeter of appearance.” Heidegger went on to say that “everyday speaking, which is not in any express way a form of *aletheuein* [disclosing or letting appear], derives its distinctive vindication.”⁷⁰ Average-ness was an indistinctness of being permitting many continuations. It was a tissue of habits—routines, pathways, infrastructures. As a background, it was a condition of possibility for a more distinct actualization.

Arbitrary, plenipotent, and creative, Heidegger declared that rhetoric was not simply “persuading” (*peithein*). With his classification of rhetoric, he proceeded to suture it into the account of temporality and modality that we examined in the first two sections of this chapter. Rhetoric was not persuading as such, nor was it “a practicing without knowledge of principles” (*empeiria*). Heidegger rejected Plato’s handle on rhetoric as *empeiria* in the *Gorgias* as “really *quite* primitive.” He was more interested in the sense articulated in the *Phaedrus* of rhetoric as a *psuchagōgia*, “a leading of the soul.” And his imagination was fired in his Winter Semester 1924–1925 lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* by the nonbeing of *technē*, “a power of bringing into being,” which dealt with relationships between that which existed and that which did not yet exist. In the end, however, Heidegger affiliated himself most

67. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 61.

68. Heidegger, 117.

69. Heidegger, *Ontologie*, 17: “das *Man* hat etwas bestimmtes Positives, es ist nicht nur Verfallsphänomen, sondern als solche ein wie des faktischen Daseins.”

70. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 339: “dieses alltägliche Sprechen—das ist die eigentliche Entdeckung des Aristoteles—geht nicht auf die *alētheia*, hat aber doch ein gewisses Recht, weil es zum Sinn des alltäglichen Daseins gehört, daß es sich in gewissem Umkreis im Augenschein bewegt,” and “von daher nimmt dann auch das Sprechen, das nicht ausdrücklich *aletheuein* ist, sein eigenständiges Recht.”

basically with Aristotle on the question of rhetoric.⁷¹ And for him, within the Aristotelian corpus, the authentic conception of rhetoric was as a *dunamis*, a possibility not a practice, not an art, not a “theory” (or, at least, not as that term is used today).

There is probably a sense in which Heidegger’s preference for characterizing rhetoric as a *dunamis* was tendentious, but if anything this is evidence of Heidegger’s desire to include rhetoric in his temporalizing account of the modalities and to revise that account by means of the preoccupations and interpretative possibilities he found in rhetoric. In Heidegger’s translation of the key Aristotelian definition, *rhetoric* was “die Möglichkeit, am jeweils Gegebenen zu sehen das, was für eine Sache, die Thema der Rede ist, spricht, jeweilig zu sehen das, was für eine Sache sprechen kann.”⁷² Paraphrasing rather than translating, we can say that rhetoric was a possibility of seeing. It was a possibility of seeing in the midst of a particular given, or as Heidegger recast it in a subsequent variation amid what is on offer in a particular situation of being-with-one-another.⁷³ It was a possibility of seeing in a given situation what speaks or might speak for the matter that is under discussion.

We should notice three things about Heidegger’s inflection of the Aristotelian account of rhetoric as a *dunamis*. First, in Heidegger’s translation, *dunamis* was “possibility” (*Möglichkeit*) and not “capacity” (*Vermögen*). Heidegger was envisaging a rhetoric that was more of an undergoing than a mastering. On this account, rhetoric was the indeterminacy of seeing several potential ways of speaking in a particular circumstance. Moreover, possibility here was doubled. It was not simply that one might retreat from speaking into a position of seeing the possibility of speaking in a particular way. Possibility proliferated, and the *particular* thing that might be said came with alternatives, a netherworld of options. Second, Heidegger was more circumspect than those who translate *endechomenon pithanon* as “the available means of persuasion.” His rendition—based on a grammar of *das, was spricht für oder für-sprechen kann*—was noncommittal, emphasizing credibility more than belief or the kind of coming into belief that might be persuasion. Third, what had been *peri hekaston* in Aristotle became *jeweilig* and *Situation* in Heidegger. In place of what has become the repeated and dimmed down English phrase “in any given case,” we have a hovering between the stock occasion with its acceptable repertoire and the particularized moment with no obvious or uncontroversial set of precedents—an emergence of the new. Later, in the context of his lecture sequence on Plato’s *Sophist*, Heidegger offered a supplementary fragment that may function as a kind of summation: “rhetoric: a being-capable-of

71. Heidegger, “Platons Phaidros,” 104. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 338.

72. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 114.

73. Heidegger, 117.

as presencing” (*Rhetorik: das Können als Sein*).⁷⁴ In this move, rhetoric was becoming the frame within which any radical differentiation between being and being-possible, present and future, would be untenable. As a manifesting of possible continuations, rhetoric simply *was* time. It simply *was* the process by which a situation came into being in conjunction with articulation as a complex amalgam of motions achieved, emergent, and possible.

As a *seeing* of possibility, rhetoric took up the accounts of temporality and modality that we examined earlier, but it also embedded those accounts in a tightly interwoven set of life capacities that Heidegger was appropriating from Aristotle and that came to define many of his own enduring interests: *theorein*, *aisthesis*, *krinein*, *phantasia*, *nous*.⁷⁵ At the intersection of these various life capacities, Heidegger was articulating what I am calling a rhetoric of *epideixis*. This was not an analysis of praising or blaming as such but rather an analysis of exhibiting, putting on display, calling out for attention. As Heidegger would say in his seminar on Plato’s *Phaedrus* in Summer Semester 1932 (continuing his thoughts on Aristotle’s *dunamis* definition), rhetoric was “a letting break through of appearing” (*das Aufbrechenlassens des Erscheinens*), or better, it was a “*letting-appear* of things” (*Erscheinenlassen der Dinge*).⁷⁶ On this account, rhetoric was a kind of awareness of the ways in which a phenomenon might be cast within a particular community combined with an awareness of what might have the potential to enter that repertoire of received ideas with distinction. As I am using the concept here, something is distinct if it can take up and hold a place within the vocabulary of a particular community. Such a distinct appearance becomes a new name even before its arrangements of “accidents” can be articulated in the course of predication. Here, predication is not so much the process of adding qualities to a substance as it is the process of separating out and calling attention to aspects of a phenomenon that are already implicitly present in the appearance.

In Heidegger, the concern with *epideixis* eventually became a very basic concern with naming. Naming might seem like a timeless grammar because it deliberately avoids verbs and therefore tenses. In fact, it was one of the basic noetic acts and was anything but timeless. Thus, for Heidegger, “naming does not simply mean the giving of a name to a thing; it also means a bringing to attention, *dēloun*”—that is, “a rendering visible.”⁷⁷ Indeed, “speech” (*logos*) simply was “rendering visible” (*dēloun*).⁷⁸ Like the

74. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 625.

