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Perception Notes

0. In the opening introductory sections of Perception, Hegel talks indifferently and interchangeably about:

- a) **Universality**
- b) **Determinate Negation** (on my reading: material *incompatibility*)
- c) **Mediation** (on my reading: material *inference*)

For instance, for (b): “The wealth of sense-knowledge belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty, for which it was only the source of instances; for **only perception contains negation, that is, difference or manifoldness, within its own essence**,” [112]. He talks about “...sensuous universality, or the *immediate* unity of being and the negative...” [115]. And for (c): “[T]he universal is in its simplicity a *mediated* universal...” [112].

I've argued that (b) is the key, fundamental notion. Given that, one can show that (a) and (c) are already implicitly in play, by the arguments I offered in discussing *Sense Certainty*. (Quickly: **being incompatible with *p* is a universal that *q* and *r* can share, and one can introduce an inferential relation *p* entails *q* iff everything incompatible with *q* is incompatible with *p*.**)

One of the big tasks of *Perception* is to show that the very concept of universality implicitly contains an intricate metaphysical structure articulated by 5 kinds of complex difference (negation) themselves intelligible in terms of one basic distinction between two kinds of difference.

1. In *Perception* we are moving from *feature-placing* conceptual contents (Strawson) to term-predicate ones. [Note that I make a version of this transition, in quite different terms, in Chapter Six of *MIE*: “What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any?”] Consciousness understanding itself as perceiving is trying to reconcile *immediacy as independence* with *determinateness of universals*.

2. The main argument of *Perception* is that

- a) **The metaphysical fine-structure of universality is determinate negation.**

And therefore:

- b) **It is impossible to reconcile the determinateness of universals with their being immediate in the sense of independent of their relations of difference to and from others, along at least six dimensions.**

3. Consider the two distinctions: exclusive difference / mere difference [ausschließende vs. gleichgültige Verschiedenheit], object/property (or particular/universal). One of the prime

arguments I extract from *Perception* is that the whole aristotelian categorial structure of objects/properties can be elaborated from this distinction between two kinds of difference or negation.

4. Start with two ways of approaching relation between *contraries* and *contradictories*: Tarskian and Hegelian.

- a) Tarskian begins with domains of merely (“numerically”) different objects.
- b) Properties are identified with sets of objects. Relational structures.
- c) Negation is defined by a function that constrains its interpretation in *all* models (structures): negation of a property is what is true of all and only the objects the property is not true of: the complementation of the set in the domain.
- d) Properties are contraries, *in a particular model*, just in case $P'(x) \rightarrow \neg P(x)$.
- e) It ought to be considered a scandal that modern quantificational logic, understood as Tarski and Quine would have us do, can make *nothing* of the relation of contrariety with which Aristotle inaugurated the subject. It comes in only at the last possible stage, and as an ad hoc, contingent, optional, wholly unmotivated restriction on the apparatus.

Built on this is the:

- f) KLS (Kripke-Lewis-Stalnaker) framework:
 - i) Shifts points of evaluation from models as relational structures to possible worlds. Note that it is important *not* to identify these. Etchemendy *Concept of Logical Consequence*. Horrible example of the mistake: literature on supervenience (Kim, Stalnaker).
 - ii) Does for *nonlogical*, *nonmodal* predicates what Tarski did for negation: give it an *intension* that is a function from points of evaluation to extensions. (Negation function always took a property to its domain-complement.)
 - iii) This was the *second wave* of the modal revolution. First was Kripke’s complete semantics for all the C.I.Lewis axiomatic modal systems. Third was Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* lectures on metaphysical necessity and *a priority*—a bridge too far, in my view, transposing the genuinely semantic insights of the second wave into supposedly metaphysical ones.
- g) Hegelian begins with contrarieties of properties or universals. “Determinate negation.” This is material incompatibility, Aristotelian contraries.
- h) Merely different objects (particulars) defined in terms of them.
- i) Contradictories (“formal negation”) then definable as minimal contrary: the property entailed by everything incompatible with P.
- j) As Jakko Hintikka and Michael Friedman have taught us, Kant’s notion of synthesis stems from a decades-long engagement with the proof-structure of Euclid’s *Elements*.

His synthesis, involving both construction and infinitude, is a way of rendering alternating quantifiers of the $\forall\exists$ sort, in a way we can model on Skolem functions. Similarly, Hegel meditated long on Aristotle's notions of contraries and contradictories.

