Passages from the *Beiträge* that mention *Being and Time*

The temptation is still close at hand to take the entire deliberation in the first half of *Being and Time* as confined to the range of an anthropology, only with an other orientation. [§30, p 48]

In *Being and Time* Da-sein still stands in the shadow of the "anthropological," the "subjectivistic," and the "individualist," etc.—and yet the opposite of all of this is what we have in view—of course, not as what was initially and solely intended, but rather this opposite, **everywhere only the *necessary consequence* of the deciding transformation of the "question of being" from guiding-question into the grounding-question**. [§172, p 208]

History is not taken here as one domain of beings among other domains; instead, it exclusively has in view the essential occurrence of beyng itself. Thus already in *Being and Time* the historicality of Da-sein is to be understood only in terms of the fundamental ontology pursued there… [11]

Here what is experienced and questioned is that which is hidden in **the guiding-question** and sways in advance: the *openness for essential swaying* as such. i.e., for *truth.* Along with what is asked here is the questioning that questions ahead into truth. And insofar as be-ing is experienced as the ground of beings, the question of the essential swaying of be-ing, when asked in this way, is **the *grounding-question***. Going from the guiding-question to the grounding-question, there is never an immediate, equi-directional and continual process that once again applies the guiding-question (to be-ing); rather, there is only a leap, i.e., the necessity of **an *other* beginning**. Indeed and on the contrary, **a *crossing*** can and should be created in the unfolding overcoming of the posing of the guiding-question and its answers as such. a crossing that prepares the other beginning and makes it generally visible and intimatable. ***Being and Time*** is in service to this preparation. i.e .. it actually stands already within the grounding question, without unfolding this question purely out of itself, inceptually. The *being* of beings, the determination of beingness (i.e., the declaration of "categories" for *ousia*), is the *answer* to the guiding-question… [§34, p 53]

The danger of misinterpreting *Being and Time* in this direction, i.e., "existentiell-anthropologically," and of seeing the interconnection of disclosedness, truth, and Dasein from the perspective of a moral resolve—instead of *the other way,* proceeding from the prevailing ground of Da-sein and grasping truth as openness and dis-closedness, as temporalizing-spatializing of the free play of the time-space of be-ing **such danger looms and gets stronger by many things that are unaccomplished in *Being and Time.*** [§42, p 60]

Within beings and the interpretation of beings unto their beingness in the sense of representedness (and already of *idea*), it makes sense and is correct to go back to "presuppositions" and "conditions." Such a return, therefore, has become the basic form of "metaphysical" thinking in manifold modifications, to such a degree that even the overcoming of "metaphysics" toward an inceptual understanding cannot do without this way of thinking (**cf. *Being and Time* and *Vom Wesen des Grundes, here* the attempt at a leap into be-ing**). §[44]

81. Playing-Forth
Coming to grips with the necessity of the *other* beginning from out of the originary positioning of the first beginning.
The *guiding-attunement:* delight in alternately surpassing the beginnings in questioning.
To this [belongs] everything involved in differentiating the guiding question and the grounding-question; responding to the guiding-question and actually unfolding it; **crossing to the grounding-question *(Being and Time)***.
All lectures on the "history" of philosophy [belong here). The decision of every "ontology" [is made here]. [§81, p 119]

The first beginning's coming originarily into its own (and that means into its history) means gaining a foothold in the other beginning. This is accomplished in crossing from the guiding-question (what is a being? the question of beingness, being) to the grounding-question: What is the truth of be-ing? (Being and be-ing is the same and yet fundamentally different.)

Historically grasped, this crossing is the overcoming-and indeed the first and first possible overcoming—of all "metaphysics." "Metaphysics" now first becomes recognizable in what is its ownmost; and, in thinking in the crossing, all talk of "metaphysics" becomes ambiguous. Put into the domain of the crossing to the other beginning, the *question:* What is metaphysics? (cf. the lecture in connection with *Being and Time* and *Vom Wesen des Grundes)* already inquires into what is ownmost to "metaphysics" in the sense of gaining an initial footing in crossing to the other beginning. In other words, the question already asks from within this other beginning. [§85]