75. Compare Heidegger, “Wesen und Begriff der Physis,” in *Wegmarken*, 314.

76. Heidegger, “Platons Phaidros,” 108.

77. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 501: “Nennen meint nicht nur: einem Ding einen Namen geben, sondern auch: es zur Kenntnis bringen, *dēloun*.”

78. Heidegger, “Diltheys Forschungsarbeit,” 164: “der *logos* ist *dēloun*.”

painter, what the poet did was bring a phenomenon together and depict unity, but this was a unity constituted by tension or a set of tensions rather than a stasis.⁷⁹ Thus, in response to Hölderlin (whom he took to be a kind of metapoet), Heidegger defined poetry as “the instituting naming of being” (*das stiftende Nennen des Seins*).⁸⁰ Then, taking up Nietzsche’s line that “language is rhetoric,” Heidegger replaced one of the two substantives (either *Sprache* or *Rhetorik*) with *dichtend*.⁸¹ Probably, he meant that “language is poeming.” Conceivably, he was improvising with “poeming is rhetoric.” We can say that both substitutions are meaningful and that both versions are in play here: poetry is the process of bringing language itself into being, and, by the same token, this process of contributing to the articulateness of the world by taking up some appearances and not others as definitions is the rhetorical project—the project of rhetoric as *epideixis*.

Rhetoric was intimately related to “unconcealment” (*alētheia*), because the processes of presencing associated with *epideixis* were essential to the Heideggerian account of truth. That which was most intensively in being—present, activated, not concealed or offstage—was most true. This meant that truth was not a relation of correspondence between assertion and world. Nor was it a normative relation of coherence between one assertion and another. Instead, truth was the phenomenon appearing as itself: named, delineated, uncovered.⁸² In laying out the intellectual-historical deliquescence of this concept in its Latinization, Heidegger laid particular blame on medieval scholastic thought.⁸³ He emphasized a formulation from Thomas Aquinas in which “truth is ‘a making equal’ or ‘a correspondence’ of a thing and the understanding.”⁸⁴ No longer a specification of a phenomenon’s appearing, Aquinas was taking truth to be a characterization of the relationship of representation between mind and world.

Attending to the rhetorical epideictic quality of Heidegger’s account of *alētheia* attunes us to a glitch in Heidegger’s formulations that is otherwise easy to miss. Listening to the 1924 Ruhr speech, Max Scheler pointed out the irony that Heidegger’s account of “being-true” (*Wahrsein*) was implicitly a gloss of the medieval transcendentals according to which being and truth and beauty were one. In response to Scheler’s question, Heidegger could only gesture toward a tension in Thomas Aquinas between the insertion of a relation of *adaequatio* between thing and intellect and the supposition

79. Heidegger, “Andenken,” 310.

80. Heidegger, “Hölderlin,” 1073.

81. Heidegger, “Platons Phaidros,” 108: “‘*Sprache ist Rhetorik*’ (Nietzsche), besser: *Dichtend!*”

82. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, 7, 10.

83. Heidegger, “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,” 119.

84. Heidegger and Scheler, “Discussion between Heidegger and Max Scheler,” in Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger*, 233–34: “*veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*.”

that “every being is true.”⁸⁵ Scheler had put his finger on something. Elsewhere, Heidegger had indeed utilized the convertibility of the medieval transcendentals (*unum, bonum, verum*) in order to articulate what he took to be the Platonic thought on the coincidence between truth and “being in the moment of its most intense presencing.” We should not forget that this medieval philosophical mode of thinking had been particularly central to his habilitation. And Heidegger was working with convertibility of this order when he later declared that “beauty is the originarily unifying unity.”⁸⁶ Again, we find the same dynamic in Heidegger’s gloss of the final line of Eduard Mörike’s 1846 poem “To a Lamp” (“Auf eine Lampe”). There, he argued that “beauty is . . . not a quality that attaches to an entity in the manner of an add-on.” Beauty is not a predicate at all but rather “one of the highest modes of presencing,” namely, “a pure emanating from itself and appearing.”⁸⁷ As *epideixis* and as a skill with situated presencing, rhetoric is concerned with precisely these kinds of convertibility between truth and beauty and unity.

The appearance that could name itself in the manner of a definition by drawing attention to the predicates that distinguished it from other appearances was intense, but it was not stable. It was not simply that no organism could maintain itself at its moment of fullest maturation and expression indefinitely. Even a cosmos might be in flux and might tip beyond the stabilities of established orbits. More basically, however, naming was the process of bringing something out into the open, and bringing something out into the open was more essential to naming than holding it there. Naming was *energeia* rather than *entelecheia*. Here, we see the rhetorical dimension of naming most clearly. Naming as revelation and not classification was concerned with breaking a taxonomic schema by showing how it was that old received vocabularies covered over zones of potential attention and sensitivity. The performativity of rhetoric was its timeful awareness of the background of received names that dramatized the freshness and embodied freedom of the new name.

TOWARD A SYSTEMATIC HERMENEUTICS OF THE EVERYDAYNESS OF BEING-WITH-ONE-ANOTHER

We are now in a position to interpret the one sentence from *Being and Time* that is essential to the line of inquiry that I am laying out here—namely, the assertion that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was the first systematic hermeneutic of

85. Heidegger and Scheler, “Discussion between Heidegger and Max Scheler,” in Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger*, 233–34: “omne ens est verum.”

86. Heidegger, “Andenken,” 310: “die Schönheit ist das ursprünglich einigende Eine.”

87. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, 102: “Schönheit ist . . . nicht eine Eigenschaft, die zum Seienden als eine Ausstattung hinzukommt. Schönheit ist eine höchste Weise des Seins, d. h. hier: das reine aus-sich-Aufgehen und Scheinen.”

the everydayness of being-with-one-another.⁸⁸ As I have said, I do not think this sentence can be understood from within *Being and Time*. In order to reconstruct its connections and implications, one has to turn to the lecture materials, predominantly from earlier in the 1920s. In the previous section, we began the work of tracing the ways in which rhetoric was at the heart of Heidegger's phenomenological project. In this section, I pursue and confirm the point by arguing that in fact Heidegger was laying claim to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as something like a first version of *Being and Time*. If "first version" seems too much, then we may think of the *Rhetoric* as a philological repertoire that Heidegger was metabolizing in order to generate his own distinctive set of concerns and practices. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* had been an analytic of *Dasein*. For Heidegger, it had been an analytic of the conditions of possibility for situated presencing. Thus, rhetoric was "nothing other . . . than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of situated presencing [*Dasein*] is explicitly achieved."⁸⁹ I proceed here by taking up the key terms of the *Being and Time* sentence, and I use them to reveal the intimate relationship between rhetoric and Heideggerian inquiry. Of course, the re-description works in both directions. It is not that I am simply claiming Heideggerian inquiry "for rhetoric." The project is not territorial in that way. Here as elsewhere, rhetoric cannot colonize without being itself fundamentally reconfigured. The Heideggerian category of "everydayness" (*Alltäglichkeit*) that emerges from this exposition is quite different from the standard received versions in most of the Heidegger scholarship, and the version of rhetoric that emerges is distinctive too. This is a rhetoric that sees everydayness as a condition of possibility for the appearance of a situation.