5. This pretty argument must be understood against the background of two different orders of explanation one might pursue concerning the two distinctions.
 - a) Tarskian : Start with *mere* difference of *objects*. Then one can identify *properties* with sets of objects, thought of as the extensions of those properties. The indiscernibility of *identicals*—that is, that if objects *a* and *b* are identical, they have the same properties—will follow set-theoretically from this definition. The other direction of Leibniz's Law, the identity of indiscernibles, will not, unless one insists that *every* different set of objects constitutes a property. (Further, once we—eventually—go modal, we will be looking at *classes* of models or possible worlds [Note: Absolutely *not* to be identified with one another. See Etchemendy's book *Logical Consequence*, and all my notes for the Naturalism seminar a few years ago.] In either case, one can then move up to *intensions* of properties by looking at *functions* from *indices* to extensions. The indices can be models, that is, relational structures. Or they can be possible worlds. We have come to see that the differences between these are great. One important one is that models have *domains* of objects. Possible worlds do not. Another is that some *logically* possible worlds (i.e. combinatorially possible constellations of objects and properties) don't count as really (metaphysically, or physically) possible. Whereas any relational structure with the right *adicities* can be a model. This is the point where modality gets incorporated—that is, at the end, and it then trickles down, via the intensions of properties, to the properties. This is *object-extensionalism*, or a broadly model-theoretic approach. This is the **Tarskian metaphysical scheme**.
 - b) Hegelian: Start with *exclusive* difference of *properties*. (In order to do this, one needs to assume *mere* difference of properties as well. One might be tempted to define merely different properties as ones that have different incompatibilities, i.e. sets of exclusively different properties. But one cannot tell when these sets are (merely) different without being able to tell when their elements are merely different.) Objects are then units of account w/res to properties, i.e. loci of exclusiveness or incompatibility of property-possession. Properties that *can* be exhibited by the *same* object are *merely* or indifferently different. This is Hegel's “also, of the indifferent matters”. Objects are merely different iff they have different *sets* of properties. Given *this* definition, the indiscernibility of *identicals* and the identity of indiscernibles both follow. Here modality is built in at the base. We *can* consider extensions of properties: the sets of objects that possess or exhibit the property in question. But for *extensions* of properties, only indiscernibility of *identicals* follows, not identity of indiscernibles. I don't want to call this “property intensionalism,” since intensions are usually identified with what they are in the object extensionalist picture. Perhaps “property modalism,” or “property exclusionism”. As I read her, Macbeth (in *Frege's Logic*) argues that Frege has a version of this sort of view.

This is the **Hegelian metaphysical scheme**.

What about other combinations?

- c) One cannot start with *exclusive* differences of *objects* because objects don't stand in such relations. Only properties do. More on this important point later.
- d) Tractarian begins with merely different *objects* and their merely different *relations*. All objects can stand in all relations. Properties are just relations to different objects. (This is discussed in the “third experience” of perceiving consciousness.) So all (elementary) properties can be had by all objects, including simultaneously. Then negation is defined by complementation in set of objects applied to. Then contradictory properties are defined. Only now, with *logically complex* properties (including negations) do exclusions come on the scene.

This is a **Tractarian metaphysical scheme**. Modality *never* enters into it.

- e) So I am distinguishing three ways of underwriting the aristotelian categorial scheme of particulars-and-universals, or (roughly) objects-and-properties. [Note: for a critical reading, keep track of where it makes a difference that Hegel does not think of relations, but seeks—along with everyone else then—to eliminate them in favor of properties. aRb becomes the two properties that a has the property of being R_{subject} (parent of) to b , and b has the different property of being R_{object} (child of) to a .]:

 - i. The **Hegelian** scheme, which starts with both *mere* and *exclusive* differences of *properties*, and derives the particular-and-universal structure from that.
 - ii. The **Tarskian** scheme, which starts with *mere* difference of *objects*, and builds up mere differences of properties extensionally, and then (optionally) exclusive differences of properties from *arbitrary* restrictions on the models or worlds (in either case, extensions) one quantifies over.
 - iii. The **Tractarian** scheme
The *Tractatus* allows *no* restrictions on what objects can stand in what relations (so, have what properties). What is syntactically-combinatorially categorically possible (“logically possible”) is possible *tout court*. Elementary objects put *no* constraints on the Sachverhalte they can enter into. Apparently, thinking about apparently elementary exclusions of color properties is an important impetus for Wittgenstein to move on from Tractarian views to his later ones. This view is discussed under the heading of the third experience of consciousness understanding itself as perceiving, i.e. applying sense universals (immediate universality).

Part I:

- Feature-placing contents, from SC. As *determinate*, it has been argued, they involve generality. But the argument for that was from their needing to stand to one another in relations of modal *exclusion*. So there is a distinction between two kinds of difference: mere or indifferent [gleichgültige] difference, and exclusive [ausschließende] difference. **The metaphysical fine structure of universality is negation.**

- Exclusive difference is *material* incompatibility or determinate negation. (This is the kind that the *Tractatus* forbids.) It is a matter of Aristotelian *contraries*. We can define *formal* incompatibility = inconsistency, that is, define abstract, *formal* negation from *determinate* negation, by the principle that the negation of *P* is its *minimal* (material) *incompatible*: the contrary that is implied by *all* the other contraries.
- This meta-difference between two kinds of difference (it is in fact itself of the kind mere difference: at any rate, it is not an exclusive difference) implicitly contains all the raw materials needed to attribute full aristotelian particular/universal, object/property structure. That is, that structure can be *elaborated from* the difference between the two kinds of difference. The categorial vocabulary of particular/universal, object/property is also *explicative of* that distinction. **The aristotelian categorial structure is *implicit in* and *explicative of* that (categorial, metaphysical) difference between two kinds of difference.** We see this in three stages:
 - Properties are identified and individuated by their strong differences from one another. (Individuating properties by their *nomological*, i.e. alethic modal, relations to one another is a prominent contemporary approach to the metaphysics of properties. I believe Armstrong holds such a view.)
 - Objects are units of account for property-exclusions. They are identified and individuated by the properties they exhibit.
 - The difference (of the exclusive kind) between objects and properties can be identified with the fact that properties have contraries, and therefore contradictories, while objects have neither.
 - This is the fine structure of 3 complex kinds of negation-(i),(ii), and (iii) (plus two more, see below)—built out of 2 *primitive* kinds of negation: exclusive and mere difference. Exclusive difference, determinate negation, Aristelian contrariety, lets one define *formal* negation or contradictories.
- **Explaining the view about the relation between *unity (identity)* and *diversity (difference)*, in relation to *determinateness*:** The discussion of the way in which identity can depend on difference, unity on multiplicity, must take account of:
 - the way the identity of one property consists in its determinate relation to other properties (its intracategorial others), which it excludes and (so) entails, and
 - the way the identity of one object consists in its determinate relation to properties (its intercategorial others), namely α) the ones that characterize it (as an “also”), and β) the ones it excludes (as an “exclusive one”), and
 - the way the identity of one object consists in its determinate relation to other objects (its intracategorial others).

