

Class 2 Notes:
Hegel's *Introduction*

1. Introduction makes 2 big moves:

- a) Critique of medium/instrument model of intrinsically intelligible representing and intrinsically unintelligible representeds. HIC on semantics/intentionality. Conceptual realism.
Q: today who on unboundedness of conceptual?. A: John and me. But: Myth of Given (Mito del Dato) presents dilemma here.

Decisive move in the conjuring trick is being made at the outset. (It is, in MoG form, discussed in next 3 chapters.). Idealism as conceptual realism.

Q: what is it to grasp or understand something (so, for it to be "intrinsically intelligible").
Descartes representational regress.

- b) Experience of error of source, *to* consciousness, of distinction between appearance and reality (what things are for consciousness and what they are in themselves).
This is the practical origin of the "distinction that consciousness essentially involves."
Origin of Dewey's pragmatism.

2. For discussion of conceptual realism:

- a) Argument against instrument/medium model of knowledge.

Focus is on the process that produces representings (appearances) from representeds (realities). Representings not identical to representeds. Rebecca West on "mind as the mirror of nature": Why would you want a copy? "One of the damn things is enough."
Cf. map of U.S. at 1-1 scale.

Q1: But, given that they are *different*, what is the difference between representings and representeds that *makes* the difference, as far as the criticism of instrument/medium picture is concerned?

A: Their status as conceptually articulated, where that stands in for intrinsically intelligible (representings) vs. not intrinsically intelligible (representeds).

After Kant, this distinction is put in terms of the *conceptual articulation* of what is intrinsically intelligible.

To think of it otherwise is the *Myth of the Given*. (In Italian: "il Mito del Dato").

His objection is to a notion of cognitive processing that involves crossing *this* boundary.

Q2: Why should we think of representings ("ideas") as intrinsically intelligible (hence, conceptually structured)?

A: Descartes's regress argument: if anything is to be intelligible as known representationally (i.e. by the mediation of representings), something (some representings) must be knowable *nonrepresentationally* (i.e. *immediately*).

The argument is against any representational theory that excavates a *gulf of intelligibility* between represented reality and representing appearance.

- b) The argument is that any such theory builds into its semantics (or theory of content, or of intentionality) the impossibility of genuine knowledge: things being for consciousness what they are in themselves. The Genuine Knowledge Condition. Kant an example.
- c) Q3: Why? Why can't knowledge that is conceptually structured by knowledge *of* what is not conceptually structured?

A: Because the picture is one where what there really is is not as such intelligible. It can only be (representationally) *related to* something that *is* intelligible. It is at most represented by something intelligible. But then what is intelligible is not what is real. And we can't work backwards, subtracting the intelligibility. The other end of the representation relation is something we can't understand.

Argument is that the *relation* between intelligible and unintelligible must itself be unintelligible on such an account.

- d) The **Trinominals**: Edwin Bissell Holt, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Roy Wood Sellars, George Herbert Meade. They're in the academic generation after C.I. Lewis, and before Quine and Goodman. From the turn of the century through the '30s, a core group of professional philosophers, mostly out of Harvard, who were not pragmatists (Meade a Peircean) nor the rival, rising positivists. Perception is their core topic. Representational vs realism. Direct realism (problem with explaining error) and representationalism (problem with explaining knowledge). But: representational realists, and critical realists (Roy Wood Sellars).

Compare: contemporary representationalists (Michael Tye, Gil Harman) and debate about conceptual vs. nonconceptual content, and their relations.

- e) Related issue: World of facts vs. world of objects. Is the "reistic" world (just of nameables: Kotarbinski) so much as intelligible?

Cf. David Lewis everything (singular term, predicate, sortal term) is a term in a Ramsified sentence that must be interpreted on a world consisting exclusively of mereological sums of ultimate particles. But he also has "intrinsic" properties.

3. Criterion of adequacy: Our *semantic* account (e.g. of representation) must not *rule out* the possibility or intelligibility of *genuine knowledge*.

4. Conclusion of argument: we must understand the world as it is independently of our cognitive activities ("what it is in itself") to be always already in conceptual shape. This is the "unboundedness of the conceptual" from *Mind and World*. Problem: John won't offer a *theory* of "the conceptual."

5. How I think it works for Hegel, by the end of the *Consciousness* section: bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism.

- a) First idea, inspired by Kant, is a non-psychological conception of the conceptual. To be conceptually articulated is to be articulated by relations of material incompatibility ("determinate negation") and consequence ("mediation").
- b) This definition is non-psychological because it does not make essential reference to our cognitive activities or capacities. In this sense, there would be conceptually articulated

objective states of affairs and properties even if there never had been knowers and agents. For *laws of nature* in Newton's and Kant's sense codify necessary exclusions and inclusions, incompatibilities and consequences among such states of affairs and properties.

6. Kant makes a crucial move kicking off idealism: care about knowledge, not truth. (What is the uniquely Kantian theory of *truth* in the first Critique?) But he pairs this with semantic insight: decisive move in conjuring trick of skepticism is already semantic, before epistemological. Refutation of Idealism is culmination of a line of thought that says that if we understand properly what it is for states to represent in the sense of even *purporting* to be representings of representeds, that issues of epistemological skepticism will not arise.

H treats theory of truth and of representation as two sides of one coin. Truth not as correspondence nor as coherence. We've come to see those turn-of-the-19th-into-the-20th century stories as semantic theories, i.e. theories of content. Distinction between internal and external relations (ladder example), (version of essential/accidental properties without Aristotelian insights into substances), and Quine: "Meaning is what essence becomes, when it is detached from the thing and attached to the word."

H: Truth as vast Bacchanalian revel.

Two sides to story: conceptual realism and process that is experience of error. These must be reconciled.

7. Two levels: shapes of consciousness and det concepts. The text clearly seems to start off with the treatment of ordinary knowledge. The Kantian notion of cognitive faculties as instruments or media suggests this. But by the end, "shapes of consciousness" are clearly being discussed. I take such "shapes" to be substructures of Geist, corresponding to structures of what cognitive consciousness is for consciousness, what normativity and normative self-hood is for consciousness, and what rational agency is for consciousness. Each of these also corresponds, then, to structures of what cognitive consciousness, normativity and self-hood, and rational agency are *in* themselves, even though in no case (until the final one) do these coincide with what those aspects of Geist are *for* consciousness.

8. From Preface:

Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist **any more than determinate thoughts do**, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent.

In the *whole* of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that *recollects* itself, whose existence is self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence. [47]

9. Truth...includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True...

Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself, and constitutes actuality and the movement of the life of truth. [47]

The True is thus a Bacchanalian revel, with not a member sober; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. t