Heidegger did emphasize the Greek topos according to which "only insofar as he lives in the polis is the human being genuinely human," but we should not therefore conclude that the key Heideggerian category of "being-with-one-another" (*Miteinandersein*) denoted simply a coming together of persons in public spaces.⁹⁰ "Being-with-one-another" as it appeared in the *Being and Time* sentence on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was not a being-together in that sense. Nor was it the obverse of being-alone. The *Sein*—"being," but as "presencing"—in *Miteinandersein* did not mean "coming-together" (*Zusammenkommen*). It meant the matrix of motions that was essential to temporality itself. *Being-with-one-another* was the class of ways in which the being of persons was their being-in-motions-with-others. It was their being-persuaded, their being-impressionable or -affected, their being-angry. It was their articulations of being in the world with others who were trying to put them in a particular place or who were

88. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 138.

89. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 110: "nichts anderes . . . als die Disziplin, in der die Selbstausslegung des Daseins ausdrücklich vollzogen ist," "die Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst."

90. Heidegger, 56: "sofern der Mensch in der polis lebt, ist er . . . eigentlich Mensch."

resisting the taking up of a particular place or stance. A degree of temporal synchronization was thus important for being-together, for it was a being-actualized in a particular place and time together. If *Dasein* were “situated presencing,” then presencing-with-one-another was the myriad of ways in which one’s relationship to others could become conspicuous, and it was the *manner* in which that relation became conspicuous. The *Da*, the time space of that becoming conspicuous, was a complex spacing of pronouns. It was a geometry of the you and the I complicated by routings through the he, she, and it, the they, we, and you plural. Confrontation was a locus classicus, but flanking was similarly crucial (isolation too), for the background against which one became conspicuous might be either a refuge denied or a prison escaped.

“Being-with-one-another,” we begin to intuit, was essentially the emotional topography of human communities, and here the connection to rhetoric becomes more explicit, for rhetoric—especially in the Heideggerian reception—is very much an analytic of emotions. This was a central preoccupation in Summer Semester 1924. Indeed, Walter Bröcker’s notes from the Summer Semester 1924 course were simply called *Rhetorik II*, because the lectures placed such emphasis on the second book of the *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle had concentrated on the *pathē*, the passions. In Heidegger’s account, such “affects are not states of the soul; here we are concerned with an orienting [*Befindlichkeit*] of a living being in a world.”⁹¹ And, as we have seen, a *Befindlichkeit* was always a specification in space and time, a spanning of the *Da*, ahead and behind, drawing pasts and futures into being. Not bodily states, not physiological processes taking place under the skin (and not convulsions in individual souls), emotions were instead orientations to others, orientations to space, orientations to time.

Modality and emotion were deeply intricately, as we see in the example of fear. Like desire and aversion (the base categories out of which it was distinguished), fear was an orientation to being-possible. Fear related to a “nothing” (*Nichts*, a no-thing-in-particular or a *vaguely* perceptible something). It attached to a kind of indeterminate nonpresence that was the *possible* presence of something or several things.⁹² If the *pathē* were exquisitely embodied (without being per se embodiments), that was because they were discriminations of motion and possible motion. The *pathē* were both the motions and possible motions of others and one’s own motions and possible motions. Because rhetoric as an orientation to possibility incorporated all of the life capacities (from *theorein* through *aisthesis*, *krinein*,

91. Heidegger, 122: “*pathē*, ‘Affekte,’ sind nicht Zustände des Seelischen, es handelt sich um eine *Befindlichkeit des Lebenden in einer Welt*.”

92. Heidegger, 192.

and *phantasia* to *nous*), the *pathē* were motilities in all life registers: ticks, feints, slights, irritabilities, continuations; poses, counterposes, imputed counterposes; reciprocations, mirrorings, fantasies, anticipated parryings; self-characterizations, character assassinations, inferred character assassinations; whole novel plots scripted ahead of time, in time, and after the fact. As Daniel Gross has argued, reading the Summer Semester 1924 lectures on the basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy closely “suggests that emotions might be treated as structuring ‘turns’ that, like tropes, constitute a domain of mental perception that make language possible.”⁹³ Emotion is the structuring and locomoting of scenes and their narratives.⁹⁴

If “being-with-one-another” was a kind of conspicuous actualization of affective relations with others, then the “everydayness” (*Alltäglichkeit*) of these relations was a waning of their conspicuousness. Heidegger’s move to everydayness constituted a deliberate displacement of theoretical attention from the moments of exception, of coming into consciousness, of framed uniqueness with which orators seem to deal. The move expressed an interest in the *repetitiousness* of the “in-any-given-case,” which had been central to the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric that Heidegger privileged. Rhetoric had its scenes. It staged its own *tableaux vivants*, and it sketched its own characters. Indeed, Heidegger was struck by Theophrastus’s caricature of the professional caricaturist that was the sophist, the “jawsmith” (*Schwätzer*), who traded in a knowledge of the clichés and *forms* of speaking that would float free of particular occasion.⁹⁵ To be sure, at times, Heidegger denounced such derivativeness, for the repetitions through which one cycled thoughtlessly were not awake to the places and times in which they were played like cards from a deck.

Everydayness, I am claiming, was a kind of temporality in which one was equidistant from a series of similar days, similar activities, similar scenes. Habit was something like being in many different times at once, present to them all, in a sense, and not to the time actually most proximate. Stock scenes were “everydaynesses” (*Alltäglichkeiten*) qua “trivialities” (*Trivialitäten*), as the Heidegger of Winter Semester 1919–1920 put it (rather absentmindedly).⁹⁶ Experiences of triviality were indexes of inability to attend, to be present. The more intensive redaction of everydayness from other resources came in Winter Semester 1921–1922, where the conceptual zone of everydayness entered the Heideggerian vocabulary by means of the dailiness of sin. There, Heidegger reported a base text transposed from Augustine: “our daily furnace is human language itself” (*quotidiana fornax*

93. Gross, “Being-Moved,” 39.

94. Gross, *Secret History of Emotion*.

95. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 302ff.

96. Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 103.

nostra, says the church father, is *humana lingua*). Usage is a daily kiln firing. It layers.⁹⁷ Life itself was a “taking care of the ‘daily bread,’” and the everyday was difficult to see on account of the fact that it was omnipresent.⁹⁸ In Winter Semester 1924–1925, Heidegger argued that the *sophos*—the “wise person” not the “sophist” (*sophistes*)—should be identified as precisely the person who could uncover the most difficult to identify everydaynesses, the habits so habitual that they were usually impalpable and invisible.⁹⁹ The laminated, *overwritten*—overlaid and protostatistical—qualities of these scenes, characters, trivialities constituted their everydayness.

Everydayness, thus, was habit (and, indeed, the habitual virtues), but Nancy Struever was right when she said that everydayness was “timeful” (*zeitlich*) in addition to *alltätlich*. Decisive for her was Heidegger’s assertion that “everydayness manifests itself in a fundamental basic structure—its timefulness.”¹⁰⁰ That is, the habituation that was everydayness was itself fired by the strenuousness of temporal orientation. Such orientation was always a spanning into tense—future, past, imperfect, pluperfect, future perfect. Apt also is the pun proposed by tensing, which is both a linguistic process of placing in time and a physiological process of bracing for a future. “Repetition” (*das Öfter*) was that which characterized “the timefulness of presencing” (*die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins*).¹⁰¹ The many-timed-ness of everydayness was a kind of indexicality. As Heidegger said first in “The Concept of Time” (the 1924 manuscript version), “the desk over there, with its particular number of places, indexes those with whom one sits at table daily,” and, equally, “the instrument encountered in use carries with it a ‘bought at’ and a ‘refined by,’” while “the book is a present from so-and-so,” whereas “the umbrella in the corner has been forgotten by so-and-so.”¹⁰² Indeed, “habit” (*hexis*) was “a how of emotion” (*ein Wie des pathos*), which was, in turn, a mode of “being-brought-out-of-sorts” (*Aus-der-Fassung-Seins*).¹⁰³ Paradoxically, habit could become a routinization of being knocked out of kilter.

In the account that Heidegger was fashioning, habits were a form of

97. Heidegger, *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*, 228.

98. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, 90: “sorgen um das ‘tägliche Brot.’”

99. Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, 95.

100. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 131: “es offenbart sich die Alltätlichkeit selbst in einer fundamentalen Grundstruktur: ihrer *Zeitlichkeit*.”

101. Heidegger, 191.

102. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 24: “der Tisch dort hat mit seinen bestimmten Plätzen die Verweisung auf die, mit denen man täglich zu Tisch kommt,” and “das in der Verwendung begegnende Werkzeug ist gekauft bei —, ausbegessert von —,” while “das Buch ist geschenkt von —,” whereas “der in der Ecke stehende Schirm ist vergessen von —.”

103. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 185.

overwriting in which the repeated layings-down and imprintings of practice remained distinct and therefore capable of eliciting a multitude of subtly different responses to subtly different requests for performance. True, for Heidegger in 1919–1920, *Habitus* had denoted a “manner of reacting” made up of “passively and not spontaneously activating tendencies derived from whatever was available.”¹⁰⁴ But the more pockmarked by impressions a habit was, the more it became a zone of unwitting but highly calibrated sensitivity. In Summer Semester 1924, the insistence came that “habituation” (*Gewöhnung*) was a result of “repetition” (*Wiederholung*) and not “exercise” (*Übung*). We must note that for Heidegger in this moment repetition did “not denote the bringing into existence of a sharply honed dexterity [*Fertigkeit*].” It denoted instead “acting afresh out of a corresponding decision in any given moment.”¹⁰⁵ Habituation, that is, did not entail isolating a motion and working it over. It involved putting oneself in a situation of judgment and repeating the deciding. This implied that habituation was “not routinization but rather a holding of oneself free—qua capacity or possibility, *dunamis*—in the mean.”¹⁰⁶ Never fully achieved, always an average (or an array of deviations from the mean), and nothing more than a possibility, habit was extremely time sensitive, liable to deterioration and forever in need of exercise.

When the distinctiveness of each near-perfect repetition became too fine to discern or remember, each-and-everydayness changed from the kind of habituation that Heidegger deeply valued to a specific form of absence akin to hiding in plain sight. Having achieved a kind of permanence in both form and use, everyday objects would disappear. As Heidegger put it in reference to interactions with “trusted objects,” “I look past these things, for they have not the character of presence [*Präsenz*], they are much too everyday, and it is as if they vanish from my everyday living [*alltäglichen Dasein*].”¹⁰⁷ To perceive the true nature of Heideggerian “repetition,” drop the metaphor “pockmarked.” Take up instead the metaphor of “worn smooth,” and visualize the adze-head worked clean into countless facets. In this way, the everyday became frictionless, tranquilized, without burr. Re-presenting that invisibility took work.

104. Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 68: habit was a “Weise des Re-agierens” derived “von passiv (nicht spontan) wirkenden Tendenzen, die aus der Verfügbarkeiten erwachsen.”

105. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 189: “Wiederholung besagt nicht: Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer fest-sitzenden Fertigkeit, sondern in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprechenden Entschluß heraus Handeln.”

106. Heidegger, 190.

107. Heidegger, 32: “ich sehe darüber hinweg, sie haben nicht den Charakter der Präsenz, sie sind viel zu alltäglich, sie verschwinden gleichsam aus mein alltäglichen Dasein.”

In establishing a spectrum between the habituation that was continued presencing even under conditions of intensive repetition, on the one hand, and, on the other, the everydayness in which repetition became a mode of camouflage, Heidegger was performing a very precise inversion of some basic Greek presuppositions concerning ontology and modality. Ancient Greek ontology had privileged the necessary as that which always was, as that which did not deviate and could not be otherwise. If Heidegger took from the Greeks the presupposition that “being” (*Sein*) was “presence” (*Präsenz*), then he inverted the meaning and consequences of that presupposition. *Präsenz* for him was not the full achievedness of *entelecheia*. It was the coming into form of *energeia*. For the Greeks, “being means being-completed.”¹⁰⁸ For Heidegger, being-finished was an acme that predicted disappearance. It was a “death mask” (*Totenmaske*).¹⁰⁹ For Heidegger, presence required spanning out of a plastic here and now. In contrast, “it would never even occur to a Greek person to see the genuine ‘Da’ in a particular here and now.”¹¹⁰ In a Greek reading, the *Da*, the “there,” would be the distributed and enduring temporality of the entity brought to its good form, a form that was, is, and would be. Heidegger first came to this insight in the 1924 manuscript on “The Concept of Time,” where, ventriloquizing and betraying Greek idioms, he claimed of any phenomenon that “only when it is what it can be will it be graspable as a totality.” That is, only “in its having-come-to-an-end is it fully there for the first time.” But then, “in its being-completed qua being-finished it is actually no longer there.”¹¹¹ Repetition does not evince a natural order; it poses a challenge to presencing.

