

In an article ('Über Sinn und Bedeutung') I distinguished between sense and *Bedeutung* in the first instance only for the case of proper names (or, if one prefers, singular terms). The same distinction can also be drawn for concept words. Now it is easy to become unclear about this by **confounding the division into concepts and objects with the distinction between sense and *Bedeutung*, so that we run together sense and concept on the one hand and *Bedeutung* and object on the other.** [CUSB 172]

The *Bedeutung* of a proper name is the object it designates or names. A concept word stands for [*bedeutet*] a concept, if the word is used as is appropriate for logic. I may clarify this by drawing attention to a fact that seems to weigh heavily on the side of extensionalist as against intensionalist logicians: namely, that **in any sentence we can substitute *salva veritate* one concept word for another if they have the same extension, so that it is also the case that in relation to inference, and where the laws of logic are concerned, concepts differ only in so far as their extensions are different.** The fundamental logical relation is that of an object's falling under a concept: all relations between concepts can be reduced to this. If an object falls under a concept, it falls under all concepts with the same extension, and this implies what we said above. **Therefore just as proper names can replace one another *salva veritate*, so too can concept words, if their extension is the same. Of course the thought will alter when such replacements are made, I but this is the sense of the sentence, not its *Bedeutung*.** The *Bedeutung*, which is the truth-value, remains the same. [CUSB 173]

We say that an object *a* is equal to an object *b* (in the sense of completely coinciding with it) if *a* falls under every concept under which *b* falls, and conversely. We obtain something corresponding to this for concepts if we switch the roles of concept and object. We could then say that the relation we had in mind above holds between the concept Φ and the concept *X*, if every object that falls under Φ also falls under *X*, and conversely. [CUSB 175-6]

Indeed we should really outlaw the expression 'the *Bedeutung* of the concept word *A*', because the definite article before '*Bedeutung*' points to an object and belies the predicative nature of a concept. It would be better to confine ourselves to saying 'what the concept word *A* stands for [*bedeutet*]', for this at any rate is to be used predicatively: 'Jesus is, what **the concept word "man" stands for [*bedeutet*]' in the sense of 'Jesus is a man'. [CUSB 177]**

[L]ogic is not concerned with how thoughts, regardless of truth-value, follow from thoughts, that the step from thought to truth-value - more generally, the step from sense to *Bedeutung* - has to be taken. They forget that the laws of logic are first and foremost laws in the realm of *Bedeutungen* and only relate indirectly to sense. If it is a question of the truth of something - and

truth is the goal of logic - we also have to inquire after *Bedeutungen*; we have to throw aside proper names that do not designate or name an object, though they may have a sense; we have to throw aside concept words that do not have a *Bedeutung*. [CUSB 178]

A proper name must at least have a sense (as I use the word); otherwise it would be an empty sequence of sounds and it would be wrong to call it a name. But if it is to have a use in science we must require that it have a *Bedeutung* too, that it designates or names an object.

Thus it is via a sense, and only via a sense, that a proper name is related to an object.

[CUSB 180]

Logic must demand not only of proper names but of concept words as well that **the step from the word to the sense and from the sense to the *Bedeutung* be determinate beyond any doubt.** Otherwise we should not be entitled to speak of a *Bedeutung* at all. Of course this holds for all signs and combinations of signs with the same function as proper names or concept words.

[CUSB 180]