If we ponder this task of the other beginning (the question of the "meaning" of be-ing in the formulation of *Being and Time*), then it will also become clear that all attempts that react against metaphysics which is everywhere idealistic, even as positivism—persist in being re-active and thus are in principle dependent upon metaphysics and thereby remain themselves metaphysics. All biologisms and natural isms, which present "nature" and the non-rational as what sustains everything and from which everything arises as "all-life" wherein everything bubbles as night against day, etc.—all of this stays completely within the fundament [Boden] of metaphysics and needs it in order to brush up against it so that a spark of the knowable and sayable—and for these "thinkers" writeable—still springs up. [§85, p 122]

This twofold character in the crossing, that grasps metaphysics more originarily and thus at the same time overcomes it, is through and through the mark of "fundamental ontology," i.e., the mark of *Being and Time.* [§91, p 128]

…**the thinking willing that in *Being and Time* seeks a way to cross from the guiding-question to the grounding-question**. [§106, p 143]

However, in order for this entirely different questioning, as Da-sein-steadfastness *[Da-seinsbeständnis],* to move at all to a decidable possibility, **one must first attempt to bring about a crossing from the guiding-question to the leap into the grounding-question**—through the complete unfolding of the guiding-question, never a direct transition to the grounding question….
***Being and Time* is the crossing to the leap (asking the grounding-question).** As long as one accounts for this attempt as "philosophy of existence," everything remains uncomprehended. [§119, p 165]

For thinking no longer enjoys the favor of the "system"; it is historical in the singular sense that be-ing itself as en-owning above all sustains all history and thus can never be calculated. Historical preparedness for the truth of be-ing replaces the systematization and deduction. And this requires above all that this truth itself already might create the basic traits of its abode (Da-sein) out of its barely resonating essential sway, and that **the subject in man must transform itself into the founder and guardian of this abode**.

In the question of being we are dealing solely with the enactment of this preparation for our history. **All specific "contents" and "opinions" and "pathways" of the first attempt in *Being and Time* are incidental and can disappear**. [§125, p 171]

***Being and Time* is therefore not an "ideal" or a "program" but rather the self-preparing beginning of the essential swaying of be-ing itself—not what *we* think up** but—granted that we are ripe for it—what compels *us* into a thinking that neither offers a doctrine nor brings about a "moral" action nor secures "existence"; instead "only" grounds truth as the free-play of time-space, in which a being can again become "a being," i.e .. come to preserve be-ing. [§125, p 171]

This distinction [between be-ing and a being] is grasped since *Being and Time* as "ontological difference"–with the intention of safeguarding the question of the truth of be-ing from all confusion. But this distinction is immediately pushed in the direction from which it comes. For here beingness is claimed as *ousia, idea*; and following these, the objectness is claimed as *condition for the possibility* of the object. **Therefore, in attempting to overcome the first effort at the question of being in *Being and Time* and its emanations (*Vom Wesen des Grundes* and the Kantbook), varying attempts were needed to master the "ontological difference," to grasp its very origin and that means its genuine *onefold*.** Therefore, the effort

was needed to come free of the "condition for the possibility" as going back into the merely "mathematical" and to grasp the truth of be-ing from within its own essential sway (enowning). Hence the tormenting and discording character of this distinction. For as necessary as this distinction is (to think in traditional terms), in order to provide at all a preliminary perspective for the question of be-ing, just as disastrous does this distinction continue to be. For this distinction indeed *does* arise from a questioning of beings as such (of beingness). But in this way one never arrives directly at the question of be-ing. **In other words, this distinction *itself becomes* the real barrier which misplaces the inquiry into the question of be-ing, insofar as, by presupposing this distinction, one attempts to go further than this distinction and to inquire into its onefold.** This onefold can never be anything but the mirroring of the distinction and can never lead to the origin, in view of which this distinction can no longer be seen as originary. [§132, p 176-77]

134. The Relation of Da-sein and Be-ing

In *Being and Time* [this relation is] first grasped **as "understanding of being," whereby understanding is grasped as projecting-open-and the opening-throwing as *thrown,* and that means: belonging to en-ownment by be-ing itself**.

But if we fail to recognize in advance the strangeness and uniqueness (incomparability) of be-ing-and together with it what is ownmost to Da-sein—then we succumb all too easily to the opinion that this "relation" corresponds to or is even commensurate with the relation between subject and object. But Da-sein has overcome all subjectivity; and be-ing is never an object, re-presentable. It is in every case only a being that is capable of becoming an object—and even here not every being. [§134, p 178]

[A few 'graphs on what he does in the Kant book.]