So we have in (a) **the intracategorial determinate otherness relating properties to properties**, in (b) **the intercategorial determinate otherness relating properties and objects**, and in (c) **the intracategorial determinate otherness relating objects to objects**. [See passages below in (5).] The selective rehearsal of the experience of perceiving

consciousness that is presented in the exposition of the three dialectics of perception is to show that **each strategy for construing determinately contentful objects and properties according to a model of independence fails to do justice to one or more of these ways in which determinateness involves relations to a multiplicity of others**. The dialectic unfolds as a series of strategies attempting the reconciliation, known to us but not to perceptual consciousness to be impossible, of determinateness with independence. Along the way different elements of consciousness or knowledge are identified as the source or authority responsible for unifying and distinguishing the determinate objects and properties.

But the main point here is that **one will never build genuine determinateness out of mutually independent, antecedently intelligible principles of diversity and unity. One must go the other way around, and derive or abstract our understanding of diversity and unity from our understanding of determinateness.**

- The overall point is that the very notion of universality—even when restricted to *immediate* universality, namely *sense* universals—**implicitly is articulated by a fine structure that involves 3 complex kinds of difference (being an opposite or contradictory is a fourth, and the two aspects of objects, as ‘also’ of its various indifferent properties and as the ‘exclusive unity’ as unit of account for exclusively different properties is a fifth) rooted in two basic kinds of difference.**

- More carefully:

5 Kinds of complex, derivative difference:

6. Properties can stand to each other in two different kinds of relations of difference:
 - i) Exclusive difference, and
 - ii) mere or indifferent difference.
 This is the basic, primordial difference of differences.
7. In terms of exclusive difference or determinate negation, Aristotelian contrariety, we can define Aristotelian contradictions, or *formal* negation: The contradictory is the least contrary, i.e. the property possession of which is implied by possession of *any* contrary property.
8. Properties are unintelligible without their relation to items of a *different* (exclusively different) category: the medium of properties, the exclusive unity of them. This is an ontological-metaphysical difference of categories. [114]: "...if **the many determinate properties** were strictly **indifferent** [gleichgültig] to one another, if they were simply and solely self-related, **they would not be determinate**; for **they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another** [sie sich unterscheiden], and **relate themselves to others** as to their opposites [als entgegengesetzte].
9. Objects have a further kind of difference within them: **as ‘also’ of its various indifferent properties and as the ‘exclusive unity’ as unit of account for exclusively different properties:**

This simple medium is not merely an “also,” an indifferent unity; it is also a “one,” an excluding unity. [114]

BB: It is an ‘also’ as the medium of its various merely, but not exclusively different properties.

It is a ‘one’, an “excluding unity” as being of an ontological-metaphysical category that is the unit of account w/res to which exclusiveness of properties is defined.

These are two different, indeed opposed, equally essential features of objects. The relation between them is yet another complex, derived form of difference, that we can see is implicit in the notion of determinate negation.

10. Objects differ from one another by their having *merely* different properties that can also be *exclusively* different.
11. Properties differ from objects in that properties have *opposites* or *contradictories* (cf. difference (1)), but objects do not. This is the main Aristotelian argument.

Part II:

The first kind of identity in difference is that of properties relative to other, exclusively different properties. [114]:

"...if the many **determinate properties** were strictly **indifferent** [gleichgültig] to one another, if they were simply and solely self-related, **they would not be determinate**; for **they are only determinate in so far as they *differentiate* themselves from one another** [sie sich unterscheiden], and **relate themselves to others as to their opposites** [als entgegengesetzte]. Yet; as thus opposed [Entgegengesetzung] to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as negation; the differentiation [Unterscheidung] of the properties, insofar as it is...exclusive [ausschließende], each property negating the others, thus falls outside of this simple medium."

[BB: The “medium” being objects.]

That is, the mere fact that an object has some properties and not others (a division into merely different ones) does not settle which of the properties the object *does* not have it *could* not have: which are *excluded* by each of the properties it has.

The Indiscernibility of Identicals says that mere difference of properties is sufficient for mere difference of objects. The Identity of Indiscernibles says that merely different objects have at least merely different properties. I think Hegel endorses these principles. But his talk of objects as excluding one another suggests that he also endorses a further, stronger principle: different objects not only have *different* properties, they have *incompatible* properties. We might call this principle the “Exclusivity of Objects.” Such a view would satisfy three criteria of adequacy, the first two of which are set by the passage most recently quoted above.

