

## Introduction Notes

Russell and Moore read Kant and Hegel out of the philosophical tradition. We were to move directly from Leibniz to Mill, and then to Frege, without a detour through the ox-bow of German Idealism.

Their objection was to Hegel, as they saw him through the lens of British Absolute Idealism.

They took it that the idealist rot set in already with Kant, though.

They saw that they couldn't open the door wide enough to let Kant in, and shut it quickly enough to keep Hegel out.

They have turned out to be right. A few academic generations after the revival of interest in Kant in Anglophone circles, pushed by Rawls on the practical side and Strawson on the theoretical side, there is renewed interest in Hegel. He is just too interesting a reader of Kant to be ignored, if we are going to take Kant seriously.

But why should be interested in either one?

I read Hegel the way Hegel read Kant.

Here is how my Hegel read Kant:

Start with Kant's 6 biggest ideas:

1. **Normative** conception of

a) intentionality (get TUA as rational unity, primacy of judgement here.) and

b) representation (that- and of-intentionality).

What we are responsible for (judgement), who is responsible ("I think", subjective form of judgement), what we are responsible to (object=x, objective form of judgement).

Hegel adds *social* theory of normativity.

2. An idea about what one must *do* in order thereby to count as taking *responsibility* for commitments, both cognitive and practical. One must synthesize them into TUA as rational unity. Ampliative, justificatory, and critical task-responsibilities.

This is the basis for Hegel's concept of experience [Erfahrung].

3. **Pragmatist functionalism** about the relation between discursive (synthetic) *activity* and conceptual *content*. Concepts are "functions of judgement" in the sense of roles w/res to *judging*.

Hegel, too, has a pragmatist functionalism about conceptual content.

4. **Categorical metaconcepts.** Besides concepts whose job it is to describe and explain empirical goings-on, there are concepts whose distinctive expressive task it is to make explicit features of the framework that makes possible describing and explaining (which will show up as inseparable: Kant-Sellars thesis about modality). The generic concept of necessity [Notwendigkeit], with natural and practical species is a special feature of this (that Hegel will make much of).

Hegel adds: They (including normativity) have a *history*.

5. **Autonomy.** Freedom as constraint by norms. Genuinely *normative* constraint is constraint one has laid on *oneself*, rules one has bound oneself by. One is really only committed to what one commits oneself to. The BKNS as a way of making sense of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. Kant has a crucial *social* dimension, in *respect* for the *dignity* (authority) of others.

Hegel moves from individual *autonomy* to social *recognition*.

6. Making explicit commitments that are inexplicably acting intentionally (and judging) is a special kind of self-consciousness. Can underwrite *moral* commitments as having been all along implicit in what one is doing in *acting intentionally*. Korsgard on morality. Hegel on making implicit explicit (=expression) as form of self-consciousness.

Note that: transcendental idealism, synthetic truths a priori, and the categorical imperative don't make my list. They are downstream, explanatorily late-coming, optional ways of working out some of the core ideas. They don't even make the top 6.

Can use (1) to introduce the topic of Geist. Recognition.

(2) introduces process of experience as determining conceptual content, both contribution of mediation (becoming visible retrospectively) and immediacy (the source of disruption, showing up prospectively).

(3) introduces both traditional/modern development and my 2-level readings of phenomenological recollection: development of determinate concepts and development of categorial metaconcept.

(4) introduces idea of semantics with an edifying intent. Age of Trust. Receiving heroic conception of agency, in which what happens is turned into something done.

Might then talk about how I see structure of the PhG (Religion passage.):

Empirical cognition,

Normativity, Self-conscious selves, community.

Intentional Agency

Spirit as a whole, and its history.

Bloom: Every strong reading is a rewriting.

Pope..(Alfonso, 1100s?): If God had consulted me before creating the universe, I could have given him some useful advice.