The conspicuousness that Heidegger was drawn to in his sketch of being-with-one-another as a kind of affective synchronization was covered over by the many-timed-ness of the everyday. In turn, however, the task of the *hermeneutic* of this everydayness of being-with-one-another—which was rhetoric itself—was to render conspicuous the work of obfuscation completed by everydayness. My claim, thus, is that Heidegger’s account of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* effected a double reversal: turning the conspicuousness of affective synchronization into habit, then turning the inconspicuousness of habit into an object of inquiry. Hermeneutic for Heidegger, recall, was most basically a laying-out, spanning, “tensing” (*Auslegung*). Thus, rhetoric was “the laying-out of situated presencing [*Dasein*] with regard to the basic possibility of

108. Heidegger, 12: “Sein heißt Fertigsein.”

109. Heidegger, *Kant*, 88.

110. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 223: “der Grieche kommt gar nicht darauf, in diesem hic et nunc das eigentliche Da zu sehen.”

111. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (1924),” 46–47: “erst wenn es das ist, was es sein kann, wird es als Ganzes erfaßbar.” That is, “in seinem Zu-Ende-gekommen-sein ist es erst voll da,” but then “in seinem Fertig-sein ist es doch gerade nicht mehr.”

speaking with one another”¹¹² This characterization cast rhetoric as a basic life function. But, above all, as the Heidegger of Summer Semester 1923 had insisted, hermeneutic was a *practice* and not a theory of interpretation. Thus, “the term *hermeneutics* ought to denote the patchwork of activities of exerting, assessing, approaching, interrogating, and explicating facticity itself.”¹¹³ The problem, as he identified it, was that “hermeneutics is now no longer the practice of interpretation itself and has become instead the doctrine dealing with the conditions, the objects, the tools, the communication and practical application of interpretation.”¹¹⁴ For Heidegger, hermeneutic was in fact a form of “vigil” (*Wachsein*).¹¹⁵ *Auslegen* was a spanning of the *Da*. As such, “the first principle of all hermeneutics” was historicization, which meant placing oneself in a particular present that traced itself out of a past and *thereby* brought into being a particular specification of nonbeing—namely, the possible.¹¹⁶

LIQUIDATING DUNAMIS

I have been arguing that there was an intimate connection between rhetoric and core elements in the Heideggerian philosophical project. For Heidegger, neither time nor space were prior to motion. In fact, time and space were produced by motions, the differentials among motions, and by the articulation of those differentials. This contention established “situatedness” (*Befindlichkeit*) as the first—rhetorical—task of all presencing. One of the corollaries of this position was that presencing itself was not constant and that some moments of presencing were more involved than others in the naming of the world that was the rhetoric of *epideixis*. When Heidegger was most intensively involved in excavating this project in the early 1920s, he turned to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and found there an exploration of the modalities and life capacities most tightly entangled with these processes of presencing. And the sentence that Heidegger used to mark the burial of this line of inquiry at the center of *Being and Time* recorded the role played by rhetoric in the articulation of such presencing against the background of an averaging of experiences that was very basically emotional in character. In

112. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe*, 139: “die Auslegung des Daseins hinsichtlich der Grundmöglichkeit des Miteinandersprechen.”

113. Heidegger, *Ontologie*, 9: “der Ausdruck *Hermeneutik* soll die einheitliche Weise des Einsatzes, Ansatzes, Zugehens, Befragens, und Explizierens der Faktizität anzeigen.”

114. Heidegger, 13: “Hermeneutik ist jetzt nicht mehr die Auslegung selbst, sondern die Lehre von den Bedingungen, dem Gegenstand, den Mitteln, der Mitteilung und praktischen Anwendung der Auslegung.”

115. Heidegger, 15.

116. Heidegger, “Der Begriff der Zeit (Vortrag 1924),” 123.

this final section, I seek to confirm the hypothesis that engagements with being-possible were central to Heidegger's thought by tracing the modality of possibility into his later work. In addition, however, I argue that the earlier rhetorical articulations of possibility are more useful and more compelling.

Not long after his 1947 rejection of Jean-Paul Sartre's appropriation of his work in the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger would claim that "the resolution conceived of in *Being and Time* is not the decided upon action of a subject but rather the opening of presencing." This was a key moment in a long campaign on Heidegger's part to insist on the continuity of his thought amid radically changing historical contexts.¹¹⁷ The "turn" (*Kehre*) so often spoken about in relation to Heidegger denoted not a change in his thought but rather a change in the disclosures of presencing—or so he maintained.¹¹⁸ I wish to shift the point of inquiry and will argue that we see a philosophical and historiographic flattening of the concept of presencing that was deleterious to both Heidegger's thought and his politics.

In the later 1930s, when Heidegger began redescribing National Socialism as just another symptom of what he cast as a basic problem called "modernity," he was also developing a critique of this modern age as a "total mobilization" (*totale Mobilmachung*) of resources. This was a phrase that Heidegger had taken from a piece originally published in 1930 by Ernst Jünger, where it denoted the complete mobilization of energies in a wartime economy. In Heidegger's recently published notebooks from the 1930s, we see variations on this way of speaking as he sought to develop a critique of modernity so complete that it would consume even his former belief in National Socialism.¹¹⁹ The story I have told thus far in this chapter is continued here because under this description of modernity, energy and capital became the twin hypostases of *dunamis*. Energy and capital became maximally vague placeholders for possibility as such. Heidegger came to understand them as nonbeing at the furthest degree of its indistinctness. In energy and capital, possibility was a fetishized capacity to become anything at all.

Ironically, Heidegger's own thinking about *dunamis* became increasingly affected by the tendency to reduce a phenomenon to all the things it *could* become that he associated with modernity. In place of the hermeneutically adroit articulation of a phenomenon by means of the relatively limited range of its immediately realizable possibilities, Heidegger became increasingly

117. Heidegger, "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," in *Holzwege*, 55: "die in 'Sein und Zeit' gedachte Entschlossenheit ist nicht die decidierte Aktion eines Subjekts, sondern die Eröffnung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit des Seins."

118. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre der Wahrheit*, 72.

119. Jünger, "Die totale Mobilmachung," 11–30; Heidegger, "Über 'Die Linie,'" 12.

oriented to the description and denunciation of the kind of commodification that understood a phenomenon in terms of its liquidation into energy or capital. The stronger Heidegger's denunciations of modernity became, the more he fell victim to his own diagnosis. Although pure liquidity will remain a kind of dream even under conditions of advanced capitalism, Heidegger himself was becoming more successful in liquidating his own conception of possibility by treating each distinct technology indiscriminately. In this respect, "The Origin of the Work of Art" and "The Question Concerning Technology," two of Heidegger's most famous post-1933 essays, were closely connected initiatives, focusing respectively on the past and the future of *dunamis* and its various modes of production.

Heidegger's affiliation to National Socialism in the early 1930s seems to have been underwritten by precisely the sense of world-historical mission encapsulated in his diagnosis and rejection of "modernity." Perceiving oneself in a world-historical context was part of his early commitment to "history," and this commitment underwrote his palpably grandiose political allegiance between 1930 and 1934 to the possibility of a radically new beginning. No longer the achievement of *nous*, "historicity" (*Geschichtlichkeit*) was becoming the potentialization of life as such. And this, I would warrant, was what Heidegger was getting at when he proposed, opaquely (and, it would seem, before his purported break with National Socialism in 1934), that "the metaphysics of presencing must deepen itself in accordance with its own innermost microstructure and broaden into a metapolitics of—the genitive is both objective and subjective—the historical people."¹²⁰ "Metapolitics" was a simultaneously grand and weak gesture, for it attempted to embed the political sphere in a conception of the academy's role in thinking the historicity of a people. In the infamous "Rector's Address" (*Rektoratsrede*) of 1933, Heidegger put whatever intellectual impetus he commanded in the service of the National Socialist cause. In that speech, he cast the historicity of a people in terms of "the highest form of the *energeia*, of the being-in-activation, of humanity" (*die höchste Weise der energeia, des 'Am-Werke-Seins,' des Menschen*).¹²¹ We see his modalities being put to political work.

Ultimately, however, Heidegger betrayed his own commitment to historicity. In his case, commitment to historicity came to entail an extreme judgmentalness on the basis of an increasingly slim archive. In the end, this preacher of historical contextualization did not really practice. Even in his own self-exonerating accounting, the same inflationary historical consciousness that underwrote his philosophical adherence to National

120. Heidegger, *Überlegungen II–VI*, 124: "die Metaphysik des Daseins muß sich nach ihrem innersten Gefüge vertiefen und ausweiten zur Metapolitik 'des' geschichtlichen Volkes."

121. Heidegger, *Selbstbehauptung*, 10.

Socialism drove his eventual and *still merely philosophical* rejection of it. Witness the articulation from the private notebooks from the 1930s: “thinking in a purely ‘metaphysical’ (that is, being-historical) manner, in the years from 1930 until 1934, I held National Socialism to be the possibility of a transition into another beginning and gave it that gloss.” Hiding in the passive voice, Heidegger went on to say that it was in this way that “this ‘movement’ was misunderstood and underestimated in both its true powers and inner necessity as well as its nature and kind.” In reality, this movement was simply a vehicle for the “the consummation [*Vollendung*] of modernity.” For Heidegger, it was the consummation of a process that was “Romantic” in its origins, geared to “the humanization of humankind in self-assured rationality,” and radicalized by a “decisiveness of the historical-technical” dedicated to “a complete mobilization of all the powers of a humanity turned upon itself.”¹²² In the later 1930s, Heidegger would argue that “the new politics is an inner and essential consequence of ‘technics’” and is “in itself the scheming organization of the people to the highest possible performance, in which regard the people is understood in terms of its biological constitution, essentially ‘technical’ (scheming), which is to say, understood from the point of view of breeding.”¹²³ To be sure, the history of biological theory and practice, not least in racialization, is one of the fundamental stories of modernity, but Heidegger’s attempt to swiftly absorb those complexities into his overall narrative exhibits an overweening synthetic ambition.

Whatever else it was, the later Heideggerian pseudopolitics of “equanimity” (*Gelassenheit*) was also a response to this hypertrophy of “possibility” (*Möglichkeit*) into a “complete ‘mobilization’ of all capacities” (*vollständige ‘Mobilisierung’ aller Vermögen*). It amounted to a new fetishization of powerlessness. In his private notebooks, Heidegger transformed “the foundational experience of my thought” (*die Grunderfahrung meines*

122. Heidegger, *Überlegungen VII–XI*, 408: “rein ‘metaphysisch’ (d. h. seynsgeschichtlich) denkend habe ich in den Jahren 1930–1934 den Nationalsozialismus für die Möglichkeit eines Übergangs in einen anderen Anfang gehalten und ihm diese Deutung gegeben. Damit wurde diese ‘Bewegung’ in ihren eigentlichen Kräften und inneren Notwendigkeiten sowohl als auch in der ihr eigenen Größengebung und Größenart verkannt und unterschätzt. Hier beginnt vielmehr und zwar in einer viel tieferen—d. h. umgreifenden und eingreifenden Weise als im Faschismus die Vollendung der Neuzeit—; diese hat zwar im ‘Romantischen’ überhaupt begonnen—hinsichtlich der Vermenschung des Menschen in der selbstgewissen Vernünftigkeit, aber für die Vollendung bedarf es der Entschiedenheit des Historisch-Technischen im Sinne der Vollständigen ‘Mobilisierung’ aller Vermögen des auf sich gestellten Menschentums.”

123. Heidegger, *Überlegungen II–VI*, 472: “die neue Politik ist eine innere Wesensfolge der ‘Technik’” and “in sich selbst ist sie die machenschaftliche Einrichtung des Volkes zur höchstmöglichen ‘Leistung,’ wobei auch noch das Volk hinsichtlich der biologischen Grundbestimmung wesentlich ‘technisch’-machenschaftlich, d. h. züchterisch begriffen ist.”

Denkens) into a sense of “the superiority of Being before all beings—the powerlessness of beings, that from Being an origin might arise.”¹²⁴ Presencing as such was beyond the control of the particular conduits of that presencing. At this point, though, even Heidegger’s humility was grandiose. Witness the ahistoricity of the assertion that “only in 2300 at the earliest may history be possible again.”¹²⁵ One cannot say *precisely* when Heidegger wrote this—either just before or soon after the beginning of World War II. The fact is that Heidegger, the theorist of datability, did not date the entries in his so-called intellectual diaries (*Denktagebücher*). I am arguing that these developments are all of a piece: total mobilization produced total equanimity, which produced an obliviousness to the particularity of the present historical situation that could be devoured endlessly anew without discrimination by the narrative of “modernity.”