- It would underwrite talk of objects as excluding one another.
- It would do so by appealing to the more primitive notion of properties excluding one another.
- And it would respect the differences between property-exclusion and object-exclusion that are enforced by the Aristotelian argument showing that objects cannot have contradictories definable from their exclusions (in the case of properties, their contrarieties) in the way that properties do.

In effect, the Exclusivity of Objects says that it never happens that two objects are distinguished by their role as things-as-alsos combining different compatible properties, according to the discernibility of non-identicals version of (LL2) unless they are *also* distinguished by their role as things-as-excluding-ones. There is no mere difference of properties distinguishing objects without exclusive difference of properties (having incompatible properties) distinguishing them. This is a topic on which Leibniz's Law is silent.

Note that as far as I can tell, Hegel is completely innocent of the thought that the fact that object o has properties P and Q excludes *more* than is excluded just by P and by Q individually. If that is true, this is a *very* odd oversight from the inventor of *holism* about conceptual contentfulness (both on the side of objects and of subjects). I would love to find evidence in Hegel that he *does* appreciate this point. (Cf. Sellars on inconsistent triads: the Sellarsian gustatory challenge to find irreducibly triadic incompatibilities of taste.)

- a) The second kind of identity in difference is that of objects relative to objects: both sides of Leibniz's Law.
- b) Third kind of identity in difference is that between properties and objects, since the exclusive differences between properties cannot be understood except in terms of the "indifferent medium" of such properties, namely objects. In this sense, **objects are the "negations of the negations"**, defined categorially by their differences from properties, which are determined by their differences from one another.

[114] continues:

"The One is the *moment of negation*; it is itself quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes another; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a Thing."

[BB: it is a moment of negation *relative to properties*, because it is a different, indeed, opposed, ontological *category* from that of properties or universals.]

"Negation is inherent in a property as a *determinateness* which is immediately one with the immediacy of being, an immediacy which, through this unity with negation, is universality. As a One, however, the determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite, and exists in and for itself."

But the way the account of objects/properties is supposed to work is made clear here:

...these *diverse aspects*...are *specifically determined*. White is white only in opposition to black, and so on, and the Thing is a One precisely by being opposed to others. But it is not as a One that it excludes others from itself...it is through its *determinateness* that the thing excludes others. Things are therefore in and for themselves determinate; they have properties by which they distinguish themselves from others...[120]

The ‘exclusion’ of one object by another can only be *mere* difference, not *exclusive* difference, because objects, unlike properties, don’t have *opposites*. The *mere* difference of objects, for Hegel, is a matter of their possession of *exclusively* different properties. **Q: Why couldn’t two objects merely differ by having merely different properties? A: Because they would have exclusively different properties. Being identical to *a* is *incompatible* with being identical with *b*, if *a* and *b* are merely different.**

This is the big Aristotelian argument that underlies and articulates the categorial difference between objects and properties: properties, but not objects, can stand in the relation of being *contradicities* or *opposites* (they can be “*entgegengesetzte*”).

Property *Q* is the opposite of property *P* in this sense just in case it is exhibited by all and only the objects that do not exhibit *P*. This is how not-red is related to red. An argument due to Aristotle [Book V of the *Categories*] shows that objects do not have opposites in this sense of contradictories. The corresponding notion of an opposite in the ontological category of objects would have object *b* being the contradictory of object *a* just in case *b* exhibits all and only the properties not exhibited by *a*. But the properties *not* exhibited by any object always include properties that are incompatible with one another, and hence not all exhibitable by any one object.

[113] sense universal is a “universal immediacy.” Cf. the two senses of “noninferential”. Since they are expressed in the simplicity of the universal, these determinatenesses, which are really only properties by virtue of the addition of a determination yet to come [BB: namely, *objects*, the “*indifferent medium*” of properties], relate themselves to themselves, are indifferent to each other, and each both exists on its own and is free-standing from the others. [113]

the medium in which these determinations permeate each other in that universality as a simple unity but without making contact with each other, for it is precisely through participation in this universality that each is on its own, **indifferent** to the others—As it has turned out, **this abstract universal medium, which can be called thinghood itself**, or the pure essence, is none other than the here and now, namely, as **a simple ensemble of the many**.

114. As it has turned out, in this relationship, it is merely the character of positive universality which is at first observed and developed.

BB: That is, the merely feature-placing vocabulary has shown we need to acknowledge sense universals in order to be held determinately contentful. So ur-properties show up first, even

though they are “really only properties by virtue of the addition of a determination yet to come,” [113], namely objects as the “indifferent medium” (the “also”) of those sense universals.

f) Next point [114]:

If the many determinate properties were to be utterly indifferent and were for all intents and purposes related only to themselves, then they would still not be determinate properties, **for they are determinate properties only insofar as they are both distinguished from each other and, as contrasted**, relate themselves to each other.

This is the key claim that distinguishes the Hegelian underwriting of the aristotelian categorial structure of objects-and-properties (particulars-and-universals) from the Tarskian and the Tractarian ones.