Certainly, this Kant-interpretation is "historically" [in history as a discipline] incorrect. [§134, p 178]

Kant continues to be the only one since the Greeks who brings the interpretation of beingness (*ousia*) into a certain relation to "time" and thus becomes a witness to the hidden reign of the connection between beingness and time.

Nevertheless, for him as for the Greeks, thinking (as *logos*—forms of judgment-categories-reason) gets the upper hand in establishing the perspective for interpreting beings as such. [§134, p 179]

In case it is still admissible, for purposes of an immediate understanding, to characterize be-ing in terms of beings, then we will appeal to the actual as what genuinely is. We know the actual as what is present, as the constant. In the other beginning, however, a being is never actual in the sense of this "being-present." Even where this being-present is encountered in constancy, it is the most fleeting thing for the originary projecting-open of the truth of be-ing.

Actual, i.e., what is, is only the remembered and the still accessible. Remembering and access open the free-play of the time-space of be-ing, with regard to which thinking must disavow "presentness" as the heretofore only and unique determination. (**Because here is the nearest region of decision about the truth of be-ing, leaping up [*Ansprung*] into the other beginning had to be attempted as *Being and Time*.)** [§136, p 180]

151. Being and a Being·
This differentiation comes initially from the guiding-question of beingness and has remained stuck there (cf. Playing-Forth, 110: *idea*. Platonism, and Idealism). But this differentiation also has its truth in the other beginning—nay, only now does it receive its truth. For now, where "thinking" no longer inquires into beingness (not beingness and thinking, but "being and time," understood in terms of crossing), this "differentiation" names that domain of enowning of the essential enswaying of being in truth, in its shelteredness, by which a being as such first moves into the t/here (Da) [§151]

[§§161-163 on being-unto-death, complaining about misinterpretations of *Being and Time* on this point.]

161. Being-toward-Death
No one has yet surmised or dared to ponder what was thought *ahead* regarding being-toward-death in the context of *Being and Time* and *only* there, i.e., what was thought "fundamental-ontologically" and never anthropologically and in terms of "worldview."

But it is totally in order that, when thinking here is not done "fundamental-ontologically" with the intention of grounding the truth of be-ing, the worst and most absurd misinterpretations creep in and spread-and, naturally, a "philosophy of death" is made up.
The misinterpretations of precisely this section in *Being and Time* are the clearest indications of the incapacity—which is still in full bloom for re-enacting the questioning that is prepared there, and that means always at the same time thinking more originarily and creatively explicating further. [§161]

How despicable and cheap it is, however, to yank the word *being-toward-death* out, then to put on it a crude "worldview," and finally to lay this back into *Being and Time.* It would seem that this calculation works particularly well, since this "book" also talks of the "nothing." Thus there follows the easy conclusion: being-toward-death, i.e., being-toward-nothing and this as the "essence" of Dasein. And that should not be nihilism? [§162]

[In *Being and Time*] "understanding of being" and *projecting-open* [are thought]—*and indeed as thrown*—the *being-in-the-world* of Dasein. But "world" [is] not the *Christian saeculum* and the denial of god or atheism! *World* [is experienced] from within the essential sway of truth and of the t/here [Da)! World and earth. [§172, p 208]

The first allusion to Da-sein as grounding the truth of be-ing is accomplished *(Being and Time)* in pursuing the question of man insofar as he is grasped as the thrower of being and thus is removed from any "anthropology." This allusion could give rise to and strengthen the mistaken view that. if Da-sein is to be essentially and fully grasped, it is to be grasped only in this relation to man.

However, mindful deliberation on the t/here [Da] as *clearing* for self-sheltering-concealing (be-ing) must already intimate how decisive the relation of Da-sein to beings in the whole is, because the t/here (Da] sustains the truth of being. Thought in this direction, **Da-sein**—itself nowhere placeable—**moves away from the relation to man and reveals itself as the "between" [*Zwischen*] that is unfolded by be-ing itself as the domain where beings tower up, where above all a being returns to itself**. The t/here [Da] is enowned by be-ing itself; and. consequently, man, as guardian of the truth of be-ing and thus belonging to Da-sein, is enowned in an outstanding and unique way. Thus as soon as a first allusion to Da-sein succeeds, the essential dimension which is announced in this allusion must be granted: **that Da-sein is enowned by be-ing and that be-ing as enowning itself builds the midpoint of all thinking**. [§175]

Da-sein itself means a "being," not the manner of being in the above sense; and nevertheless [it means] the manner of being in that unique distinction that *it* first determines the constitution, what-being as who-being, selfhood.