Granted, some of Heidegger’s most intensive philosophical labors in the 1930s were concentrated on the question of how to think concepts in the vicinity of *dunamis* afresh. There was, for example, something both ingenious and spent in his reconciliation of the twin ideas that for him were at the center of Nietzsche’s intellectual project—namely, the ideas of “will to power” (*Wille zur Macht*) and “eternal recurrence of the same” (*ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*). Heidegger emphasized what he took to be a fundamental tension between the power of origination embedded in the will to power and the exhaustion of creativity embodied in the Nietzschean “yea-saying” to an endless recurrence of the same sequence of life and lives. His move in the Nietzsche lectures that he gave originally between 1936 and 1940 and then published in 1961 was to argue that will to power and eternal recurrence were instantiations of the same idea of being as a process of infinite and infinitely repeated differentiation. Will to power was a creativity that realized every possibility, and eternal recurrence was the vindication of this process even in the moment of its exhaustion. As Heidegger put it, “that everything recurs is the most extreme proximity of a world of becoming to a world of being—and this is the apex of the thought.”¹²⁶ To Heidegger, recurrence reinstated the version of Greek ontology in which the orbit of the heavens was an emblem of *entelecheia* qua fully achieved motion and fully achieved presence.

Nevertheless, despite his desire to differentiate and renew the idiom of possibility, what we really see in the Heidegger of the 1930s is a thinker wandering in a no-man’s-land of his own creation between “total mobilization”

124. Heidegger, 362: “die Übermacht des Seyns vor allem Seienden—die Ohnmacht des Seienden, daß aus ihm ein Ursprung komme.”

125. Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII–XV*, 225: “frühestens um 2300 mag wieder Geschichte sein.”

126. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1:466: “Daß Alles wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annäherung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins:—Gipfel der Betrachtung.”

and “equanimity,” attempting to find a conceptual rapprochement for his commitments. For Heidegger in 1931, theorizing “force” (*Kraft*) entailed a philological project of separating the various usages of “ability” (*Fähigkeit*), “art” (*Kunst*), “talent” (*Begabung*), “capability” (*Vermögen*), “capacitation” (*Befähigung*), “aptitude” (*Eignung*), “skill” (*Geschicklichkeit*), “violence” (*Gewalt*), and “power” (*Macht*).¹²⁷ But this taxonomy was left unpursued. Similarly, Heidegger expended considerable energy trying to read Nietzsche in terms of the modality of “basic concepts” he had excavated from Aristotle. Thus, “agency [*Kraft*], the in-itself-gathered and coiled capacity, the standing-ready-to . . . is that which the Greeks, and Aristotle above all, termed *dunamis*.” In contrast, “power [*Macht*] . . . is a being-potent in the sense of command enactment, a being-at-work of agency—and in Greek this would be *energeia*.” Further, “power [*Macht*] is will as willing-beyond-oneseelf, but it is equally a coming-to-oneseelf, a finding and reporting of oneseelf in the closed simplicity of essence—for the Greeks, *entelecheia*.” Yet what had been differentiated was then simply lumped together again: “for Nietzsche, power [*Macht*] is all of these things at once: *dunamis*, *energeia*, *entelecheia*.”¹²⁸ Self-defeating, Heidegger was replicating his commitment to a taxonomic differentiation of modalities and then casting it aside.

We should read “The Origin of the Work of Art” (delivered as a series of lectures in 1936 but first published in 1950) in the context of the matrix of tensions set out within Heidegger’s thought by the extremes of “total mobilization” and “equanimity.” Although he emphasized that “the great artists prize artisanal ability above all else,” Heidegger insisted even more vehemently that the handwork arts of the artist could never be thought of as a form of “operation” (*Tätigkeit*).¹²⁹ The activity of pushing out the bounds of a world by means of artworks that *were* the truths of that world, he claimed, was a process much more profound than the mere “exercise” of skill. The *technē* of a *technitēs* (the “fashioning” or “bringing-to-the-fore” of the “artist”) might be understood as a participating in the founding and articulation of a world (*Welt*) by working with what are now called the “affordances” of the “earth” (*phusis*, *Erde*) qua materialities with their own

127. Heidegger, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik*, 72.

128. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1.76–77: “Kraft, das in sich gesammelte und wirkungsbereite Vermögen, das Instandesein zu . . . , ist das, was die Griechen, vor allem Aristoteles, als *dunamis* bezeichnen. Macht ist aber ebenso das Mächtigsein im Sinne des Herrschaftsvollzugs, das Am-Werk-sein der Kraft, griechisch: *energeia*. Macht ist Wille als Über-sich-hinaus-wollen, aber so gerade das Zu-sich-selbst-kommen, sich in der geschlossenen Einfachheit des Wesens Finden und Behaupten, griechisch: *entelecheia*. Macht heißt für Nietzsche dieses alles zugleich: *dunamis*, *energeia*, *entelecheia*.”

129. Heidegger, “Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in *Holzwege*, 47–48: “die großen Künstler schätzen das handwerkliche Können am höchsten.”

distinctive life cycles and tendencies to fall into both form and chaos. But this had to be presented as a very particular kind of potentialization of nature. Why? Because modernity as a “total mobilization” of natural and human resources was lurking in the background. Heidegger insisted that once it had been removed from its cultural context, inserted in an exhibition, or visited from afar (by the tourist at Paestum, for instance), the work of art would no longer be capable of achieving itself as an event and as a truth. And in this he was profoundly conservative. The minoritarian Heideggerian report is that, in fact, works of art build worlds precisely because they are radical and name something previously unnamed. Conservativeness was in part a response to a radicalism that Heidegger had only just disowned, but contradictions lay strewn all about the text. Despite Heidegger’s purported disavowal of the National Socialist historical mission, the work of art essay still listed “the historical people” (*das geschichtliches Volk*) as the vehicle of the world of artworks.¹³⁰

Many of Heidegger’s most famous post-1945 statements extend the hypothesis that Heideggerian historiography was becoming increasingly indiscriminate. The notorious Bremen lectures of 1949 were clearly histories of the present. Cast as an “insight into that which is” (*Einblick in Das Was Ist*), this sequence of four lectures proposed a massive historical thesis about the processes underlying recent events, and it was the astounding historiographic *immodesty* of the project that readers have found most offensive. That is, in one of his very few semidirect public references to the Nazi crimes of extermination, Heidegger infamously proposed a historical connection between the “fabrication of corpses” (*Fabrikation von Leichen*) in the death camps and the rise of a “mechanized food industry” (*motorisierte Ernährungsindustrie*). Both were to be understood simply in terms of a massified attitude toward “life” characteristic of “modernity.” What we have here is an omnivorous historiography of the now, one that was insisting that all developments were simply aspects of a single deeper process.¹³¹