This simple medium is not merely an “also,” an indifferent unity; it is also a “one,” an excluding unity. [114]

BB: It is an ‘also’ as the medium of its various merely, but not exclusively different properties. It is a ‘one’, an “excluding unity” as being of an ontological-metaphysical category that is the unit of account w/res to which exclusiveness of properties is defined.

These are two different, indeed opposed, equally essential features of objects. The relation between them is yet another complex, derived form of difference, that we can see is implicit in the notion of determinate negation.

I now further perceive the property as determinate, as contrasted with an other, and as excluding it. I thus in fact did not apprehend the objective essence correctly when I determined it as a community with others, or as continuity, and, in terms of the determinateness of the property, I must in fact break up the continuity into pieces and posit the objective essence as an excluding “one.”[117]

In the broken-up “one,” I find many such properties, which do not affect each other but which are instead indifferent to each other.

[115]: “sensuous universality, that is, the *immediate* unity of being and the negative,”

Now we should be able to see what this means:

a) The object is the *categorial* negative of the property.

They are distinguished by the following two features:

b) the property is the *exclusive* negative of the other properties, and

c) the object is the *mere* negative of the other objects.

So negativity (union with which distinguishes empirical consciousness understanding itself as perception from empirical consciousness understanding itself as immediate sense certainty) here is *triadic*, having these three senses or (Hegel claims) dimensions.

12. What is called in [113] the thing as “the indifferent ‘also’” is the thing as the seat of properties that are at most *indifferently* different, i.e. *merely* different.

13. [115]:

“...the thing as the truth of perception reaches its culmination to the extent that it is necessary to develop that here. It is

- α) the indifferent passive universality, the *also* of the many properties, or, rather, *matters*.
- β) the negation generally as simple, that is, the *one*, the excluding of contrasted properties, and
- γ) the many *properties* themselves, the relation of the two first moments: The negation, as it relates itself to the indifferent element and extends itself within it as a range of differences; the point of individuality in the medium of enduring existence radiating out into multiplicity.”

14. [116]:

“Now, it is in this way that the thing of perception is constituted; and consciousness is determined to be perceiving insofar as this thing is its object; it *only has to “take” the object* and conduct itself as **pure apprehension**; what thereby emerges for it is the true. If in this taking, it itself were to do something, it would by means of such addition or omission of something alter the truth.” [Cf. H’s *Introduction*]

This is the text that establishes that empirical consciousness understanding itself as perceiving *essentially* commits itself to the *independence* of what it perceives. Here *independence* occupies the role that *immediacy* did in *Sense Certainty*. It can have different senses, which must be picked apart.

Outline of Perception:

- I. [111]-[116]: Account of how things look to us (the phenomenological, retrospective consciousness).
- II. [117]: First experience of phenomenal perceiving consciousness. Both the unity and diversity of properties and objects are seen as objectively in the independent objects and properties.
- III. [118]-[120]: Second experience of perceiving consciousness. Divide the source of unity and the source of diversity between subjective and objective poles (act of perceiving and what is perceived).
 - 1. Objective unity, subjective diversity.
 - 2. Subjective unity, objective diversity.
- IV. [121]-127]: Third experience of perceiving consciousness. Unity and diversity both objective: unity in independent objects, diversity derives from their relations to one another (what they are *for* one another).
- V. [128]-131]: Summary of how things look to us, transition to next section.

The overall lesson is that one cannot reconcile the *independence* (immediacy) that empirical consciousness conceiving itself as perception is committed to by its restriction to *sense* universals, with the *determinateness* of its content that implicitly requires distinguishing *mere* difference from *exclusive* difference.

Introduction: [111]-[116]: Account of how things look to us (the phenomenological, retrospective consciousness).

The dialectics are driven by locating *responsibility for* diversity or unity in different places.

Hegel invokes this by using the phrase "nimmt (sie) auf sich" (takes it upon itself, takes it up), in [118], [120], [122], and [131].

IV. [117]: First experience of phenomenal perceiving consciousness.

Both the *unity* and *diversity* (identity and difference) of properties and objects are seen as objectively in the independent objects and properties.

First “experience” of ECUIP (empirical consciousness understanding itself as perception) **is discovering the negation in the unities of both universality and particularity.**

The first investigation of the relations between identity and difference. The overall view is that **the fine-structure of universality is negation: the identity of items of all categories (so far, properties and objects) is articulated by determinate differences of five kinds, compounded out of the two basic kinds of difference (determinate negation).** Holism, to be further explored in *FU*. Negation of the negation. Some of the views from “Holism and Idealism...”, made more explicit in *FU*, get foreshadowed already here.

1. First move [117]:

“The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One....

- a) ...but I also perceive in it a property which is *universal*, and which thereby transcends the singularity [of the object].
- b) On account of the *universality* of the property, I must rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a *community*.”

That is, the property is construed as a *repeatable*. It is what is in principle *common* (“a *community*”) to a variety of *instances*. It is what unifies that multiplicity of instances.

So here we have the *intercategorial* distinction between the *one* object (unity) and the property as universal over *many* instances (a kind of diversity).

2. Second move [117]:

“I now further perceive the property to be *determinate*, *opposed* to another and excluding it.”

This shows that it was incorrect to think of the property merely as *unifying* its instances. It also essentially *excludes* other properties. The content associated with a sense universal determines not only what instances it is correctly applied to (the proper circumstances of application) but also what the correct significance of such application is (the proper consequences of application), in particular the other universals it precludes or forbids me from applying.