But this *"being"* is not *"man"* and Da-sein is not its how to be (still easily misunderstandable in *Being and Time),* but the being is *Da-sein* as ground of a definite, i.e., future humanness, not "of human in itself"; here, too, there is not enough clarity in *Being and Time.*

The talk of "human Dasein" (in *Being and Time)* is misleading to the extent that it implies that there is also an animal "Dasein" and a plant "Dasein." "Human Dasein"—here "human" does not mean the qualification according to species and in view of specificity of "Dasein" in general (as being-extant), but the uniqueness of *that* being, human, to whom alone *Da-sein fits [eignet].* But how?

Da-sein—the being that distinguishes a human *in its possibility; thus Da-sein then no longer needs the addition "human."* In what possibility? In its utmost [possibility), namely of being the founder and preserver of the truth itself. Da-sein-what *undergirds* and *simultaneously elevates* man. Hence, the talk of Da-sein *in* humans as the occurrence of that grounding. But one could also say "humans in Da-sein" or the Da-sein "of" humans. [§176, p 212]

179. “Existence”
(Being and Time)
Initially, in conjunction with the age-old *existentia* [existence], is *not* the what but the that-being and the how-being. But this [is] *parousia*, presence, extantness (the present).
Here on the other hand: Existence = the full temporality and indeed as ecstatic. *Ex-sistere—being exposed to beings.* For some time now [existence is] *no longer used. because* [it is] *misconstruable- "Philosophy of Existence."*
Da-sein as ex-sistere means having been shifted into and standing out in the openness of be-ing.
From this perspective the what, i.e., the *who,* and the selfhood of Da-sein are determined.
Existence-for the sake of Da-sein, i.e., grounding the truth of be-ing.
Metaphysically, *existence* (means] presencing, appearing.
Being-historically, *existence* [means] inabiding removal-unto the t/here [Da]. [§179]

Truth and with that the essential sway of ground become dis-jointed temporally-spatially. Thereby, however, time and space are grasped originarily from truth and are essentially related to the grounding. **This relation is seen in *Being and Time,* but in the background and not mastered**. [§188]

In the history of the truth of being Dasein is the essential case of the between [Zwischenfall], i.e., the case of falling-into that “between” [Zwischen] into which man must be displaced, in order above all to be himself….
But belongingness to being holds sway only because being in its uniqueness needs Da-sein and, grounded therein and grounding it, needs man. No truth holds sway otherwise….
Thus one must ask: In which history must man stand, in order to belong to en-ownment?
For this, must he not be thrown ahead into the t/here [Da]—an event which becomes manifest to him as thrownness?
Thrownness will be experienced above all from within the truth of be-ing. **In the first preliminary interpretation (Being and Time) thrownness still remains misunderstandable in the sense of man's accidentally appearing among other beings.** [§194, p 223]

Da-sein never lets itself be demonstrated and described as something extant. It is to be obtained only hermeneutically, i.e., however, according to *Being and Time,* in the thrown projecting-open. …The t/here [Da) is the open between *[Zwischen]* that lights up and shelters—between earth and world, the midpoint of their strife and thus the site for the most intimate belongingness, and thus the ground for the "to-oneself,,. the *self,* and selfhood. [§198, p 226]

But the attempts heretofore, in *Being and Time* and subsequent writings, to enforce *this* essential sway of truth as ground for Da-sein—rather than the correctness of representation and assertion—had to remain inadequate, because they were always still enacted *defensively* and thus always had what was to be warded off as their aim—thus

making it impossible to know the essential sway of truth from the ground up, from the ground as which the essential sway itself holds sway. [§226, p 246]

But time-space belongs to truth in the sense of the essential enswaying of being as enowning. (**At this juncture we need to understand why the point of reference of *Being and Time* shows the way in the crossing**.) But the question is how and as what time-space belongs to truth. What truth
itself is cannot be sufficiently said in advance for itself but rather merely in grasping time-space.