Thus, the late critiques of technology would themselves be jeremiads against the technologization of possibility that set all technological innovations in the lockstep of modern decline on the basis of snippets of evidence and massive projection. Radio was the possibility of a mass production of soul-states in isolation. For Heidegger, it was “the emblem of an interdependence between the planetary and the idiotic” (*das Sinnbild der Zusammengehörigkeit von Planetarismus und Idiotismus*).¹³² In the “Equanimity” essay, collected later in the *Heimat*-focused volume dedicated to Heidegger

130. Heidegger, 37.

131. Heidegger, *Einblick in Das Was Ist*, 56.

132. Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII–XV*, 265.

by his home city of Messkirch on his eightieth birthday, the complexities of “The Question Concerning Technology” were simplified into a very flat assertion: “nature is being transformed into one single and gigantic gas station, into an energy source for modern technics and industry.”¹³³ Heidegger was appropriating just enough Marx to make himself citable by historians of technology and what has become the environmental humanities, but the truer history of this claim within Heidegger’s own corpus is a history of growing imperviousness to differentiation. Technics was becoming an all-consuming concept.

When we read Heidegger’s assorted denunciations of modernity together with its modes of “manufacture” (*Herstellen*), we should be suspicious, because in the denunciation of technological modernity there is a proximity between Heidegger’s thought and his anti-Semitism. The reserve armies of possibility qua “inventory” (*Bestand*) stored by modern technological capitalism, the reconceptualization of “technology” (*Technik*) not as a means to an end but as “a mode of unconcealing” (*eine Weise des Entbergens*), the insistence that “technology” (*Technik*) transformed the world into a series of “calculabilities” (*Berechenbarkeiten*) fostering necessitarianism in *The Principle of Reason*, the distancelessness of the distance media (the televisual, the telephonic) that made all things equally presentable in any given place and time, the deracination of peoples rendered “homeless” (*heimatlos*), stripped of “down-to-earth-ness” (*Bodenständigkeit*)—all of these critiques of possibility run amok had a precedent. In Heidegger’s words, “one of the most hidden forms of the gigantic and perhaps the oldest is the hard-bitten scheming of the counting and huckstering and mixing all together upon which the worldlessness of the Jews is based.”¹³⁴ Heidegger’s anti-Semitism was built into his account of the blank stare of an omnipossibility embedded in capital. The irony is shocking and should give us pause: the critique of technologized modernity that was supposed to drive Heidegger’s disowning of National Socialism was itself conceptually of a piece with his anti-Semitism.

No one can say anything about Heidegger without confronting the man’s politics between, at least, 1930 and 1934 together with his either cowardly or unrepentant failure to address his political mistakes publicly once the scale of the crimes with which they were complicit became clear after, at the latest, 1945. My position on this point is that Heidegger’s phenomenological, temporal, and rhetorical investments before 1927 were neither

133. Heidegger, “Gelassenheit,” 23.

134. Heidegger, *Überlegungen VII–XI*, 97: “eine der verstecktesten Gestalten des Riesigen und vielleicht die älteste ist die zähe Geschicklichkeit des Rechnens und Schiebens und Durcheinandermischens, wodurch die Weltlosigkeit des Judentums gegründet wird.” For the man’s sense of the connection between modernity and Jewry, see also Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII–XV*, 46.

determinative of his political positions in the 1930s nor immaterial to them. If a story ends this way, we might wonder, why trace its beginnings? Because beginnings are not destiny, and because history contains points of no return before which things could have been otherwise. Aristotle was not always already infected with the bacillus of National Socialism, and the Heideggerian transposition of Aristotle into Weimar Germany was not always already fated to yield either the *Rektorsrede* of 1933 or the anti-Semitic critique of modernity's gigantism. As I am endeavoring to do here, we can build a book on the basis of Heideggerian materials dating from the 1920s because those materials themselves provide the beginnings of a criticism of the direction Heidegger himself pursued in the 1930s and beyond.

THE AFTERLIFE OF HEIDEGGERIAN CONCEPTS

The transformation of *dunamis* into "total mobilization" that I have been tracing remains indicative of a broader problem in the work of Martin Heidegger. As my emphasis on his Summer Semester 1924 evocation of the basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy demonstrates, Heidegger was a thinker engaged primarily in the reevaluation of basic investigative terms. If successful, a thinker working at this level will become the author of an oeuvre with implications extending across the disciplinary map, but that kind of success is dangerous because the work of *applying* those basic concepts in particular zones of localized inquiry will remain tremendously difficult and, indeed, creative work. As the inferentialist historiography that I have elicited from the work of Robert Brandom attempts to confirm, there is no application of a concept that is not itself a development of that concept. Just so, there is no application of the basic concepts forged by Martin Heidegger that is not a development of those concepts. Heidegger's own "application" of the forms of modal analysis that he developed in the 1920s to the forms of possibilization he saw around him in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were certainly developments. As I argued in the previous section, however, the specific development that we see in those applications was profoundly ironic because the *dunamis* of the later period became a kind of all-consuming and for that reason paradoxically emaciating concept.

I have called the basic Heideggerian concepts on temporality, modality, life capacities, and hermeneutics "foundations" of rhetorical inquiry, and the task in the next chapters of this book is to develop these categories of thought by giving them specificity in particular zones of investigation. To embark on a historiography of this kind is not to suppose that Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, and Aby Warburg can be thought of as instruments of a more basically Heideggerian project. The afterlife of concepts may be understood as their more genuinely creative moment. And, in fact,

this stands in stark contrast to the Heideggerian impulse that wishes at each moment to fetishize what came first—as the pure and primordial and pristine. In the chapters that follow, I shall pursue Heidegger’s intuition that an appearance may name itself. In (respectively) Arendt, Benjamin, and Warburg, this appearance that names itself will become a process in which an appearance calls into being and is called into being by a space that surrounds it. It will become a moment exhibiting dialectical tensions. And it will become a moment that can become free and generative once fractured into something like an image table that clusters the “moment” in the variety of its distinguishable aspects and potential continuations. These thoughts do develop a basic Heideggerian insight on truth as *alētheia*, but they transform it almost beyond recognition. What is more, they improve it decisively.