Accordingly at this stage the *determinateness* of what is perceived is understood to consist in the way a sense universal or observable property differentiates itself from a *multiplicity* of others, which it excludes or contrasts with.

3. Third move [117]:

a) “In the broken up One I find many such properties which do not affect one another but are mutually indifferent. Therefore I did not perceive the object correctly when I apprehended it as exclusive....”

It was realized at the previous stage that each property instantiated by a particular object *excludes* its instantiation of others. Now it is noticed that each particular object also *includes* many such excluding properties.

b) “...so now it [the object] is a universal *common medium*, in which many properties are present as sensuous *universalities*, each existing on its own account and, as *determinate*, excluding the others.”

But here the demands that the properties in question *both* be *independent* of their instantiation by particular objects and of other properties *and* be determinate collide.

c) Since it is true of properties that

“...only when it belongs to a One is it a property, and only in relation to others is it determinate,” if those relations are ignored, as demanded by the requirement of *independence* integral to perceiving consciousness' conception of the authority of immediacy,

“it remains merely *sensuous being* in general, since it no longer possesses the character of negativity.”

As indeterminate, consciousness understanding itself as perception has been robbed of any intelligible notion of content.

Conclusion:

- We can't conceive of objects as determinate apart from their relation to their properties.
- And we can't conceive of the properties, in terms of which objects are determinately what they are, as determinately what *they* are apart from their relations (of exclusion) to other properties.

So, we can't conceive **either objects or properties** as *determinate and independent* of their relations to other things (properties to other properties, objects to properties, and objects to other objects).

V. [118]-[120]: Second experience of perceiving consciousness.

The **second strategy** tried out by perception, in the face of the failure of the first, is to assign a role to consciousness in the reconciliation of determinateness and autonomy.

Divide the source of unity and the source of diversity between subjective and objective poles of intentional nexus (act of perceiving and what is perceived).

3. Objective unity, subjective diversity.

4. Subjective unity, objective diversity.

1. The *second* experience of ECUIP is the one where the principles of unity and diversity (identity and difference) are assigned variously to the subjective or the objective poles of the intentional nexus.

a) These correspond to Kant vs. Shelley.

Kant has all unity as the product of the Understanding, which operates on an initially given sensory *manifold* of intuition.

Shelley sees the “white radiance of eternity” as refracted through the multicolored stained glass of the mind, to yield the multiplicity we see.

The One remains, the many change and pass;

Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,

Stains the white radiance of Eternity,

[from *Adonais*]

b) These two views loomed large in the debates about British Absolute Idealism, out of which Russell and analytic philosophy emerged. Russell put them as the difference between the “bucket of shot” and the “bowl of jelly” models. He, of course, went with the first, which culminated in the Tarskian and PW models.

c) This debate was understood, by Russell, following Bradley, in terms of *internal* and *external* relations. (Cf. the relations between rungs and rails of a ladder, as internal, and the relation between the ladder and the wall it leans against, as external.) Both took it that the two principal alternatives were: all relations are internal (Bradley, holism) vs. all relations are external (Russell, atomism). Whitehead objected that these alternatives both committed the “fallacy of lost contrast.” Cf. Dummettian molecularism in semantics. (But don’t bring this up before the Quinean transformation below in (d).)

d) Should understand the latter debate in terms of Quine’s remark in “Two Dogmas...” that “meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the thing and wedded to the word.” The *ontological* debates over atomism and holism get transformed into *semantic* debates. Hegel already had *both* dimensions fully and essentially in play, and saw the essence of both in the *relations* between them: conceptual idealism about whether how it stands between subjective *processes* or *practices* and objective *relations* is to be understood in terms of processes or relations.

[118] For consciousness, it has thereby been determined just how its perceiving is essentially composed, namely, not as a simple, pure act of apprehending, but rather as being in its act of apprehending at the same time taking a reflective turn into itself from out of the true. This return of consciousness into itself, which immediately blends itself into that pure apprehending – for it has been shown to be essential to the act of perceiving – alters the true. At the same time, consciousness takes cognizance⁹ of this aspect as its own, and it takes it upon itself, and as a result, it purely receives the **true object**.

BB: Not pure apprehending, because perceiving consciousness must add to each property the cloud of virtual, contrasting [Entgegengesetzte] properties by the exclusion of which a property is intelligible as determinate. This it sees as its addition, a reflection of its own activity. Thus its immediate apprehension was a falsification, an error. That apprehension *as an error*—as only what things were *for* consciousness, is the new, true object.

[C]onsciousness has to a greater degree the cognizance [Erkenntnis] that the *untruth*, which comes forth here, falls within consciousness. [118]

The conduct of consciousness, which is now up for examination, is so composed that it is no longer merely the act of perceiving but is conscious of its reflective turn into itself, and it separates this reflective turn into itself from simple apprehension itself.

[122]

Through the comparison, consciousness thus finds that not only *its* act of “taking the true” has in itself the *diversity* of the *act of apprehending* and that of *returning-into-itself*, but it also finds that the true itself, the thing, has to an even greater degree shown that it itself exists in this doubled fashion.