Time-space is the enowned encleavage of the turning trajectories *[Kehrungsbahnen]* of enowning, of the turning between belongingness and the call, between abandonment by being and enbeckoning (the enquivering of the resonance of be-ing itself!). Nearness and remoteness, emptiness and gifting, fervor and dawdling- all of this dare not be grasped temporally-spatially in terms of the usual representations of time and space but the other way around: within them lies the hidden essential sway of time-space. [§239]

By this approach be-ing itself is apparently still made into an object, and the most decisive opposite of that is attained which the course of the question of be-ing has already opened up for itself. But ***Being and Time*** **after all aims at demonstrating "time" as the domain for projecting-opening be-ing. Certainly, but if things had remained that way, then the question of being would never have unfolded as *question* and thus as enthinking of what is most question-worthy**.

Thus at the deciding juncture it was necessary to overcome the crisis of the question of being that was necessarily initially so laid out, and above all to avoid an objectification of be-ing-on the one hand by *holding back* the "temporal" interpretation of be-ing and at the same time by attempting besides to make the truth of be-ing "visible" (freedom unto the ground in *Vom Wesen des Grundes,* and yet in the first part of this treatise the ontic-ontological schema is still thoroughly maintained). By merely thinking further along the line of the question already set forth, the crisis did not let itself be mastered. Rather, a frequent leap into the essential sway of be-ing itself had to be ventured, which at the same time required a more originary enjoining into history: The relation to the beginning, the attempt to clarify *aletheia* as an essential character of beingness itself, the grounding of the distinction of being and a being. Thinking became increasingly historical. i.e., the differentiation between what is a historical *[historisch]* observation and what is a systematic observation became increasingly untenable and inappropriate.

Be-ing itself announced its historical essential sway. However, there was and still continues to be a fundamental difficulty: Be-ing is to be projected open in its essential sway, but projecting-opening itself is the "essential sway" of be-ing, is projecting-opening as en-ownment.

Unfolding the question of being unto enthinking of be-ing must all the more unreservedly give up any representational approach, the more inabiding in be-ing this enthinking becomes; and this unfolding must come to know that what matters is to **prepare for a**

historical de-cision which can be endured only historically. This is to say that the attempt at enthinking does not transgress its own historical measure and thus fall back into what has been up to now. [§262]

As it is introduced in *Being and Time,* understanding of being has a transitional and ambiguous character; this corresponds to the designation of man ("human Dasein" and "Dasein *in* man").

On the one hand understanding of being—looking back, as it were, metaphysically—is grasped as the ungrounded *ground* of the transcendental and, in general, of re-presenting beingness (all the way back to *idea*).

On the other hand (because understanding is grasped as projecting-open and this is grasped as thrown) understanding of being indicates grounding the essential sway of truth (manifestness, clearing of the t/here (Da). Da-sein). To say *"understanding of being that belongs to Da-sein"* becomes *superfluous;* it says the same thing twice and even in a weakened form. **For Da-sein "is" precisely grounding the truth of be-ing as enowning**. Understanding of being moves *within* the *differentiation* of beingness and a being, without as yet validating the origin of the differentiation from within the *deciding-essential sway* of be-ing. [§264, p 320]

"Ontological difference" is a passageway that becomes unavoidable if the necessity of asking the grounding-question out of the guiding-question is to be made manifest. And the guiding-question itself? But this task cannot be avoided as long as any way at all must nonetheless be secured which leads *out of* the still very inadequate tradition of *metaphysically* inquiring thinking **into the necessarily unasked question of the truth of be-ing**. [§266]

What ensues here, what is already presupposed, the *metaphysical* thinking of beingness, cannot stand as the basic outline for grasping-be-ing—historically and in accord with Da-sein—**the essential sway of be-ing and its truth in its essential swaying**. Nevertheless, the crossing into the other beginning cannot be prepared in any other way than that the courage for the old (for the first-ever-inceptual) is brought to bear on the crossing and thus initially the attempt is made to drive the old itself in its own constitution beyond itself: a being, being, **the "meaning" (truth) of being (cf. *Being and Time*)**. But it is important to know that from the beginning *this* more originary retrieval demands—and already gives rise to—**a complete transformation of man into Da-sein, because the truth of be-ing, which is to be opened up, will bring nothing other than the more originary essential swaying *of be-ing itself*.** And this means that everything is transformed and that the walkways that still led to be-ing must be broken off, because another time-space is enopened by be-ing itself, which time-space makes a new erecting and grounding of beings necessary. **Nowhere with a being and only once in be-ing does the mildness of the awesome in the innermost essential sway turn to meet man and gods, each time in a different way, as a storm**. [§267]

