

Some Quotations and References from Week One:

Kant:

“I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give of judgment in general. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between two concepts...

(W)hat is defective in this interpretation...(is) that it applies only to categorical, not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (the two latter containing a relation not of concepts but of judgments), an oversight from which many troublesome consequences have followed.”

[CPR B140-1]

Kant sees that in the traditional theory, the notion of predication is being asked to do two incompatible jobs. On the one hand, it serves semantically as a structural way of building up new judgeable contents. On the other hand, it is thought of pragmatically as a kind of doing that has the force or practical significance of endorsing such contents.

Frege on ampliativity:

“[Kant] seems to think of concepts as defined by giving a simple list of characteristics in no special order; but of all ways of forming concepts, that is one of the least fruitful.

If we look through the definitions given in the course of this book, we shall scarcely find one that is of this description.

The same is true of the really fruitful definitions in mathematics, such as that of the continuity of a function.

What we find in these is not a simple list of characteristics; every element is intimately, I might almost say organically, connected with the others...

If we represent the concepts (or their extensions) by figures or areas in a plane, then the concept defined by a simple list of characteristics corresponds to the area common to all the areas representing the defining characteristics; it is enclosed by segments of their boundary lines.

With a definition like this ...we...use the lines already given in a new way for demarcating an area.

Nothing essentially new, however, emerges in the process.

But the more fruitful type of definition is a matter of drawing boundary lines that were not previously given at all.

What we shall be able to infer from it, cannot be inspected in advance; here we are not simply taking out of the box again what we have just put into it.

The conclusions we draw from it extend our knowledge, and ought therefore, on Kant's view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be proved by purely logical means, and are thus analytic.”

[GL §88.]

Locus classicus for the “Frege-Geach point” enforcing the force/content distinction is Geach’s gemlike article “Ascriptivism.”

[*Philosophical Review* , Apr., 1960, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 221-225.]

(Link to full text on course website.)

The radical rejection of Frege’s force/content [*Kraft/Inhalt*] distinction is championed by both Pitt Ph.D. Irad Kimhi, in *Thinking and Being* [2018] and former Pitt post-doc and then tenured faculty member here, Sebastian Rödl, in *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity* [2018].