- Structure of identity-in-and-through-difference exhibited by the Aristotelian structure understood in the Hegelian way cannot be accounted for by *separate* principles of identity and difference—paradigmatically, one supplied by subjective pole of intentional nexus, the other by the objective pole.
- In fact, *both* subjective and objective have to have *both* principles articulating determinateness.
- This is the first glimpse we get of the difference of form attaching to the conceptual content common to the two poles of the intentional nexus. They correspond to the two readings of “exclusive difference”: alethic modal on the objective side, and deontic normative on the subjective side.
- The difference between them shows up in what is required to make sense of the possibility of *error*. That is what happens when the alethic modal and deontic normative sense of “materially incompatible” come apart, or fail to track one another.
- That tracking has both an alethic modal component, namely *tracking* of the alethic modal necessities by the deontic normative, and a deontic normative component, namely normative *government* of...[Tell story from end of MEMRTA].

Error as giving us the key to the difference of *form* of determinate negation on the two poles of the intentional nexus. I must find passages that support my alethic/deontic reading. This is the difference between *change of mind* and *change of object* (cf. the Second Analogy, already invoked in my chapter on *Sense Certainty*, in connection with the distinction between relations of representations and representations of relations). Acknowledgment of error (requiring three stages: apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, recognition in concepts, cf. A-Deduction) requires *exclusive* differences. In [111] we get the distinction between the *act of perceiving* (= the “pointing out”) and the *object* (which is “indifferent to whether it is perceived”). [Note (9/13): I later, in (7) (around 9/9) conclude that there is no evidence for such a theme in *Perception*. Is that too hasty a conclusion?]

VI. [121]-127]: Third (Tractarian) experience of perceiving consciousness.

Unity and diversity both objective: unity in independent objects, diversity derives from their relations to one another (what they are *for* one another).

Both the elements of *unity* and *diversity* which alternated between being assigned to the *thing* and to *consciousness* are to be assigned to *things*, but only *one* of them to the thing which is the thing characterized by perceptual properties.

The *diversity* which makes it *determinate* is then understood in terms of the *relations* which that single thing stands in to *other* things.

Tractarian begins with merely different *objects* and their relations. All objects can stand in all relations. Properties are just relations to different objects. (This is the “third experience” of consciousness understanding itself as perceiving, i.e. trying to reconcile immediacy as independence with determinateness of universals.) So all (elementary) properties can be had by all objects, including simultaneously. Then negation is defined by complementation in set of objects applied to. Then contradictory properties are defined. Only now do exclusions come on the scene.

[123]

The “also,” that is, the indifferent distinction, falls just as much into the thing as it does into *oneness*, but since both are different, it does not fall into the same thing but rather into *different* things. The contradiction, which exists *per se* in the objective essence, is distributed into two objects.

[124]

The *various things* are therefore posited as each existing *on its own*,¹⁷ and the conflict falls into each of them reciprocally such that each is different not from itself but only from others.

However, each is thereby *itself* determined as *something distinct* and has the essential distinction from others *in it*, but at the same time not in such a way that this would be a contrast *in itself*. Rather, it is on its own¹⁸ *simple determinateness*, which constitutes its essential character and distinguishes it from others. [125]

This determinateness, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and which distinguishes it from all others, is now so determined that the thing thereby exists in contrast to others but is supposed to preserve itself on its own²⁰ in that contrast. However, it is merely a thing, that is, a “one” existing for itself insofar as it does not stand in this relation to others, for in this relation the connection with others is posited to an even greater degree, and connection with others is the cessation of being-for-itself. It *relates* itself²¹ to *others* precisely through the *absolute characteristic* and its contrast, and it is essentially merely this act of relating. However, the relationship is the negation of its self-sufficiency, and the thing in fact perishes by virtue of its essential property.

BB: I read this as saying that the determinateness of the object consists in its mere differences from other objects. So what it is in itself, one determinate thing and not another, turns out to be relational and involve the other things it contrasts (weakly) with. This repeats what happened with properties, only there it was in the medium of *strong* differences. The lesson to be learned is the difference between the identity-through-difference of *properties*, where the difference is *strong*, and the identity-through-difference of *objects*, where the difference is *weak*.

126. The necessity of the experience for consciousness is that the thing perishes precisely by virtue of the determinateness which constitutes both its essence and its being-for-itself.

In [128] we hear that for this reason the object is the “**opposite**” [Gegenteil] of itself.

This is the term used when we say that properties have opposites, and objects do not.

[129]: From out of sensuous being, it became a universal, but since it *emerged from out of the sensuous*, this universal is essentially *conditioned* by the sensuous and is thus not truly in parity with itself. Rather, it is a universality affected *with an opposition*, which for that reason is separated into the extreme terms of individuality and universality, **of the “one” of properties and of the “also” of the free-standing matters**. These pure determinatenesses seem to express *essentiality* itself. However, they are only a *being-for-itself* which is burdened with *being for an other*. But since both exist essentially *in one unity*, unconditioned absolute universality itself is now on hand, and for the first time consciousness truly enters into the realm of the understanding.

[130] and [131] sum up what Hegel wants us to learn:

Perceiving consciousness, no less than consciousness in the form of sense certainty is in fact the plaything of abstractions, first of Being, then of the distinction between Essential and Unessential, or equally One/Many, Unity/Difference. This is because it does not have an adequate *comprehension* of the presuppositions of the *determinate contentfulness* of its sensuous *apprehensions*.