But man can belong to be-ing (not only among beings), insofar as he draws out of this belongingness—and precisely out of it—what is most originarily his ownmost: Man understands be-ing (cf. *Being and Time*); he is the governor of projecting-open be-ing. The guardianship of the truth of be-ing makes up what is ownmost to man, grasped out of be-ing and "only" out of this. **Man belongs to be-ing as the one who is enowned by be-ing itself for the grounding of the truth of be-ing.** [§276, p 351-52]

42**. From "Being and Time" to "Enowning'"**

On this "way"–if stumbling and getting up again can be called that—the same question of the "meaning of be-ing" is always asked, and *only* this question. And therefore the locations of questioning are constantly different. Each time that it asks more originarily, every essential questioning must transform itself from the ground up. Here there is no gradual "development." Even less does that relationship exist between what comes later and what is earlier, according to which what is earlier already includes what comes later. **Because in the thinking of be-ing everything steers toward what is unique, stumblings are, as it were, the rule!** This also averts the historical *[historisch]* approach, which gives up what is earlier as "false" or proves what comes later as "already meant" in what is earlier. The "changes" are so essential that their full import can only be determined when each time the *one* question is thoroughly asked from its questioning location.

The "changes," however, are not conditioned from the outside, by means of objections. For up until now no objection has become possible, because the question has not yet been grasped at all. The "changes: stem from the growing abground character of the be-ing question itself, in which every historical *[historisch]* support is taken away from this question. Therefore, however, the *way* itself becomes more and more essential, **not as "personal development," but as the exertion of man—understood totally nonbiographically—to bring be-ing itself within a being to its truth**.

Here something is merely repeated that since the end of the first beginning of Western philosophy, i.e., since the end of metaphysics, must be always more decisively owned up to, namely that **thinking of be-ing is not a "doctrine'" and not a "system," but rather must become actual history and thus what is most hidden**. This happens for the first time as the thinking of Nietzsche; and what comes to us as "psychology" and as *self-analysis* and undoing and *"Ecce homo,"* with all the contemporaries of that desolate time—all of this has its actual truth as the history of thinking, a thinking that with Nietzsche still *seeks* what is to be thought and still finds it in the sphere of the *metaphysical* way of putting the question (will to power and eternal recurrence of the same).

In the attempts since *Being and Time* the question is indeed put forth *more originarily,* but everything is kept in more modest measure—if one can compare measures at all.

Enactment of the being-question allows for no imitation. Here the necessities of the way are each time historically first, because unique. Whether these necessities, seen "historically" *[historisch],* are "new" and "actual" is here not even a possible perspective for judging.

The historical mastery over the history of Western thinking becomes increasingly important, and **dissemination of a "merely historical" or "systematic" erudite philosophy becomes increasingly impossible**.

For **what counts is** not to voice new representations of beings but rather **to ground human *being* in the truth of be-ing and to prepare for this grounding by enthinking be-ing and Da-sein**.

This preparation does not consist in acquiring preliminary cognitions as the basis for the later disclosure of actual cognitions. Rather, **here preparation is**: opening the way, yielding to the way—**essentially, *attuning***. But again, not as if what is thought and to be thought is merely an indifferent occasion for setting *thinking* in *motion.* Rather the truth of be-ing, the knowing awareness of mindfulness, is what counts.

But the pathway of this enthinking of be-ing does not yet have a firm line on the map. The territory first comes to be *through the pathway* and is unknown and unreckonable at every stage of the way.

The more genuinely the way of enthinking is the way to be-ing, the more unconditionally is it attuned to and determined by be-ing itself.

Enthinking is not thinking-out and haphazard invention but rather (is) that thinking that through questioning places itself before be-ing and demands of be-ing that it attune the questioning, all the way through.

But in en thinking of be-ing, beings in the whole must be put up for decision every time. **In each case this succeeds only in *one* purview and turns out to be all the more needy, the more originarily the hinting of be-ing strikes this thinking**.

The territory that comes to be through and as the way of enthinking of be-ing is the *between [Zwischen]* that *en-owns* Da-sein to god; and in this enownment man and god first become "recognizable" to each other, belonging to the guardianship and needfulness of be-ing. [§42]