Conjecture: **The transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness is rationalized by the realization that sense certainty, perception, and understanding were not, properly, forms of consciousness, but ways of conceiving consciousness, that is, forms of self-consciousness.**

[130]: The sophistry of perceiving seeks to save these moments from their contradictions, to hold fast to them by distinguishing various points of view, by [invoking] the *also* and the *insofar*, as well as seeking finally to lay hold of what is true by distinguishing the *unessential* from an *essence* that is opposed to the universal. Yet these expedients, instead of warding off illusion in apprehension, prove themselves rather to be nothing at all, and the true, which is supposed to be won through this logic of perceiving, proves to be in one and the same regard the opposite and thereby to have as its essence that universality completely devoid of distinction and determination.

I think these are the three movements of *Perception*:

- i) distinguishing various points of view
- ii) invoking the *also* and the *insofar*,
- iii) distinguishing essential/inessential.

[131] Since common-sense wants to bestow truth on them (sometimes

- i) by taking their untruth onto itself,
- ii) sometimes calling that illusion a mere semblance on the part of unreliable things, and
- iii) by separating the essential from what is necessary to them but nonetheless supposed to be unessential, and by holding fast to the former as their truth in the face of the latter),

[by making these moves], it does not preserve their truth for them, but it does bestow untruth on itself.

15. The overarching theme of *Perception* is that the *sense universals* we discovered determinately contentful episodes exercising the epistemic authority of sensuous immediacy necessarily involve are structured by *negation*. **Universality is a structure of negation.** It involves two *basic* sorts of difference (mere or indifferent difference and exclusive difference or contrariety—a modal notion, which was at the center of Aristotle’s logic), which in turn articulate complex structures of identity-through-difference: those distinguishing-and-relating properties to properties, properties to objects, and objects to objects.

At the end of *Perception*, it is this structure of **universality-articulated-by-negation (identity-through-difference)** that is taken into *Force and Understanding*.

VI. **Conclusion:** [128]-131] Summary of how things look to us, transition to next section.

16. Insofar as we take seriously a) the three *experiences* [Hegel does *not* call them “dialectics”] of **empirical consciousness understanding itself as perceiving (ECUIP)**

[Note that realizing that this, along with its preceding empirical consciousness understanding itself as immediate sense certainty and the succeeding empirical consciousness understanding itself as understanding, are forms of *self-consciousness* is the key to the *expository* transition from *Consciousness* to *Self-Consciousness*.]

and b) the *progression* from one to the next in H’s exposition, we must ask:

- Why are these realizations or insights that ECUIP must undergo, on pain of failing to understand itself? And
- Why should or must they come in this order?

I don’t have good answers to these questions.

But I also don’t think that what we can learn from Hegel’s analysis depends on having answers to these questions. If we had *good* answers to them, we would learn more. But we should not hold what we *can* learn from his discussion hostage to the further commitments undertaken by insisting on answers to these questions.

17. Hegel’s *Perception* view is as anti-Humean a view as one could have.

- a) Hegel thinks that just in having determinately contentful *sensory* states, in virtue of taking in sensory content one distinguishes between the two kinds of difference: the difference between **red** and **square**, and the difference between **red** and **green**. One implicitly knows, he claims, that something *can* be both red and square, and *not* both red and green, simply in virtue of taking in *those* contents. The modal properties are a necessary part of the content one is taking in.
- b) Q: To what extent is this disagreement between Hume and Hegel an *empirical* disagreement? Hume must claim that the fact that we have never observed something that is all red and all green is a fact like our never having observed a blue stone-fruit. That one *could* experience something red and heptagonal (though perhaps one has not), but could *not* observe something all red and all green is *just* a regularity. There is no *phenomenal* difference between those possible combinations. Such a view requires a *very* special (I would say, *obviously* artificially constructed, and so fragile [compare Searle on intentions in action] sense of ‘phenomenal’.)
- c) 2-factor theory of observation underwrites direct observability of such modal facts.
- d) This is a *different* argument against the Myth of the Given than Sellars gives. It relies on a *perceptual* version of the Kant-Sellars thesis about modality. So it uses claims Sellars in fact makes, but *not* ones he appeals to in EPM.

The two parts of my discussion of *Perception* are:

- I. From feature-placing to aristotelian object-property metaphysics.
- II.
 - a) Structure of identity-in-and-through-difference exhibited by the structure in (I) cannot be accounted for by *separate* principles of identity and difference—paradigmatically, one supplied by subjective pole of intentional nexus, the other by the objective pole.
 - b) In fact, *both* subjective and objective have to have *both* principles articulating determinateness.
 - c) This is the first glimpse we get of the difference of form attaching to the conceptual content common to the two poles of the intentional nexus. They correspond to the two readings of “exclusive difference”: alethic modal on the objective side, and deontic normative on the subjective side.
 - d) The difference between them shows up in what is required to make sense of the possibility of *error*. That is what happens when the alethic modal and deontic normative sense of “materially incompatible” come apart, or fail to track one another.
 - e) That tracking has both an alethic modal component, namely *tracking* of the alethic modal necessities by the deontic normative, and a deontic normative

component, namely normative *government* of...[Tell story from end of MEMRTA].